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Effects of party-state on democracy and human rights: The case of Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Catholic Bishop's Conference (ZCBC)
May 30, 2008

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Executive summary

Introduction

On 29 March 2008, Zimbabwe conducted what are arguably historic elections in several senses. First, it was the first time that Zimbabwe simultaneously held four elections to elect the President, 210 members of the House of Assembly, 60 Senators and nearly 2 000 local government councillors. Second, is that the four-tier elections were all held on one day rather than over several days as was the previous tradition. Third was that they were being held in the context of a SADC-mediated negotiation process between the then ruling ZANU-PF party and the then opposition MDC party. Some of the fruits of the negotiations included agreement to "harmonize" all elections and more significantly, to make some important but modest changes to the electoral and political playing field. Lastly was that the pre-election campaign period was the most peaceful (even carnival) since the beginning of the multi-layered Zimbabwe crisis in 2000.

Framework for analysis

In reviewing the 29 March elections, we do so against the background of the 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. We also note that the Electoral Act governing elections in Zimbabwe also provides for general principles guiding democratic elections. The African Union also has similar guidelines and principles.

We found it useful to approach the task by elaborating on the framework the CCJP first applied for our Report on the March 2005 parliamentary elections. This refers to the perspective that sees post-independence Zimbabwe as incrementally moving towards the construction of a party-state whereby the ruling ZANU-PF party imperceptibly merged with the structures of the state. The party and the state increasingly became indistinguishable and resources of the state (i.e. public resources) were taken to be resources of the ruling party. State institutions - including electoral and security institutions - became integral parts of the party-state.

We also found it useful to observe that Zimbabwe, given the depth, scope and longevity of the crisis and some of its violent manifestations, was in many senses similar to conflict situations in other parts of the world. The very existence of a SADC-brokered mediation process at the time attests to the existence of conflict that needed to be resolved. It could then be argued that Zimbabwe was not really ripe for elections and that the mediation efforts should have been exhausted, concluded and the conditions created for elections before holding them. The developments that happened after 29 March lend credence to this line of argument.

The socio-economic context

Zimbabwe went to the polls in the midst of an unprecedented economic meltdown signified by a 364% inflation rate in March 2008, the highest inflation rate in the world; to put this into proper perspective, the next highest inflation rate was 53% for war-torn Iraq. The purchasing power of the average Zimbabwean has fallen to levels last seen in the early 1950s and according to some economists, Zimbabwe's gross domestic product declined by over 43% between 2000 and 2007. Agriculture is on its knees, largely a consequence of the fast-track land reform programme hastily and chaotically implemented since 2000 and which played havoc with commercial agriculture. The manufacturing sector has shrunk by more than 47% between 1998 and 2006, the same output figures as in 1972. In June 2007 the Government announced and implemented the populist Operation Reduce Prices whereby retailers were to slash their commodity prices by 50% and in the six months that followed, manufacturing output fell by more than 50% and some firms were forced to close down.

The informal economy has blossomed where the formal economy used to be. In 1980, the informal economy accounted for less than 10% of the labour force. This rose to 20% in 1986 and to an estimated 40% in 2004. In June 2005, nearly 3 million Zimbabweans earned their living through informal sector employment while the formal sector employed only about 1.3 million people.

The human cost of the economic crisis has been catastrophic. Millions have taken the exit option and estimates put the number of Zimbabweans - most of them professionals - in the Diaspora at about 3 million or a quarter of the population. The unemployment rate is over 80%, so is the poverty level, having doubled since mid-1990s. Zimbabweans have one of the lowest life expectancies in the world; life expectancy at birth is now 37 years for men and 34 years for women. In short, the social and economic situation in the pre-election period was dire and desperate.

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