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Can South Sudan-s SPLM avoid the mistakes of past liberation movements
Leon Hartwell
July 12, 2011

On 9 July 2011, Africa and the world welcomed a new state, the Republic of South Sudan. Khartoum remains the capital of rump Sudan, while Juba officially departed from the parent state and it is now the capital of the newly formed state. What resulted in the split of Africa-s largest state and what implications will this have on South Sudan?

The road to statehood for South Sudan, at least in terms of modern history, is one of a long drawn out civil war between the Arab/Muslim dominated North and the largely Black African Christian South. This was principally related to the South-s continued marginalisation by Khartoum. In the last two decades alone the conflict situation led to the deaths of over 2 million people in the South.

A number of negotiation processes in the early 2000s finally led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The aim of the CPA was to make unity attractive but the agreement also allowed for an exit option. It therefore called for a referendum that would decide the fate of the South. In January this year, approximately 99 per cent of Southerners voted for succession, which is why many people in Juba celebrated the birth of an independent state. Yet, the road ahead will continue to be bumpy should the South fail to address a number of outstanding and transitional issues.

Politics in South Sudan is largely dominated by the Sudan People-s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). As it stands, it is difficult to differentiate the SPLM from most state institutions. Southerners generally lack experience in public administration but they are expected to develop into a fully fledged government sooner rather than later. Of particular importance, the transitional government must stock up public institutions on the basis of merit, and not simply liberation credentials. Service delivery and accountability should be the order of the day.

Key to South Sudan-s success is the adoption of a new constitution that should allocate responsibilities and govern the relations between the different spheres of government. The transitional government, which is dominated by the SPLM, should also make sure it allows for divergent perspectives to be included and promoted in a constitution (and a host of legislature) that will help to define the new state.

For many years, members of the SPLM and its military wing (the SPLA), have been fighting a common enemy. As has happened in several newly formed states, long-suppressed factionalism is starting to surface upon gaining self-determination. The big question is how the SPLM dominated government will manage that. Some newly formed states opted for inclusive governments, thereby accommodating divergent perspectives.

During its formative years, liberation movements tend to adopt highly secretive and top-down decision making structures. The challenge for SPLM will therefore be to change this culture and transform the movement into a democratic and transparent political party. This is very important as the largest opposition in South Sudan will for the time being not come from other parties, but from within the SPLM. This would require the SPLM to shed its military culture, decentralise, and promote pluralism within the party. Decentralisation should also be adopted within the civil service.

Related to the above issue, the SPLA (which changed its name upon gaining independence to the South Sudan Armed Forces) needs to transform into a professional security sector that support democratic institutions, without favour to any specific political party. Smaller opposition forces located in South Sudan should also be integrated into the security sector. The military and police should operate in sync with the rule of law with a strong emphasis on respect for human rights.

Given the South-s turbulent history, establishing a justice system that punishes offenders without fear or favour will also be crucial. The people of South Sudan will have to deal with trauma caused by past injustices, but they also need to be assured that never again will perpetrators get away with impunity.

Border issues will continue to plague the whole of Sudan over the next few years. The Abyei area, which separates North and South Sudan, is one of the most highly contested areas as the territory is rich in oil reserves. South Sudan and the international community should continue to focus on peaceful means to solve these border disputes.

South Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world. It also seriously lacks infrastructure, healthcare and education institutions. This year, an estimated 98% of its government revenue will come from the oil sector. Consequently, oil will play a dominant role in the country-s stability. The transition government will have to ensure that the oil sector operates transparently and that revenue is utilised in the most optimal way by diversifying the economy while promoting sustainable development.

As we have seen in many newly independent states, the government of the day will have a very short period - 10 to 15 years - to get its house in order. After that, the independence euphoria will become stale and people will want to see results. Whether South Sudan will be able to satiate the needs of the people (irrespective of their political identity) and balance that with long-term development will ultimately determine its stability. Failing on either account will be a lost opportunity for the people of South Sudan and the international community that has welcomed the new state with open arms.

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