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The Zimbabwe Conundrum Part 3: The opposition
George Ayittey, ZimOnline
September 14, 2009

http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=5103

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There have been some 208 African heads of state since 1960 but one would be hard pressed to name just 15 good leaders. Take this challenge yourself and see if you can name me just 15 good leaders since independence. Even if you can name me 20 good leaders that would mean the overwhelming majority - over 90 percent - were utter failures.

Said the Nigerian student, Akira Suni, "Almost without exception, they (African leaders) are a big disgrace to humankind. Apart from indulging in their usual foolish rhetoric, what have they done to satisfy even the most basic needs of our people" (BBC News Talking Point, April 16, 2001).

In an unusual editorial, The Independent newspaper in Ghana wrote: "Most of the leaders in Africa are power-loving politicians, who in uniform or out of uniform, represent no good for the welfare of our people. These are harsh words to use on men and women who may mean well but lack the necessary vision and direction to uplift the status of their people (The Independent, Ghana, July 20, 2000; p.2).

The slate of post-colonial leadership in Africa has been a disgusting assortment of military fufu-heads, "Swiss bank socialists," crocodile liberators, quack revolutionaries, briefcase bandits and vampire elites.

They amassed power to do only three things: To loot the treasury, to squash all dissent and to perpetuate themselves in office. The exceptions are shamefully few.

Monumental leadership failure

The crisis Africa faces is one of monumental leadership failure. Ideology is not particularly relevant. Both pro-West and pro-East leaders have failed their people. Collectively, these leaders have been responsible for the deaths of more than 18 million Africans since independence. This total is more than what Africa lost through the slave trade - from both the West and East African coasts.

According to former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, corrupt African leaders have stolen at least $140 billion from their people in the decades since independence (London Independent, June 14, 2002. Web posted at www. independent.co.uk).

This type of leadership is a far cry from that which Africans have known in their own traditional systems for centuries. Name one African chief who looted the treasury for deposit in a foreign bank.

"Despotism does not inhere in the African tradition," said the famed and late British economist, Lord Peter Bauer. Yet, they have become commonplace in post-colonial Africa. As of today, of the 54 African countries, only 16 are democratic: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde Islands, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa and Zambia.

Even then, a strict definition of democracy would eliminate some of them. Thus, political tyranny is still the order of the day for the vast majority of Africans.

Post-colonial Africa

Despots have proliferated in post-colonial Africa - not so much because of their ingenuity but because of the nature and character of the opposition forces arrayed against them. To be sure, African despots are crafty evil geniuses with a lot of firepower at their disposal.

They are brutally efficient at intimidation, terrorism and mass slaughter. Using bribery, they easily co-opt their enemies with government positions and ministerial appointments. They are also very adept at the diplomatic game.

However, according to Newton-s Law of Physics, for every force in nature there is a counter-force. A force dominates either because a counterforce is non-existent or weak. African despots have prevailed for decades because the forces of opposition against them are weak or no-existent. These forces are in the main three:

1. The Intellectual/Professional class - professors, lecturers, lawyers, doctors, soldiers, students, etc.
2. Opposition politicians,
3. Civil society groups - editors, journalists, church groups, etc.

These groups, collectively referred to as the chattering class, are often weak, underfunded and argumentative. It is exceedingly difficult to unite them for a common cause.

During the struggle against colonialism, it was easy to unite them against white colonialists but not against today-s black neo-colonialists, who are no different - or even worse - in their brutal suppression of popular aspirations for freedom.

The result is a conundrum faced by many African countries: A failed leadership that adamantly refuses to reform its abominable political and economic systems to provide more freedom. And an array of opposition forces that is too weak to push for change or reform.

But without reform, the country will implode and descend into the vortex of violence, chaos, and destruction: Somalia, Rwanda, Zaire, Liberia, etc.

Virtually all of Africa-s failed states would have been saved had their leaders been willing to relinquish, share political power or implement real political reform.

Of the forces arrayed against African despots, the most stunningly disappointing have been Africa-s academics, professors, scholars and intellectuals. What is most amazing is that, there are professors with strings of PhDs, including Agricometriology (the application of nuclear technology to the cultivation of cassava), who can-t even define "democracy" - let alone explain such concepts as "rule of law," "accountability," or "transparency."

Intellectual prostitutes

Many of these African scholars and professors acted like intellectual prostitutes, selling off their integrity, conscience and principles to hop into bed with barbarous regimes. Then after being used and defiled, they were tossed aside or worse.

On a continent with nearly 900 million people, one would be hard-pressed to name just 15 world-renowned African scholars, thinkers or intellectuals who are in the forefront pushing for change or freedom in Africa.

A few come to mind: Professor Wole Soyinka of Nigeria, Chinua Achebe of Nigeria, Professor Ali Mazrui of Kenya, Nobel Laureates Nelson Mandela, Arch-Bishop Desmond Tutu, and Professor Wangari Maathai.

Why so few? It is because of intellectual prostitution and collaboration. In Zimbabwe, examples of such intellectual prostitutes are legion - Gideon Gono, Professor Jonathan Moyo, to name a few.

Civil society groups have been hamstrung by repressive laws and restriction on freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement and press rubs. Such groups must be licenced by the government and their licences can be revoked if they are too critical of the government.

Even then, they must seek police permits before then can gather or hold a public rally. Such a restriction may apply to political parties and prevent them from holding political rallies.

In Uganda, for example, a political party can legally be registered but it is illegal to hold a political rally of more than 6 people. Imagine.

Suppressed and traumatised

However, the group that has been most brutally suppressed and traumatised in Zimbabwe has been the journalists and editors of the independent media.

Shortly after independence in 1980, the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust was set up to buy out the country's five main newspapers. Mugabe argued that the newspapers were owned by the South African Argus newspaper group and that the news was racially biased. Nathan Shamuyarira, the Minister of Information, declared that the purchase was motivated with a "view to getting the right news through to the consumer". Naturally.

In 2007, 27 years later, the suppression of the media had intensified under strict media laws crafted by Professor Jonathan Moyo. In 2007, the licence of the Weekly Times, an independent publication, was revoked.

The media commission's chairman, Tafataona Mahoso, said the newspaper had produced coverage whose "core values, convictions and overall thrust were narrowly political, clearly partisan and even separatist, in contrast to what had been pledged," according to an article announcing the paper's closing on the front page of the state-controlled Herald newspaper in Harare, the capital.

But editor Diggs Dube called the closure of his paper "politically motivated" and said it was intended to stifle debate in advance of the March elections. "There's absolutely no freedom of the press" in Zimbabwe, Dube said (The Washington Post, Feb 27, 2007; p.A24).

Zimbabwean journalists have been beaten, tortured, killed and have had their offices bombed. Many have fled into exile. The Mugabe government controls all television and radio stations.

The Opposition Parties

Quite frankly, the state of opposition parties in Africa leaves much to be desired. In many places in Africa, they are hopelessly fragmented, disorganised and prone to squabbling.

In addition, many opposition party leaders lack vision and are driven more by personal ambition and lust for power than the cause for freedom. Even worse, their choice of tactics is often extremely poor.

It is extremely difficult and painful to criticise opposition leaders because of brutalities and the threats to their lives which they have endured. Many paid the ultimate price in their quest for freedom for their people.

We all saw the puffed face of Morgan Tsvangirai in 2008 after he was pummeled by ZANU PF thugs. At least four attempts were made on his life. Earlier this year he lost his wife, Susan, in what I don-t for a moment believe was a "road accident."

Nonetheless, the opposition in Zimbabwe has been hobbled by a slew of problems which also beset other opposition forces elsewhere in Africa. The MDC would be loathe to admit it but it has made some serious tactical errors and miscalculations. They are mainly three:

1. The split into two factions
2. Poor choice of tactics
3. GPA/GNU

1. The split within the opposition camp

Nothing delights a tyrant more than to see that the forces arrayed against him are divided. It enables him to play one faction against the other, thereby strengthening his grip on power.

Squabbling within the MDC erupted into violence at the party-s Harvest House headquarters in May, 2005. It subsequently led to a split of the MDC into two factions: MDC-T (led by Tsvangirai) and MDC-M (led by Professor Arthur Mutambara). This split spelt doom for opposition politics in Zimbabwe which will take a log time to recover. Exactly the same folly occurred in Kenya in 2007.

The Orange democratic Movement (ODM) was formed out of a grassroots people's movement to push the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum. It was poised to challenge the corrupt and despotic rule of President Mwai Kibaki in the December 2007 presidential elections. But in August 2007 - just four months before the vote - ODM split into two: ODM-Odinga and ODM-Kenya. Imagine.

The elections were held and stolen. Kibaki was sworn in barely two hours after the fraudulent results were announced. Violence erupted in the streets. Over 1 000 people were killed and more than 250 000 rendered homeless.

The same spectacle was witnessed in Zimbabwe after the March 29, 2008 elections in which the opposition presented a divided field.

This folly was repeated in Gabon-s September 1, 2009 presidential election. The process was rigged to ensure that the son of the late Omar Bongo, who had ruled Gabon for 41 years succeeded his father. The son, Ali Ben Bongo, "won" with 41 percent of the vote. His nearest rival, Andre Mba Obame, a former interior minister, won 26 percent) votes and the third candidate, Pierre Mamboundou won 25 percent.

Obviously, if the two opposition candidates had formed an alliance they would have defeated the Bongo dynasty.

Entrenched despot

No one single individual or party can defeat an entrenched despot. It takes a coalition or an alliance of opposition forces. Here is the mathematics of it.

The despotic incumbent always has some support, no matter how terrible his rule has been because of ethnic loyalty and patronage. Assume that the incumbent has only 30 percent popular support. This means that if you field 10 opposition candidates, they will DIVIDE the opposition vote and none of them will have enough to defeat the incumbent.

In the case of Gabon, Ali Ben won with 41 percent of the vote, meaning if the two opposition candidates had fielded one candidate, the alliance candidate would have defeated him. I can tick off similar follies elsewhere in Africa:

• In Kenya's 1992 election, for example. President Daniel arap Moi won with only 37 percent of the vote over a divided field. The second place candidate won 32 percent of the total. "President Daniel arap Moi's Kenya National African Union won 1.5 million votes in 1992, compared with a combined 3.5 million for the opposition" (The Washington Times, June 22, 1995; p.A18). They repeated this same folly in the December 1997 elections. Kenya's opposition parties numbered 26, which fielded 13 presidential candidates to challenge Moi. Imagine.
• In Benin's 1990 election (only a second runoff election defeated Mathieu Kerekou) and in the Ivory Coast where 42 opposition parties were registered in 1994, although there was some election rigging.
• In Tanzania, 12 opposition parties were formed to challenge the ruling CCM's monopoly lock on power in 1994.
• In Zambia's Dec 27, 2001, presidential elections, the ruling party's (MMD's) presidential candidate, Levy Mwanawasa, won with just 29 percent of the vote. "The 70 percent of voters who opposed Mr Mwanawasa split their loyalty between 10 power-hungry rivals. The withdrawal of one or two of them would have helped Mr Anderson Mazoka to victory" (The Economist, Jan 5, 2002 ; p.38).

Beside playing into the hands of the despot, an MDC split also confuses voters and exacts a heavy public relations toll. Well-wishers, supporters and sympathisers outside Zimbabwe - both foreign and African - become baffled: Which split to support?

To be sure, Mugabe is a monster but how can the MDC be taken seriously when it itself is split? And if the MDC can-t resolve its own differences, how can it resolve those with ZANU PF?

2. Poor choice of tactics

The first rule in any war is to "know the enemy". One must know the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and devise one-s strategy accordingly. One does not fight an enemy on the turf on which he is strongest. One exploits his weaknesses.

For example, Africa-s despots concentrate their security forces in their capital cities. Therefore, one does not call for mass protests in the capital cities where the security forces are ensconced. A smart strategy is that which stretches them geographically. Note that all rebel insurgencies start from the countryside where security forces are thinly spread.

Second, one goes to battle PREPARED. Too often, opposition parties scramble to take part in elections without an ounce of preparation. This requires ensuring that the playing field is level; the electoral commission is independent, all parties have access to the state media, an access to polling stations are open and free, etc.

If these requirements are not met, ALL - not just one or a few - all opposition parties must boycott the elections. This has never been the case in Zimbabwe, where, since 1985 Mugabe has controlled every aspect of the electoral process.

Somehow the MDC has an inexplicable and abiding faith in the capacity of ZANU PF to reform itself. The MDC seems to believe, despite accumulated evidence to the contrary, that it can reason with the ZANU PF torture machine. One can-t reason with a rogue or a despot. Nor can one play by the book when the other refuses to.

Needless to say, time and again, the MDC finds itself outmaneuvered and snookered. One perfect example is the constitution-making process. The MDC bungled this badly.

Kariba Draft

In Sept 2007, representatives of the ruling ZANU PF and the two formations of the opposition MDC met in secret at Lake Kariba and drafted a new constitutional proposal, known as the Kariba Draft. It was authored by Zanu PF's Patrick Chinamasa and Nicholas Goche, MDC-T's Tendai Biti and MDC-M's Welshman Ncube.

The Kariba Draft was referenced in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed on Sept 15, 2008. Article 6 of the agreement establishes a 19-month constitution-making process. All parties agreed to use the Kariba Draft as a reference document or the basis for crafting a new constitution. On July 23, 2009, the Joint Monitoring Implementation Committee or JOMIC reaffirmed this position. Now the process is in tatters.

A huge brouhaha erupted regarding the appropriateness and the adequacy of the Kariba Draft. Signatories to the original document started backpedalling. It split MDC-M. Civil society groups rejected the Kariba Draft for not being "people-driven".

An attempt to rectify this at an All-Stakeholders Conference on July 13 was disrupted by ZANU PF thugs at the Harare International Conference Centre. Volleys of abuses were hurled at the Speaker of Parliament Lovemore Moyo and bringing the proceedings into complete chaos.

A hurriedly convened conference on July 14 ended in failure. According to Clerk of Parliament Austin Zvoma, this was due to delays in confirming the budget by donors, late drafting of programmes, delays in the invitation of principals and confirmation of dates.

Some 4 000 delegates were invited, far exceeding the capacity to accommodate them. Some even allegedly represented organisations that didn-t exist. In any case, the Parliament-driven process is being rejected by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU). They convened Constitutional Convention on July 27, 2009.

Meanwhile the Parliament-driven process has ground to a halt because of disagreements, infighting and a lack of funds. Munyaradzi Mangwana, a ZANU PF legislator and co-chairperson of the parliamentary select committee, which is spearheading the process, told the Zimbabwe Independent that the constitution may not be completed until 2013. That means, elections cannot be expected before 2013, which means four more years of suffering and agony for the Zimbabwean people.

3. The GPA/GNU fiasco

To resolve political crises in Africa in recent years, various vehicles or modalities have been tried. ALL these modalities entail some form of negotiations in some kind of a forum. It must be clear who is going to negotiate with whom: Between ZANU PF and the MDC or with the people? Every effort must be made to ensure that the negotiations are not controlled or hijacked by one party. Furthermore, decisions arrived at must be "sovereign" or binding on all parties.

When these requirements are met, then it can be said that the country crafted its own solution to its problems or that the solution is "home-grown". Did the GPA meet these requirements? The answer is a resounding no!

The first obvious problem was representation. The MDC can claim to be a coalition of some civil society groups but it is not broadly representative of Zimbabwean society. Church groups, students groups, women groups were not represented in designing the GPA.

The GPA has other problems as well. It was crafted outside the country and, as such, can scarcely be called "home-grown". Further, it is not sovereign; ZANU PF does not regard it as "binding". Nor does it have enforcement mechanisms. Even worse was the solution it proffered - the government of national unity (GNU).

The experience with power-sharing in Africa in recent times is anything but salutary. Essentially, power-sharing deals are a formula for joint state-sanctioned plunder of the country. A "government of national unity" (GNU) is often proposed to "bring opposition leaders into government". A number of ministerial or government positions are reserved for opposition or rebel leaders. But the formula seldom works.

Bitter squabbles erupt over the distribution of government posts as nobody is satisfied with the eventual distribution. Though a peace accord is an exercise in "give and take," each side feels it is "stronger" and should, therefore, be awarded more ministerial positions.

Resentment inevitably builds over allocation of posts and the composition of the government of national unity or reconciliation. Squabbling over posts may lead to the resumption of hostilities and conflict again - Angola in 1992, Congo in 1999, Sierra Leone in 2000, and Ivory Coast in 2004.

Backtracking on agreements

More importantly, African despots never honour agreements to which they append their signatures. Their promises and signatures are just for show as they lack sincerity or commitment. Even before the ink is dry, they start backtracking on the agreements they have made. They may agree to the creation of a post of prime minister but deprive it of power or a budget to enable him to function. Recent African history abounds with such examples.

Even when a "government of national unity" (GNU) is eventually established, it is short-lived. Angola-s GNU did not last for more than six months in 1992. In South Africa, former president de Klerk pulled out of the GNU after barely one year when apartheid was dismantled in 1994. Congo-s GNU in 2003 created 4 vice-presidents but did not bring peace to eastern Congo, especially the Bunia region. Burundi-s civil war flared up in August 2003 again, despite the establishment of a GNU, brokered by former president Nelson Mandela and Ivory Coast-s GNU established in January 2003 collapsed in less than a year.

Sudan-s GNU, brokered in Kenya in 2005 barely lasted a year. After battling the tyrannical regime of President Omar el Beshir of Sudan, the late John Garang of the Sudanese People Liberation Army (SPLA), decided to join a GNU. The agreement was supposed to foster peace by melding SPLM with the ruling party, the National Congress Party, in a national unity government that would rule Sudan until multiparty elections in 2009. But within nine months, he had perished in a mysterious helicopter crash. Though the mystery was never solved, his widow blamed the Beshir regime.

Six months later, the rebel movement - now called Sudan People-s Liberation Movement (SPLM) abruptly pulled out of the national unity government on October 12, 2007. The former rebels said "the move was intended to press Sudan-s ruling party to live up to the multifaceted agreement, which has been hobbled by disputes over borders, troop movements and sharing Sudan-s oil profits" (The New York Times, Oct 12, 2007; p.A8).

Deal floundering

Following Kenya-s violent December 2007 elections in which 1 300 people perished, a peace deal was reached and GNU created in February 2008. But that deal has been floundering. The tribunal to try those suspected of organising the violence is yet to be created.

Ominously, Prime Minister Raila Odinga has been complaining bitterly that he has been sidelined and excluded from major decision-making. He said President Kibaki has the habit of "embarrassing" him publicly by failing to consult him on important decisions. They made an effort to reconcile in Kilaguni in April, 2009 but the fence mending never got off the ground because the parties couldn-t even agree on an agenda.

The bloated government of 44 ministries and 53 assistant ministers has achieved little in a year. On April 6, 2009, Justice Minister, Martha Karua, one of Kibaki-s staunchest supporters, resigned, claiming that she could not institute reforms.

Against this backdrop, Zimbabwe-s GNU doesn-t stand a chance. First, Mugabe-s ZANU PF shows no interest in living to the letter of the GPA reached on September 15, 2008. There has already been predictable squabbling over the distribution of government positions.

Article 20 of the GPA stipulated 31 ministers and 15 deputy ministers, with 15 coming from ZANU-PF, 13 MDC-T and 3 MDC-M for a total of 46. The most asinine GPA proposition was the joint control of the Home Affairs ministry by ZANU PF and MDC-T.

However, Mugabe-s ZANU PF set out to grab all the key and important ministries. It was originally allocated 15 but seized 22 anyway. A furore erupted and 15 additional ministries were created, bringing the total to 61. Still, Mugabe is still not satisfied and transferred major portfolio powers from Communications Minister Nelson Chamisa of MDC-T to Transport Minister Nicholas Goche of Mugabe's own ZANU PF party.

Confusion reigns

Confusion reigns over who got what and the GPA is not being adhered to. As soon as Roy Bennett, the deputy Agriculture Minister, returned from exile to take up his post, he was promptly arrested and charged with treason, although he has subsequently been released but has not been sworn in.

Farm invasions are still continuing, as well as violence, abductions and murders. And it is the police themselves and land officers and senators who are going around illegally invading farms, looting and beating up farm workers and farmers.

The MDC has no real power to stop these crimes; nor the power to effect change. It does not control any of the key institutions of the state - the security forces, the civil service, the media, the judiciary, etc.

Second, a Joint Monitoring Implementation Committee or JOMIC was set up with the mandate to monitor the implementation of the Global Political Agreement and ensure that that Agreement is implemented to the fullest extent possible in letter and spirit. But JOMIC started off without any resources nor funding from the state. It has only skeletal office or secretarial staff. Even then, JOMIC has no power of enforcement; only an authority of persuasion.

Third, it is unlikely the military generals, who vowed they will never accept an MDC electoral victory, would support the unity government. Indeed, hardliners in ZANU PF, Joint Operations Command (JOC), the military and air force have reportedly formed a clandestine group, the Social Revolutionary Council (SRC), which operates from the president-s office with the aim of sabotaging the GPA. Its members include Defense Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, State Security Minister Didymus Mutasa, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Gideon Gono and the commanders of the army and air force.

The Social Revolutionary Council is said to be behind the recent wave of invasions of white-owned commercial farms and the continued detention and harassment of officials and activists of MDC-T.

4. The role of SADC

The MDC is aware of these problems and the deficiencies of GPA and GNU but blames them on the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which brokered the deal. This lame excuse doesn-t speak well of the MDC. It makes the MDC look bad.

It portrays the MDC as "unimaginative" and "incompetent" - unable to craft its own "Zimbabwean solution" and must depend on SADC. Worse, how in perdition can the MDC depend on such a useless regional organisation? Does SADC understand the "rule of law"? What has it said to condemn the violent farm invasions and flagrant violations of human rights in Zimbabwe the past 10 years?

In the post-colonial period, regional organisations have never intervened in the resolution of political crises in any African country. They are generally regarded as "internal matters". Regional organisations have only become involved in peacekeeping. Even then, their performance has been fatuously execrable.

On June 2, 1993, Nigeria's military government of General Sani Abacha, leader of the ECOMOG forces dispatched a contingent of 2 000 Nigerian soldiers to Sierra Leone to force the coup leaders to return power to Kabbah. At the titanic battle between "armed buffoons" and coconut-heads, the Nigerian soldiers had the worst of it and 300 of them were taken prisoner! And in 2007, when African Union peacekeeprs came under sustained rebel assault, they fled! And where is the AU in Somalia or Congo DR?

SADC, of course, has no such peacekeeping record; nor does it have experience in political statecraft. Its original mandate is economic - to promote economic integration and development among the southern African states. Its budget is 70 percent aid-funded. It is mystifying why the MDC should invest so much faith in SADC to craft a political solution for Zimbabwe.

OPTIONS FOR THE MDC

It is clear that the current path (GPA/GNU) leads nowhere. The GNU is not working. The intransigent ZANU PF regime won-t yield an inch. Running back to SADC portrays the MDC as a "cry baby". Though the MDC has brought some relief to the people, it has no power to effect change. If it stays on this course, it will progressively lose credibility and popularity. People cannot wait forever for change. They can be patient and the Zimbabwean people have shown an enormous fount of patience but there are limits to their patience and time is running out.

The other option for the MDC is to level with the Zimbabwean people and pull out of the GNU. It is not working. And both factions of the MDC must pull out of it. You can-t have a situation where one faction pulls out and the other stays. The two factions should make renewed efforts to unite. A joint convention should be held to choose a new leader. This convention should be broadened to include other civil society groups that hithertofore been excluded. A new strategy must be crafted that is "home-grown," not one dictated by outsiders. All those African countries that made successful transition from autocracy to democracy used their own home-grown solutions. These countries are Benin, Cape Verde Island, Sao Tome & Principe, Malawi, South Africa and Zambia - the latter two being Zimbabwe-s neighbours.

The wise learn from the mistakes of others.

*George B. N. Ayittey is Distinguished Economist in Residence in the Department of Economics at American University in Washington DC. He received his PhD from the University of Manitoba, and he is the author of the books, Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Development, Africa in Chaos, The Blueprint for Ghana-s Economic Recovery, Africa Betrayed, and Indigenous African Institutions. A contributor to numerous scholarly volumes, Professor Ayittey-s articles have been published in numerous journals.

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