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Preventing and mitigating political violence in Zimbabwe: a national responsibility
Maxwell Madzikanga
June 08, 2012

There seems to be broad and universal agreement among some political quarters that the power sharing arrangement in Zimbabwe has been but a national disaster. This is a view even regularly articulated at home and abroad by some of the key leaders in the coalition government. However, despite its seemingly dismal performance, the coalition government and arrangement helped to prevent further prevent politically-motivated violence, economically stabilised the country, and prevented inevitable national implosion. During the term of office of the coalition government, Zimbabwe witnessed an improvement in a number of key health, social and other development indicators. Right from the beginning the power sharing arrangement, it was known by all coalition partners that the arrangement was transitional, time-bound and a short-term agreement to enable the country to cool down and politically breathe. However the coalition performed, this transitional arrangement should not be used to stifle the return to full democratic normalcy. One of the critical ingredients for the return to full democratisation is the need and quest for the prevention and mitigation of politically-motivated electoral violence in all its varied forms.

The factors that initiate, propel, fuel and spiral the vicious cycle of political violence are multifaceted, structural, intersecting and systemic. For the coalition arrangement to come to a sustainable end, the country needs to conduct credible elections within a reasonable timeframe. However, elections are by their nature an uncertain and competitive political process. When political stakes are high as in the case of Zimbabwe, politically-motivated electoral violence tends to characterise all phases of the electoral process. The pre- and post-independence political landscape in Zimbabwe has largely remained intolerant to diverse political opinions and discourse. Before independence, the then Rhodesian armed forces, law enforcement apparatus, civil service and all the state machinery were highly partisan and rallied blindly behind the Rhodesian Front. On the other hand, during the war, the key liberation movements experienced ugly "struggles within the struggle" that unfortunately spilled into post-independence Zimbabwe. The ugly consequence of this intolerant posture has done more harm to the republic and has served but one purpose-mocking the supreme sacrifices made by thousands of gallant sons and daughters of the soil.

Political violence is not a walk in the park but leads to loss of life, property, and "fracturisation" of families, communities and permanent disruption to traditional safety nets. Despite the ugly consequences of political violence, it seems that the current socio-economic scene is Zimbabwe is not adequately prepared to prevent and deal with another potential wave of electorally motivated violence. Political violence in general and electoral violence in particular is predominantly a reflection of widespread poverty and lack of social services, catastrophic unemployment levels and depleted trust in public institutions. In the past, political violence in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in Africa encompassed use of brute physical force, threats and intimidation. The violence tended to be largely but not exclusively targeted at potential candidates, electoral officials or objects of the electoral process like ballots and facilities. It also entailed harassment, breaking up of opposition meetings and denying smaller political parties access to state resources.

Currently, for most politicians in the coalition Government in Zimbabwe, politics and contestation for political office is largely a life and death situation. Violent strategies are therefore employed as many political leaders in Zimbabwe have nothing to show to their constituencies in terms of meaningful parliamentary representation and participation, articulation of voters- priorities, infrastructural development, interest articulation and innovative development initiatives brought to the community.

I agree with Jendayi Frazer, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs who rightly observed that violence during elections whether perpetrated by the incumbent, opponent, or both, is a clear sign of the weak institutionalisation of the African state and fragmented identity of the nation. What is critical Jendayi-s observation is the realisation that violence is perpetrated by both the incumbent political leaders as well as by oppositional actors. It is not the proportion or degree that matters but the fact that in Zimbabwe for example violence has been and continues to be promoted covertly and overtly by all political actors. An impartial, pluralistic and capacitated media would play an important role in critically analysing political statements and exposing any politicians salivating for hurt-inciting language. It is most unfortunate that the key political actors in the country seem to have perfected their talents for using violence-packed language, a language that promotes disharmony, hatred and enmity. Political violence in Zimbabwe is initiated and galvanised particularly by those political elites who want to hold on or attain political power whatever the cost. Violence peddling is happening against a background of "abundant suppliers" of violence who include unemployed and disgruntled young people, partisan administration structures, and even criminal gangs wearing hats of activists or "revolution guardians". Zimbabweans of all divergent political formation should look forward to an era when electoral violence as a weapon for attaining and sustaining political office would be shredded into the dustbin of history. They should yearn for that era when political disputes would be settled impartially in an empowered, professional, adequately resourced and competent court of law.

Through its security apparatus, the state has the prerogative and responsibility for protecting all its citizens regardless of their political views or lack of. The proportionate use of force by the police, existence of appropriate plans for management of rallies, availability of appropriate crowd-control equipment and gadgets, clear police command lines, respect for the man in uniform by the coalition government and the general population are some of the missing ingredients in the country-s democratisation trajectory. The Zimbabwe Republic Police needs to always act in a non-partisan and professional way by handling perpetrators of violence in an equal manner. However, a police force that is poorly remunerated, ill-equipped and badly motivated will run away when political violence breakout. Military structures that are unsure of their future and protection in the event of change in political incumbency will not be of help in ensuring respect for the constitution, respect for human rights and in ensuring a fearless handover of power from one leader to another. Better the devil you know so the argument goes!

Pre- during- and post-electoral violence weakness national cohesion, increase national inequalities and disparities, increases suspicions, reduces the value of a its citizens at home and abroad, depletes national pride and innovativeness, feeds brain drain, deepens and strengthens the violence horizons and ultimately depresses voter turnout as well as participation in other essential democratisation processes.

Paul van Tongeren and Kai Brand Jacobson provide an interesting framework that could be useful in enhancing understanding, preventing and mitigating electoral violence in Zimbabwe. Critical ingredients of the framework are the need to ensure that any underlying causes and triggers of electoral violence are mapped. The mapping should begin at least 24 to 48 months before an election happens. They also argue that at all levels in a country there should be in existence a time-tested coherent infrastructure for peace and mediation mechanism. The two electoral experts suggest that social media should be harnessed with a view to raise national awareness on the cost of violence, its long-term impact as well as reporting incidents of electoral irregularities as they occur. Lastly, Paul and Kai recommend that adequate and comprehensive electoral training should be provided to members of the police and other security services to enable them to respond non-violently to incidents of political violence. The role of law enforcement agencies before, during and after an election is to prevent violence in the first place, provide intelligence, and investigate incidences whenever they happen and to apprehend offenders and hand them over to the judiciary system. The treatment of offenders or suspects should be the same irrespective of their political orientation, totem, standing or affiliation.

It is also indispensable that the entire judiciary apparatus needs to be impartial, trusted, and resourced to deal robustly with any perpetrators and instigators of political violence. To combat impunity, the judiciary should not only be seen to be dispensing "predictable justice" but should also work in sync with other state organs, civic actors, national level actors and international judiciary mechanisms.

The electoral management body in Zimbabwe should be robust and prompt in dealing with electoral complaints and acting in an impartial a manner. At the same the time question of impunity has to be aggressively tackled at all levels beginning with leaders of all political parties, contestants, and cascading down to the lowest administrative cell.

The approach to permanently deal with political violence should entail multi-agency, multisectoral, and multi-level strategies. Dealing with political violence without dealing with other forms of violence endemic in our schools, institutions of higher learning, families and communities would be a waste of scarce national resources. Violence awareness raising and training should be mainstreamed in the school curriculum, training of armed forces, the police and all tertiary institutions so that there is a ubiquitous understanding of violence, its forms, manifestations and mitigation.

AfricanViews articulated in one of its writings that the focus of the African state should be one of shifting current paradigms "from conflict to resolution" "from hostility to hospitality" "from ailing to healing" "from poverty to sustainability" "from apathy to empathy" and "from tears to smiles". This seemingly paradisiac yearning is achievable but only if political leaders in Zimbabwe realise that ascendancy to political office is more to do with service provision and servanthood than masterhood, sacrifice than fringe-benefits and trappings of power, discomfort than globe-galloping, community engagement and commitment than grandstanding and parcelling out borrowed, un-adapted policies and strategies. Peaceful and violent-free elections are possible but only if all Zimbabweans have access to education, food, health services, water and sanitation, economic resources, social services, dignity, pride and all other variants of freedom. Unless that occurs, the dream for fair, free, violent-free elections would remain an expensive dream only possible in the after world. And only enjoyed by Gods!

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