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Ethnic
politics on the Zimbabwean campaign trail: Do voters really care
Marko
Phiri, African Arguments
February 19, 2013
View this article
on the African Arguments website
Since independence
in 1980, there appears to have been an ingrained political psyche
peculiar to Zimbabwe’s Matebeleland region, where the political
landscape has been painted in ethnic colours. Historians say today’s
tribal politics date back to the 1960s and 70s when nationalists
were agitating for independence from the then white minority regime.
This is dismissed by those who insist that the liberation struggle
was ‘ethnicity blind’ – the main nationalist formations,
the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) and the Zimbabwe
African National Union (Zanu) having within their ranks diverse
ethnic compositions. Yet this question is once again on the table
as the country prepares for polls slated for 2013, which could still
be pushed back to 2014 and even 2015 according to some reports.
From the late vice-president Joshua Nkomo’s Zapu which entered
into a “unity pact” with Robert Mugabe’s Zanu
PF in 1987, to the revived version of the party under the leadership
of a former Home Affairs Minister Dumiso Dabengwa, to Welshman Ncube’s
MDC, there remains a reading of local politics through an ethnocentric
prisms, despite protestations by the political leaders that these
definitions are fictions created by ‘tribalists’.
Zapu was itself
revived in 2008 as a protest to what was seen by Ndebele politicians
in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe’s second largest city, as Mugabe’s
reluctance to recognise the underdevelopment of Matebeleland. Zapu
leader Dumiso Dabengwa was accused by erstwhile Zapu comrades who
remained in Zanu PF as sowing seeds of ethnic division. This was
despite the fact that Dabengwa endorsed Simba Makoni’s failed
bid for the Zimbabwe presidency in the 2008 under his Mavambo-Kusile
project.
Mavambo-Kusile
itself presented yet another twist to the country’s enthopolitics
where a political leader from Matebeleland would endorse a leader
from the Shona majority, something already criticised by activists
here who say they want to reverse the myth that no Ndebele can rule
Zimbabwe.
The financial
difficulties this political outfit finds itself mired in –
threatening its participation in the coming polls – also raises
questions about its support base. The country’s main political
parties rely not only on largess from well-heeled supporters, but
also from subscriptions from grassroots members.
Another twist
in the ethnopolitics of Zimbabwe concerns differences within the
dominant Shona ethnic group. Some contend that Zimbabwe will never
be ruled by anyone who isn’t a Shona – itself a group
made of up from numerous dialects, which themselves have been subject
to unending debate about one particular group dominating the country’s
politics.
Finance Minister
Tendai Biti, who is also MDC-T Secretary General, kicked up a storm
when he commented that it was time politicians from other Shona
dialects took over the State. It was, however, an acknowledgement
of what cannot be ignored: Zimbabwe, like many other African countries,
carries the burden of ethnic politics, and it is still instructive
that some of Mugabe’s harshest criticism has emerged from
his own Shona tribesmen and women.
Albeit latent,
these ethnic tensions remain, but it is another thing altogether
if political leaders can harness these in pursuit of political office.
But whether or not voters really care about ethnicity remains a
question that will be answered in the coming polls, if those stoking
ethnic emotions have their way.
Prime Minister
Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC-T originally emerged as an eclectic
mix of Zimbabweans of all hues and ethnicities. However, Ncube’s
MDC is now being identified as unabashedly pro-Ndebele (as seen,
for example, in reader comments on the MDC’s Facebook wall).
This could be a test for those players who are expressly pro-Matebeleland,
some critics say anti-Shona, and have been on the vanguard pushing
for a separate Ndebele state.
I listen a lot
to people talking politics here, but always wonder if ‘ordinary’
voters really care about voting preferences based on tribal/ethnic
loyalties. Some critics believe that political parties emerging
from Matebeleland seek to cash-in on the ‘angry vote’
where long disgruntled people from the region accuse Robert Mugabe
of deliberate economic marginalisation and are therefore expected
to vote for a regional political party led by their ‘own people.’
Welshman Ncube,
fingered by Tsvangirai and others as pushing the ethnic ticket,
dismisses this. He asserts himself as a ‘national politician’
despite Tsvangirai casting aspersions on him claiming that he is
a ‘village politician’ (due to confining his campaign
trail to rural parts of Matebeleland). Ncube has had to shrug-off
that rather odious tag by insisting that he is not some kind of
tribal lord, but a genuine contender to the national political throne.
The history
of Zimbabwe’s post-independence elections shows the rural
vote to be the largest bloc, with Mugabe for years claiming the
rural areas as his main support base. Ncube could, after all, be
playing politics as usual – strategising that if he can penetrate
this demographic, he could turn out as a genuine political powerhouse
rather than a politician who has been accused by political opponents
of appealing to ethnic loyalties and stoking tribal hate in the
process.
The issue of
language and ethnic belonging has come out as important in attempting
a forensic detailing of how Zimbabweans in fact choose or will choose
their leaders. It didn’t assume such importance in previous
polls, where Tsvangirai emerged to challenge Robert Mugabe, but
it is no doubt gaining resonance in contemporary politics, especially
in light of the coming election. Anger is growing, especially in
Bulawayo, where whole industries have shut down with some relocating
to the capital city Harare amid little or no government intervention
towards an economic bailout for these firms.
Morgan Tsvangirai
managed to capture the people’s hopes and aspirations in Matebeleland
and presented himself as a man of the people and nothing was being
said in 2008 about voting for a Shona in Matebeleland being anathema.
If anything at all was being said, it emerged from fringe pressure
groups such as Ibhetshu Likazulu, which fashions itself as secessionist
and has always questioned the logic of voting for a Shona –
the very people Ibhetshu accuses of “killing our people”
during the Gukurahundi back in the early 1980s. Ncube himself has
claimed that while Tsvangirai presents himself as a paragon of democracy,
MDC-T continues to offer token positions to people from Matebeleland,
a pointer for many here that tribalism cuts across the country’s
politics with poorly disguised fervour.
The MDC Deputy
Secretary General Moses Mzila-Ndlovu, who is also a government minister,
claims both Mugabe and Tsvangirai are anti-Ndebele “tribalists,”
a barb that apparently only buttresses the assertion that ethnicity
is a critical factor in today’s politics. The anger from the
1980s Gukurahundi killings lingers on with those identified perpetrators
insisting it is a closed chapter of Zimbabwe’s history. Ncube,
like his MDC’s Secretary General, Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga,
says there is a general belief within Zanu PF and the MDC-T that
politicians from Matebeleland are not cut out to lead Zimbabwe in
their own right. But as politicians bicker about ethnicity and the
national interest, voters could still find themselves hard done
by a poll that has too many political parties that will split the
vote. The fear is that this could in fact hand over victory to the
long-despised Robert Mugabe.
Two controversial
opinion polls issued this year attempted to take the pulse of voting
trends in Zimbabwe and tried to map the voting trends and preferences
based on the country’s regions. The Freedom House survey entitled
Change
and ‘New’ Politics in Zimbabwe put it this way:
“The survey
results suggest that the MDC-T’s support base had become more
Shona-centered than it had been in 2010 when the Ndebele constituted
a slightly higher proportion of those that declared they would vote
MDC-T than the Shona. The MDC-T also continues to have substantial
support in the Karanga, Ndau, Zezeru and Manyika groups. ZANUPF’s
support base also appears to have been in flux. The single biggest
ethnic chunk of its support now seems to come from the Korekore
group, followed by Shona, Zezeru, Karanga, Ndebele and Ndau. The
2012 ethnic profile of the ‘vote is my secret’ category
is not clearly differentiated from those of the two main parties.
This grouping is predominantly Shona, followed by Zezeru, Karanga,
Ndebele and Manyika.”
It is curious
that recent studies had, up until now, failed to train the spotlight
on this dynamic, a variable that is emphasised in American opinion
polls where minority groups or any other demographic is polled to
find out whether they will vote Republican or Democrat.
One wonders
though whether the tribal/ethnic breakdown of voter intentions is
really useful or whether it overemphasizes overt ethnicity-based
political affiliations, when what the country has seen in previous
elections is bloody political violence spurred by mere political
party affiliation.
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