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How
costly are dictators?
Shawn Hagedorn,
MoneyWeb
March 15, 2011
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/mw/view/mw/en/page492379?oid=533387&sn=2009+Detail
The greater
a nation-s mineral wealth, the less well aligned will be the
interests of school leavers and the nation-s ruling elites.
Dictators will amass great fortunes not so much to fund personal
consumption but to dissuade coups. A dictator-s primary focus
is to stay in office. Once the dictator is much wealthier than would-be
contenders, they and prospective defectors are discouraged from
mounting a challenge - particularly if there is little prospect
of accessing hard cash if the coup is successful. Hence, often state
coffers are poorly stocked while personal offshore accounts are
well funded. Gaddafi is able to indefinitely fund today-s
mercenaries and Libyian soldiers know that if oil production is
crippled he has the cash to also finance their payroll whereas his
replacement may not.
Toppling a dictator through
a violent coup can be quite expensive but much less so than a civil
war. According to Oxford economist Paul Collier-s research,
civil wars tend to last for seven years and are many times more
expensive than coups. Both Tunisia-s or Egypt-s coups
have thus far been quite inexpensive relative to a civil war. Let-s
hope that Libya is similarly fortunate.
But toppling
a dictator through a bloodless coup is not the same as defeating
an incumbent in a genuine multi-party election. The most common
desires among protesters are for jobs and lower food prices. Policies
which promote job creation accelerate middle-class growth. It is
a disaffected urban middle class which is most likely to rise up
and revolt. Hence dictators favour policies which discourage rural-urban
migration and minimise higher education. Where arable land can be
made available, land give-aways become very appealing to dictators.
The higher the percentage of people on smallholdings the better
as those people will be permanently marginalised economically and
politically - unless the election dynamics are quite robust.
In short, dictators are
hostile to middle-class growth while genuine elections much more
closely align policies with the interests of the masses.
Democracy is a more natural
form of government in countries with few natural resources and high
standards of living from producing finished goods. In resource poor
countries, such as Japan, South Korea or Israel, governments have
long adapted to assisting their people to be more effective at competing
globally as their work and consumption are important for growing
the tax base. This is seldom the case in Africa or the Middle East.
When dictators can skim mineral wealth there is no need to grow
jobs or finished goods exports to increase taxes. Subsistence farmers
do not produce surpluses therefore their value to dictators is not
significant.
Oddly enough, the most
prohibitive cost of dictators is often replacing them. If they are
followed by another dictator, then the new dictator will also seek
to build a war chest of offshore funds thus further depleting the
nation-s savings. But even if a fervently pro-the-people democrat
is chosen through an ideal multiparty election process, youthful
protests for jobs will go unanswered for many years if not decades.
Reversing a tyrant-s anti middle class policies will take
many years and the risk of a generation of school leavers being
permanently marginalized is high.
As well as jobs, today-s
North African protesters also want affordable food. When food prices
increase reflecting strong global economic growth, then the value
of commodity exports should be on the rise and despots or their
replacements should be able to subsidise their country-s food
bill. But there are many scenarios where food price go up while
a country-s mineral or energy export revenues stagnate or
decline. The core problem is that decades of patronage politics
will have fostered policies leading to a large crony class with
very high income expectations and a much larger percentage of the
population for whom food is their largest expense item.
Even if a tyrant can
be toppled quickly and at a low cost, reversing his anti-skill development
and anti-business formation policies will be very expensive and
take many years, if not decades, to correct.
*Shawn Hagedorn
is an independent analyst
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