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MDC preliminary report on March 2005 parliamentary elections
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
March 31, 2005

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Executive Summary
Periodic and genuine democratic elections are the cornerstone of any functioning democracy. Zimbabwe does have periodic elections but they are not democratic.

Whatever the outcome of the March 2005 parliamentary elections, the elections cannot be judged to be free and fair. The distorted nature of the pre-election playing field and the failure to address core democratic deficits precluded a free and fair election.

The MDC is participating in the elections under protest. We agreed to participate on the basis that the prevailing view amongst our structures and supporters on the ground was in favour of participation. The issue of our participation, however, does not confer legitimacy on the result.

If the MDC wins the elections, and secures a parliamentary majority, it will be a testament to the courage and determination of the people of Zimbabwe to overcome the nefarious obstacles deliberately placed by Mugabe and Zanu PF to frustrate their collective desire for a new beginning and a new Zimbabwe.

The electoral reforms introduced by the Zimbabwe Government were woefully inadequate and failed to ensure that Zimbabwe’s electoral framework and political environment adhered to the new democratic benchmarks encapsulated in the SADC Protocol On Guidelines and Principles Governing Democratic Elections.

This preliminary report provides compelling evidence to substantiate the MDC’s position that the elections cannot be judged free and fair.

Chapter Two exposes the fallacy of claims that the electoral process was managed and run by ‘impartial, all-inclusive, competent and accountable national electoral bodies’. Those who pronounce such claims site the role of the new ‘independent’ electoral commission. The new commission failed to demonstrate its independence and was established too late in the day to have any meaningful role in the management of the electoral process. By the time it was officially established most of its core duties, such as voter registration and the compilation of the voters’ roll, had already been carried out.

The elections were managed and run by the same institutions who presided over the wholesale rigging and subversion of the electoral process in the 2000 parliamentary elections and 2002 presidential elections. Nothing has changed.

Chapter Three outlines how the administrative processes for the elections were manipulated to secure political advantage for the ruling party. The voter registration exercise was carried out in a discriminatory manner under the directions and guidance of the Registrar General who openly supports Zanu PF. Thousands of people in urban areas, perceived MDC strongholds, were disenfranchised.

The voters’ roll is in a shambles. It is inaccurate and grossly inflated. The MDC was denied access to the electronic copy but was eventually given a hard copy. Data extrapolated from an audit of 10% of the roll indicated that there were over one million dead people still on the roll. The names of thousands of people who have left the country in the past few years, and who were denied their moral right to vote, are still on the roll. This created tremendous capacity for ‘ballot stuffing’, especially when one considers that members of the military are in charge of a large number of polling stations.

The delineation of constituency boundaries by the Mugabe appointed Delimitation Commission resulted in Harare and Bulawayo losing two constituencies each. Three new constituencies were created in areas perceived to be pro-Zanu PF.

The allocation and location of polling stations was again a clear attempt to boost the electoral chances of the ruling party. A disproportionate number of polling stations were allocated to rural areas compared to urban areas. Moreover, a number of polling stations are located at the homesteads of local headmen renowned for their support for the ruling party.

Chapter Four illustrates the extent to which voters were unable to access the wide variety of information necessary to make an informed choice at the ballot box. Legislative curbs on a free press, and a flagrant lack of equal access to the state controlled media, severely restricted the free flow of information and ideas to the electorate, especially in rural areas. In this context, the situation was worse than in the 2002 presidential poll.

Chapter Five describes the hostile political conditions on the ground, which remained prevalent throughout the campaign period, and details the extent to which the law enforcement agencies and traditional leaders were firmly harnessed to the campaign agenda of the ruling party.

MDC rallies and meetings continued to be banned under the Public Order and Security Act. Not a single Zanu PF rally was banned. While the MDC was obliged to comply with Section 24 of this Act and provide police with notification of rallies/meetings four days in advance, this did not appear to apply to Zanu PF; it was free to hold public meetings and rallies without police notification or permission.

While political violence was lower compared to the 2000 and 2002 elections it still remained at unacceptable levels. For this election, however, Zanu PF did not really have much need to encourage its supporters to go out and beat the electorate into submission. Five years of terror and violence has had a severe psychological impact on the electorate, especially in rural areas. People fear retribution if they freely express their political preferences. This psychological impact enabled Zanu PF to engage in slightly more subtle techniques to coerce and intimidate the electorate, as this chapter clearly demonstrates.

Chapters Six documents the incidents of electoral malpractice during the campaign period in 45 constituencies. We are still awaiting the reports from the other 75 constituencies. These outstanding reports, as well as any incidents of electoral malpractice on polling day, will be included in a final report that will be published in due course.

The MDC remains deeply concerned that despite the weight of evidence available, the various observer missions that are in the country to observe the election process continue to claim that the MDC has no evidence to back up its allegations of electoral malpractice. As this report clearly demonstrates, this is not the case. Observer missions have been provided with evidence of numerous allegations of malpractice yet do not appear to have carried out full investigations.

We are concerned that they have spent too much time in urban areas and not sufficient time in rural areas, where most irregularities have occurred.

The MDC received assurances from all the observer missions that they would conduct their duties in a fair, impartial and transparent manner. We were assured that their final reports would be based on an objective assessment and analysis of the situation on the ground.

Comments over the past few days however, by senior South African officials mandated to observe the elections, have raised suspicions that South Africa is deliberately preparing the ground to declare the elections free and fair. We hope this is not the case.

We trust that all observer missions will be cognisant of the findings in this report and factor them into their own analysis of whether or not the election was free and fair.

Finally, it is the MDC’s view that the findings in this report demonstrate in unequivocal terms that the election cannot be judged free and fair. If the MDC does win it will be because the will of the people has prevailed over attempts by Mugabe and Zanu PF to rig the ballot. We await with interest the findings and conclusions of the observer missions.

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