Back to Index

This article participates on the following special index pages:

Power dynamics in Zimbabwe's inclusive government
Derek Matyszak, Research and Advocacy Unit Zimbabwe
September 15, 2009

Download this document
- Word97 version (217KB)
- Acrobat PDF version (172KB)
If you do not have the free Acrobat reader on your computer, download it from the Adobe website by clicking here.

Introduction

The elections of March 2008 yielded an astounding victory for Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change opposition parties. For the first time the ruling ZANU PF party lost its majority in parliament - by a single seat to the MDC formation led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and 11 seats if combined with those held by the formation of the MDC led by Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M). Tsvangirai garnered over 4% more of the votes than Mugabe in the presidential poll, but (officially) short of the 50% plus one to prevent a run-off. In the build up to this run-off poll, security forces and militia loyal to Mugabe launched an intimidatory campaign of such violence that Tsvangirai was forced to withdraw from the poll, unable to ensure that his supporters would be able to vote or that the polls would be monitored. The MDC-T's records indicate that over 500 people were murdered during this campaign. Brutal beatings, rapes, the burning of homesteads and massive displacement of voters from their constituencies rendered the process an electoral farce. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission ignored this violence and declared Mugabe the winner of the poll with an 85% majority, announcing polling statistics and return numbers which were clearly phantasmagorical. Not even Mugabe's allies in the regional SADC block were prepared to recognise his election as legitimate. With Mugabe firmly in control of the army, but the clear loser of the 2008 elections and thus with no democratic legitimacy, a political impasse developed.

Under the auspices of South Africa's president Thabo Mbeki, talks began between the main protagonists to attempt to resolve the deadlock. Tsvangirai was in a strong negotiating position. ZANU PF had clearly lost popular support. And Thabo Mbeki, the most influential SADC player in the process, was desperate to resolve the long running Zimbabwean crisis. Millions of Zimbabwean refugees who had poured across the border into South Africa to escape the consequences of Zimbabwe's economic meltdown, were placing service delivery in poorer areas - an accepted Achilles heel of the Mbeki administration - under increased pressureand a global economic slowdown had resulted in increased competition for jobs and consequent antagonism towards immigrants. Mbeki's own position as president was under threat on account of internal politics within his ANC party. He desperately wanted to resolve the Zimbabwe crisis and present a major foreign policy success to deflect criticism from his governance and growing pressure for his resignation. Furthermore, Mbeki and SADC could not allow the possibility of a formal take over by the Zimbabwean military or for Zimbabwe to become a failed state - particularly in light of the fact that Southern Africa was trying to market itself as a tourist destination ahead of the 2010 FIFA World cup.

Mugabe too was under considerable pressure. The refusal of SADC to recognise the presidential run-off meant that Mugabe faced a crisis of legitimacy vis-à-vis his own allies. It was also clear that Mugabe's ability to finance his ZANU PF party and his government, and more importantly the ability to pay the army and police force through the printing of cash could not last much longer. No matter how large the denomination of notes or quantity printed, given the rate of inflation, it was a matter of months before none would be willing to exchange Zimbabwe dollars for hard currency. Most significant commercial transactions were already being conducted in foreign currency - despite the fact that these transactions were technically illegal. With the effective dollarisation of the economy the Zimbabwe dollar was soon to become completely worthless.

For MDC-T supporters therefore, the sole question was how the transition of power was to take place. Tsvangirai, interviewed by South Africa's eTV, firmly declared that the on-going post June 2008 electoral talks were not about power-sharing or the formation of a Kenyan style government of national unity (GNU) but about a transitional government and return to democracy, with the MDC in charge and leading to fresh elections. Despite this pronouncement, the discourse in fact quickly morphed into discussions about a GNU and "power sharing". This was to be the first of numerous positions which Tsvangirai declared non-negotiable and from which he would subsequently retreat.

Despite the powerful negotiating position that had been occupied by Tsvangirai, the "global political agreement" (GPA), which emerged left Mugabe's extensive powers almost untouched. Although it was referred to as a power sharing agreement (and not an agreement to establish a transitional government) there was very little "sharing" of power with the MDC formations.

Download full document

Visit the Research and Advocacy Unit fact sheet

Please credit www.kubatana.net if you make use of material from this website. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License unless stated otherwise.

TOP