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Government obstructs humanitarian access to displaced as new evictions loom
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
May 05, 2006

http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountrySummaries)

In May 2005, the Zimbabwean government initiated an extraordinary campaign of forced evictions and demolitions resulting in the internal displacement of an estimated 570,000 people, many of whom remain in transit camps and have limited access to assistance. The campaign, known as Operation Murambatsivina, or Operation Restore Order, targeted informal settlements and business structures in urban areas throughout the country. Providing little if any notice of impending evictions, Operation Murambatsvina was characterised by extreme violence and brutality – twenty thousand vendors were reportedly arrested, and through bulldozing, smashing and burning, homes were first destroyed in shanty towns in high-density suburbs and subsequently the operation was extended to settlements on farms in peri-urban and rural areas. More than 52 sites across Zimbabwe were affected by the operation. The motivations behind the devastating operation remains unclear – while the government maintains the operation intended to ‘clean up’ urban areas, a number of other explanations have surfaced, including that the operation was aimed as retribution against those who voted for the opposition, or that it was initiated over general concern over chaos and congestion in the cities or to deter a popular uprising and force people to move to rural areas. Whatever the reasoning, the operation in itself violated the fundamental human rights of those affected and exposed those displaced to further abuses. While the operation targeted supposed illegal structures, many of those displaced held valid legal title to their homes or businesses.

The Zimbabwean government continues to deliberately obstruct humanitarian agencies working in the country and continues to threaten urban dwellers and entrepreneurs with renewed evictions. Zimbabwe is characterised as a complex humanitarian situation; 24.6 per cent of Zimbabweans are estimated to be infected with HIV and there are 1.3 million orphans. Set against the backdrop of economic collapse, with an unemployment rate of 80 per cent, a political crisis, a failed land reform process that had already caused large-scale displacement, and an acute housing shortage, Operation Murambatsvina only served to exacerbate the vulnerability of the Zimbabwean population. The UN estimates that 2.4 million people, equalling 18 per cent of the population, were directly or indirectly affected by the operation. While many top UN officials and western governments condemned the operation, the silence from African leaders and governments and African regional organisations such as the African Union, continues to be a major impediment to a genuine recognition by the Zimbabwean government of the severity of the situation and the humanitarian needs.

Background
Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has been governed by the Zimbabwe National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party, led by current President Robert Mugabe. After independence, while the Government provided better education and health care, as well as higher wages and improved work conditions to the black majority, a number of political and economic issues were not sincerely dealt with. Most importantly, the question of land ownership was not addressed, as white ownership of the most fertile land continued post-independence as a result of the independence settlement, known as the Lancaster House Agreement, which in effect maintained the pattern of colonial settlements. The Agreement included a willing-seller willing-buyer policy, but Zimbabweans and their government lacked funds to purchase white-owned commercial farms. Despite pledges from international donors to assist Zimbabwe in buying commercial farms, many donors never honoured their funding promises (UN, July 2005, p.15).

At the time of independence, a total of 15.5 million hectares of land remained in the hands of farmers of European descent, and only 3.5 million hectares of this land was redistributed between 1980 and 1997. In June 1998, the government set a target for Phase II of its land-reform programme to redistribute an additional 5 million hectares of land within six years. Spontaneous land invasions of commercial farms by peasants also began in 1998, some of which turned violent in certain parts of the country. In 2000, only about 3 per cent of the target set in 1998 had been reached. As pressure on the government mounted, and land invasions continued, in mid-2000 the government embarked on a “fast track” land programme aimed at distributing 9 million hectares before 2001 by radically expanding the list of land to be acquired from white farmers (UNDP, January 2002, p. 4-7).

The accelerated land reform process has been deeply politicised as commercial farmers and their farm workers have been considered supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition group. While many farm workers did support the MDC, a sizeable minority held no political affiliation. Often farm occupations were led by groups of militant “war veterans” from the independence struggle in the 1970s. These war veterans, along with ZANU-PF militias carried out invasions not only on farms listed for acquisition, but also several hundred non-listed farms (HRW, March 2002, p.17).

Displacement caused by land reform
Reports of farm workers being displaced as a result of Zimbabwe’s land reform process started to emerge during the first half of 2002, with stories of farm workers being brutally forced to leave farms and seek shelter in makeshift camps, in the bush or travel to urban areas. Serious acts of violence against farm owners and farm workers have also been widely documented (Amani Trust, 31 May 2002; BBC 11 July 2002; HRW, March 2002).

Despite the official end of the fast track land programme, white owned farms continued to be listed for compulsory acquisition. Farm evictions continued to be reported in 2003, and in some cases farmers were reportedly attacked by settlers or gangs (AFP, 28 August 2003). In July 2004, Refugees International reported that due to economic disruption and political harassment, 150,000 former farm workers had become internally displaced (RI, 23 July 2004). In 2004 the government also reported that less than one percent of former farm workers had been resettled as part of the fast-track land programme, with the majority migrating to urban settlements or rural communal areas (IRIN, 6 February 2004). As a result of displacement caused by farm worker eviction, Zimbabwe saw an increase in its urban population as well an increased informal economy, two elements which led to the government’s most recent forcible eviction, Operation Murambatsvina, commonly referred to as Operation Restore Order.

Economic collapse and political crisis
The dire economic situation in Zimbabwe is a key factor compounding the humanitarian situation in the country. In January 2004, inflation hit a record 623 per cent and is currently estimated at 613 per cent (Mail and Guardian, 19 April 2006). The current economic situation is characterised by a large fiscal deficit, low economic performance, high unemployment and lack of foreign currency. Measures imposed by the post-independence Economic Structural Adjustment Period (ESAP) in the 1990s led to reductions in skilled and unskilled labour, the closure of many manufacturing industries, prices increases and the deterioration of social services. All of these factors combined, including the liberalisation of the economy, resulted in the decline of the formal and growth in the informal sector, especially in the towns and cities of Zimbabwe. In June 2005 the International Labour Organisation reported that the majority of Zimbabweans earned their living in the informal sector (UN, July 2005, p. 16-17). While the overall population growth in Zimbabwe is reported to be 1-2 per cent annually in the last decade, the urban growth is 4-5 per cent. Formal unemployment is estimated at 80 per cent (UNOCHA, 30 November 2005, p. 9).

A number of political issues also impacted on the decline of the economy and the resulting humanitarian situation. Since it came to power in 1980, the ZANU-PF government has displayed an often violent intolerance towards political opposition. In the 1980s the government led a brutal military campaign in Matabeleland aimed at wiping out the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union (PF-ZAPU) which resulted in the deaths of some 20,000 people (UN, July 2005, p.15; HRF, June 2005, p.6). Election periods also saw an increase in politically motivated violence and harassment, and in the 1990s after the MDC emerged as formidable challenger to the government, large-scale land invasions of commercial farms were orchestrated by the ruling party (HRF, June 2005, p.6). As a result of increased migration to towns and cities from commercial farms suspected of supporting the MDC, urban areas became known as opposition strongholds and have been viewed by the government with suspicion (UN, July 2005, p.19).

The severe economic climate and increased population in Zimbabwe’s cities presented a need for adequate, legal and affordable housing for low-income households in urban and peri-urban environments, a need which largely went unfulfilled. Thus many urban dwellers were forced to build makeshift shelters or sleep in other people’s homes, often in overly congested areas. In addition, informal housing settlements have been created in a number of locations throughout Zimbabwe, at times with implicit approval from government officials. Often these informal settlements took the form of backyard extensions of legal dwellings. Such forms of housing greatly expanded both as a form of affordable rentals and as providing a source of income in a time of extreme economic scarcity (HRF, June 2005, p.6; UN, July 2005, p.25). The lack of housing is also evident as the government estimates the urban housing backlog to be 1 million housing units (UNOCHA, 30 November 2005, p.9).

In the context of a severe housing shortage, a rising urban population, economic collapse and a political climate characterised by violence and intimidation, Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order exacerbated a worsening humanitarian situation with especially grave social and economic consequences for Zimbabwe’s most vulnerable populations.

Operation Murmbatsvina
On 25 May 2005, the government of Zimbabwe launched Operation Murambatsvina, a nationwide campaign of forcible evictions and demolitions in urban areas. The official government translation of Operation Murambatsvina is Operation Restore Order, although in the Shona language murambatsvina literally translates to “clean the filth or dirt”. Prior to the launch of the operation on 19 May 2005, a municipal representative in Harare announced that an operation was underway in Zimbabwe to “enforce bylaws and stop illegal activity”. Five days later, the City of Harare issued a notice saying that all those that had erected illegal structures should demolish them by 20 June 2005, while no such warning appeared in any of the other cities where Operation Restore Order was implemented. On 25 May, only a few days after the notice was posted, a mass military-style operation began in Harare, Bulawayo, and other cities throughout the country. The operation began with the near total destruction of vendors’ markets, flea markets, other informal market premises and alleged illegal housing structures. Within a week of the operation, twenty thousand vendors were reportedly arrested, and through bulldozing, smashing and burning, homes were first destroyed in so-called shanty towns in high-density suburbs and subsequently the operation was extended to settlements on farms in peri-urban and rural areas. More than 52 sites across Zimbabwe were affected by the operation (UN, July 2005, p. 12; HRW, December 2005, p.10).

Municipal police implemented many of these operations, and the army was also deployed to deter any resistance to the operation. The operation was characterised by extreme violence, owners of structures on a number of occasions were forced to assist in the demolishment of their own homes. Informal structures were not the only buildings destroyed; in Hatcliffe, a squatter camp north of Harare, the police destroyed not only informal structures but also a Catholic centre for AIDS orphans, a secondary school, a World Bank funded lavatory and a mosque. The police beat those who resisted, and one local rights organisation reported that the government publicly stated that resistance to the operation would not be tolerated. As many were unable to return to their homes, large numbers of people camped outdoors alongside major roads, moved to transit camps such as Caledonia Farm, returned to rural areas, or became constantly mobile sleeping in parks or other open spaces (HRF, June 2005, p.8,11; UN, July 2005, p.34). During the operation six deaths were reported, including a child being hit by a truck and a child and sick women hit by falling debris (UN, July 2005, p.62, 35; AI, 30 June 2005).

Many of those either living or working in the structures that were destroyed held valid leases. While many displaced may have also not had valid leases, it is clear that the operation did not comply with relevant domestic law regarding land ownership (UN, July 2005, p. 58-59).

The government has given a number of justifications for the operation, including controlling chaotic urbanisation, and in particular its health consequences, preventing illegal market transactions including trading in foreign currency and reversing environmental degradation caused by urban agricultural practices. A number of possible motivations have also emerged, including that the operation was retribution against those who voted for the opposition during the last few presidential and parliamentary elections, that the operation was a result of general concern over chaos and congestion in Zimbabwe’s cities, that the operation is related to the politics of succession to President Mugabe, that the operation was designed to deter a popular uprising and that the government has an expressed interest in forcing people to live in rural areas (UN, July 2005, pg. 20; HRF, June 2005, p.17).

Official government figures released in July 2005 indicate that 92,460 housing structures had been directly demolished affecting 133,534 households and that 32,538 small, micro and medium sized enterprises were also destroyed. Using these figures, the UN estimates that 569,685 people have lost their homes. Adding those who those who lost their businesses or other forms of livelihood, the UN further estimates that 650,000 to 700,000 people were directly affected by the operation. In addition, many Zimbabweans’ were also indirectly affected, i.e. due to the loss of rental income or the disruption of income earned through the informal economy. The UN fact-finding mission led by UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe, Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, estimated that 2.4 million people, or 18% of the population, were directly or indirectly affected by the operation, virtually eliminating the informal sector in Zimbabwe. (UN, July 2005, p.34).

Humanitarian situation
Zimbabwe is described by a number of UN agencies as a “complex humanitarian situation”, with Operation Murambatsvina and continued forced displacement only being one cause among many. Zimbabwe is reeling from the HIV/AIDS epidemic, with 24.6 per cent of Zimbabweans estimated to be infected with the virus. In 2003 it was estimated that there are 1.3 million orphans in Zimbabwe, 75% of which have been orphaned by AIDS. In 2005-2006, at least three million people will require food assistance, and 30% of the water systems in rural areas are non-functional (UNICEF, 2006, p.95; UNOCHA, 30 November 2005, p.1). Thus Operation Murambatsvina worsened the basic living conditions of an already vulnerable population. In addition, the affects of the operation on orphans, those living with HIV/AIDs and female-headed households remain especially acute (UN, July 2005, p.39; HRW, December 2005, p.24; ActionAid, November 2005).

The Zimbabwean government has deliberately blocked the provision of humanitarian assistance to displaced persons. It has refused to allow international agencies to provide tents to those requiring shelter, apparently fearing that the usage of tents would expose the scale of the crisis. In August 2005, after a number of international agencies erected tents for displaced persons in one area of Zimbabwe, Headlands, police took down the tents and instructed the UN country team that any tents or plastic sheeting would not be tolerated. The government has also prevented food aid from being distributed to those displaced by the evictions (HRW, December 2005, p.21). General humanitarian access to internally displaced persons remains inadequate and inconsistent and on many cases has been denied (UNOCHA, 30 November 2005, p.6; HRW, December 2005, p.5; UN, July 2005, p. 53). Most recently, the government restricted one international agency to feeding only vulnerable groups in Hopley Farm, a transit camp for IDPs that contains approximately 1,300 people. In January 2006, the World Food Programme reportedly stopped distributing food in the camp due to reports of politicisation of relief aid (ZimOnline, 6 April 2006).

Threats and reports of actual incidences of new forcible displacement continue – in late March 2006 the City of Harare warned it would tear down illegal structures built since Operation Murambatsvina began in May 2005 (UNOCHA, 31 March 2006). However, officials from Harare resident associations said City Council officials had already begun evicting residents from uncompleted housing structures (IRIN, 7 April 2006).

National response
During the mission of the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe in June 2005, the government launched Operation Garikai (meaning reconstruction/resettlement) as a reconstruction effort. The operation includes the construction of housing and market stalls and will require $300 million, as estimated by the government, an expenditure not included in the 2005 national budget (UN, July 2005, p.47). It remains unclear how far Operation Garikai has gone to improve the situation of the displaced. Indeed, in a number of reconstruction sites surveyed, it was confirmed that the number of houses built does not match the need for new housing for the hundreds of thousands of people displaced. In addition, most IDPs will remain ineligible to receive assistance via Operation Garikai as families must show proof of formal employment, earn a specified salary, be on a municipal housing waiting list, and be able to afford an initial deposit and monthly instalments. One concern, recently reflected by Human Rights Watch, is that benefits under Operation Garikai will most likely go to members of the government, including the army and police (HRW, December 2005, p.19).

International response
Much of the international attention on Zimbabwe’s forcible evictions stem from the visit and following report of the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe in June 2005. The Special Envoy exposed the crisis in Zimbabwe in a profound and detailed manner, and briefed the UN Security Council on her findings despite attempts by China to stop such a briefing from taking place (ICG, 17 August 2005, p.18).

Following the Special Envoy’s visit, the UN has not conducted a country-wide needs assessment. The absence of reliable information poses an obstacle to effective humanitarian programming and planning. In December 2005 the UN launched a $270 million appeal for humanitarian aid in Zimbabwe, only after UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appealed to the Zimbabwean government to accept UN relief, which it had initially rejected (UN, 31 October 2005; HRW, December 2005, 22; ICG, August 2005, p. 16).

Many top UN officials have spoken out about the internal displacement situation in Zimbabwe, including the UN Secretary-General, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs, and a group Special Procedure mandate holders of the UN Commission on Human Rights, including the Special Rapportuer on Adequate Housing (UN, 29 July 2005; UN 24 June 2005; UN, 31 October 2005). The UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, also visited the country in December 2005 and stated that Zimbabwe is in “meltdown” (BBC, 8 December 2005). While the UN does have plans to enhance its humanitarian operations on the ground in Zimbabwe, it is clear that a stronger humanitarian and human rights strategy on behalf of the UN country team is necessary to both effectively respond to the IDP situation and ensure that the Zimbabwean government honors its international obligations to protect its population.

While many western leaders and institutions, including the EU, have spoken out about the humanitarian and human rights crisis caused by Operation Murambatsvina, the general silence and lack of action of African leaders and African inter-governmental organisations remains deplorable. In July 2005, Zimbabwe’s most powerful and influential neighbour, South Africa, extended credit to Zimbabwe to allow it to meet its obligations to the International Monetary Fund, however South Africa has yet to publicly condemn the continued forcible evictions nor has it used its leverage to influence regional bodies, such as the South African Development Community (SADC) or the African Union to sincerely address the situation (ICG, 17 August 2005, p. 13-14). At the end of 2005, after an intensive lobby effort by international and Zimbabwean civil society groups, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) did pass a resolution on Zimbabwe which took note of the internal displacement situation and called on the Zimbabwean government to implement the recommendations in the UN Special Envoy’s report (ZLHR, 4 January 2006). However, at its most recent summit held in early 2006 in Khartoum the African Union declined to take up the ACHPR resolution. If the silence of Africa’s leaders and institutions continues, it is unlikely that the Zimbabwean government will see any reason to stop evictions and genuinely respond to the massive internal displacement situation that it has created.

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