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Zimbabwe Conundrum Part 2: ZANU PFs choices
George
Ayittey, ZimOnline
September 10, 2009
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=5087
Read
Part 1
Read
Part 3
At present,
President Robert Mugabe-s ZANU PF party has amassed enormous
power and controls all key state institutions: the security forces
(the military and the police), the judiciary, the media, the civil
service (which it has militarised), and the central bank, headed
by Gideon Gono, who has literally destroyed the Zimbabwean currency.
One catastrophic
mistake made by the Zimbabwean opposition was not seeking to wrestle
at least one institution out of the grip of ZANU PF. No popular
revolutions since 2000 have succeeded without opposition control
of at least one key state institution such as the security forces,
the judiciary or the media. The Rose Revolution in Georgia (Nov
2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (Nov 2004), and the Cedar
Revolution in Lebanon (Feb 2005) all succeeded because they had
the control or support/sympathy of at least one key state institutions.
Key
state institutions
It takes an
institution to battle another institution.
At any rate,
the ZANU PF controls all key state institutions and governs with
impunity. It knows the opposition is weak or ineffective and exploits
their weaknesses mercilessly.
In addition,
it has assembled young thugs - Green Bombers - to terrorise,
intimidate and cow the people. The rule of law is non-existent.
ZANU PF holds itself above the law and is answerable only to itself.
Like other African
despots, Mugabe refuses to take responsibility for his own stupid
failures. These despots frequently use the West, the World Bank,
and other external factors - even earthquakes on Jupiter!
- as convenient scapegoats to divert attention from their
own scandalous failures.
"President
Daniel rap Moi accused the IMF and other development partners of
denying Kenya development funds, thus triggering mass poverty"
(The Washington Times, June 3, 1999; p.A12).
According to
the Chairman of Ghana-s ruling NDC, Issifu Ali, whatever economic
crisis the nation is going through has been caused by external factors.
"He said the NDC has since 1982 adopted pragmatic policies
for the progress of Ghana, adding that the macro-economic environment
of 1999 has been undermined by global economic developments"
(The Independent, Nov 18, 1999; p.3).
Greedy
Western powers
According to
the Zimbabwe Independent (April 27, 1999), "Mugabe rejects
the criticism of those who blame the government for the economic
crisis. It is, he says, the fault of greedy Western powers, the
IMF, the Asian financial crisis and the drought" (p. 25).
President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe also blames Western sanctions,
British colonialists, racists and "snakes" (whites)
for ruining his economy.
Even African
organisations such as the African Union are also steeped in the
externalist orthodoxy. The New Economic Partnership for African
Development (NEPAD) claims that Africa-s impoverishment has
been accentuated by the legacy of colonialism and other historical
legacies, such as the Cold War and the unjust international economic
system.
Colonialism
subverted the "traditional structures, institutions and values,"
creating an economy "subservient to the economic and political
needs of the imperial powers" (para 21). Colonialism, according
to NEPAD, retarded the development of an entrepreneurial and middle
class with managerial capability. At independence, Africa inherited
a "weak capitalist class," which explains the "weak
accumulation process, weak states and dysfunctional economies."
(para 22).
More recent
reasons for Africa's dire condition include "its continued
marginalisation from globalisation process." (para 2). NEPAD
seeks $64 billion in investments from the West.
Now, Libyan
leader Muamar Ghaddafi, the chairman of the African Union, says
Israel is the cause of Africa-s problems.
Incompetent
and corrupt leaders
By the beginning
of the new millennium, even Africa-s children were fed up
with this "colonialism-imperialism" claptrap. Chernoh
Bah, president of the Children's Forum asserted that Africa's socio
economic problems are a direct repercussion of incompetent and corrupt
political leaders who usurped political office via the gun. "Some
blame colonialism for Africa's plight while others blame the continent's
harsh climatic conditions. I think the reason is the kind of political
systems we have had over the past decades", he said. (Standard
Times [Freetown], April 2, 2003; web posted).
At the United
Nations Children's Fund Summit held in May 2002 in New York, youngsters
from Africa ripped into their leaders for failing to improve their
education and health. "You get loans that will be paid in 20
to 30 years and we have nothing to pay them with, because when you
get the money, you embezzle it, you eat it", said 12-year-old
Joseph Tamale from Uganda (BBC News, May 10, 2002).
Prominent Africans
also started lashing out at the leadership. UN Secretary-General,
Kofi Annan, himself an African, excoriated African leaders at the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Lome in July 2000.
He pointedly told them that they are to blame for most of the continent's
problems.
"Instead
of being exploited for the benefit of the people, Africa-s
mineral resources have been so mismanaged and plundered that they
are now the source of our misery" (Daily Graphic, July 12,
2000; p.5).
Earlier in the
year at a press conference in London in April, 2000, Kofi Annan,
"lambasted African leaders who he says have subverted democracy
and lined their pockets with public funds, although he stopped short
of naming names" (The African-American Observer, April 25
- May 1, 2000; p.10).
During a brief
stop-over in Accra, he disclosed in a Joy FM radio station interview
that "Africa is the region giving him the biggest headache
as the Security Council spends 60 to 70 percent of its time on Africa.
He admitted sadly and that the conflicts on the continent embarrasses
and pains him as an African" (The Guide, July 18-24, 2000;
p.8).
Blaming
outside forces
Ordinary people
are speaking out too. Said Akobeng Eric, a Ghanaian, in a letter
to the Free Press (29 March - 11 April 1996): "A big obstacle
to economic growth in Africa is the tendency to put all blame, failures
and shortcomings on outside forces. Progress might have been achieved
if we had always tried first to remove the mote in our own eyes"
(2).
The African
people, fed up at the incompetence of their leaders, started lashing
out. Angry at deteriorating economic conditions in Ghana, thousands
of Ghanaians marched through the streets of the capital city, Accra,
to denounce the ruling regime of President Jerry Rawlings. "If
Jerry Rawlings says the current economic crisis is due to external
forces and therefore, beyond his control, then he should step aside
and allow a competent person who can manage the crisis to take over,"
Atta Frimpong demanded (The Ghanaian Chronicle, Nov 29, 1999; p.1).
In Zimbabwe,
the people did not buy Mugabe-s claim that "Britain,
greedy Western powers, the IMF, the Asian financial crisis and the
drought" were responsible for the country-s economic
mess. They rejected his request for constitutional revisions to
give him more draconian powers in a February 15, 2000 referendum,
handing him his first political defeat in 20 years of virtually
unchallenged rule.
The
game is up
United States
President Barack Obama echoed these internalist sentiments when
he said in Accra on July 11, 2009 that, "the West is not responsible
for the destruction of the Zimbabwean economy over the last decade,
or wars in which children are enlisted as combatants."
The game is
up for ZANU PF. It has lost all credibility with the Zimbabwean
people. It has become an imposition - a cancer - on
Zimbabwe-s body politic - a far cry from the liberation
stature it once enjoyed. Fear and paranoia are driving the regime
to cling to power at all cost - by force and with brutal repression.
Albert Einstein
once defined insanity as doing the same thing over and over again
and expecting different results. The ZANU PF regime has resorted
to brutally repressive measures over and over again since independence
in 1980 without any improvement in the economy or society.
I call it lunacy.
To extricate itself from the mess, ZANU PF has two distinct choices
to make. The first is to maintain its hard-line stance and, the
second, is to adopt a more conciliatory approach.
1. The
hardline approach
The hardline
position is invariably a dead end - literally. Africa-s
post-colonial history is replete with intransigent autocrats who
refused to yield to popular demands for freedom and took hardline
positions:
President Marcias
Nguema of Equatorial Guinea (1979): His dictatorship was one of
the most repressive regimes in Africa. Of the tiny population of
300 000, thousands of people were eliminated. All prominent politicians
and intellectuals were either killed or driven into exile. Eventually,
he was killed by his own cousin, Lt.-Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo,
who is still president in a tenure no better than his uncle-s.
Field Marshal
Idi Amin of Uganda (1979): He also called himself the "Conqueror
of the British Empire." His lunatic antics and cruelties need
no elaboration. He was eventually ousted from power by President
Julius Nyerere who sent Tanzanian troops over the border into Uganda.
Amin fled into exile in Saudi Arabia, where he perished.
Milton Obote
of Uganda (1986): He was ousted from power by a rebel movement led
by Yoweri Museveni, the current president.
General Samuel
Doe of Liberia (1990): A rebel leader cornered him and cut off his
left ear. He bled to death.
General Moussa
Traore of Mali (1991): On March 18, 1991, angry Malians took to
the streets to demand democratic freedom from the despotic rule
of Moussa Traore. He unleashed his security forces on them, killing
scores, including women and children. But pro-democracy forces were
not deterred and kept up the pressure. Asked to resign on March
25, he retorted: "I will not resign, my government will not
resign, because I was elected not by the opposition but by all the
people of Mali! But two days later when he tried to flee the country,
he was grabbed by his own security agents and sent to jail. From
there, he lamented: "My fate is now in God's hands."
General Siad
Barre of Somalia (1991): Even though Somalia is ethnically homogenous,
his rule was particularly cruel. He played one clan against another
and even went as far as dropping bombs on clan leaders who opposed
his rule. Eventually, he was routed by forces loyal to Mohamed Farar
Aideed. Barre fled Somalia in a tank that ran out of gas near the
Kenya border. He eventually made his way to Nigeria where he died
in exile.
Comrade Haile
Mariam Mengistu of Ethiopia (1991): Despite having Africa-s
largest army with 200 000 soldiers, he was ousted from power by
a rag-tag band of determined Eritrean and Tigrayan rebels. His soldiers
could not protect him. In fact, many of them defected to the rebels
side with their weapons. He fled into exile in Harare, Zimbabwe.
And how safe was he in Zimbabwe? In 1996, an Eritrean, Solomon Haile
Ghebre Michael, tried to assassinate him. ZANU PF officials should
be speaking with him.
General Juvenal
Habryamana of Rwanda (1994): His plan, returning from peace talks
with opposition parties in Tanzania, was blown up or shot down by
hardliners within his own administration, triggering an orgy of
violence and mayhem that resulted in the slaughter of more than
1 million Tutsis.
General Mobutu
Sese Seko of Zaire (1996): He changed his name to "Sese Seko
Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga", which, in the local Lingala language,
meant, "The rooster who leaves no chicken untouched."
A rebel leader, Laurent Kabila, chased him out of his coop into
exile in Morocco, where he died. Hundreds of Mobutu-s soldiers
also joined the rebel forces. Subsequently, Kabila himself was shot
dead by this own security detail.
The list is
long but the above should suffice. In all cases, it is instructive
to note that the threat to the despotic regime did not come from
opposition parties. It came from:
1. Within
the despot-s own security apparatus or circle of officers
and family members (Obiang, Abacha, Habryamana, Traore)
2. Rebel groups (Obote, Mengistu, Barre, Doe, Mobutu Sese Seko
3. Invasion from a neighboring country (Idi Amin).
Threat
to ZANU PF
Clearly, the
threat to the ZANU PF regime is not going to come from the opposition
parties. The threat to ZANU PF is more likely to come from within
or from a rebel insurgency.
Rebel insurgencies
start when the political process breaks down. When the politicians
talk and talk and fail to resolve a crisis, a frustrated leader
may "take to the bush" and pick up guns.
The insurgency
often starts with a small band of determined rebels from the country-side,
where government troops are thinly spread. The troops are often
concentrated in the capital city to repel any challenge to the despot
in power.
It is relatively
cheap to start a rebellion. "The late Laurent Kabila, who overthrew
the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, once boasted that all he needed to
mount a revolution was $10 000 and a satellite telephone" (The
Economist, May 24, 2003; p.24).
As it turned
out, Kabila was bank-rolled by Rwanda. ZANU PF should not delude
itself into thinking that Botswana, South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia
or some neighboring country would not finance and support a rebel
movement.
Rag-tag
malcontents
Nonetheless,
it takes only a small band of determined rag-tag malcontents to
plunge the country into mayhem. Back in 1983, Museveni of Uganda
set out with a rag-tag band of only 27 rebels in a guerrilla campaign
against Obote. Charles Taylor of Liberia started out with about
150 rebels; the late Mohamed Farah Aidid of Somalia began with 200
rebels; and Paul Kagame of Rwanda set out with less than 250.
Rebel leaders
set their sights on only one destination - the capital city,
the seat of government or power. As they advance inexorably toward
the capital city, their ranks swell with deserting government troops,
as well as restless and unemployed youth, who sense an opportunity
for jobs and riches through pillage and plunder. Some, like child
soldiers, are forcibly recruited into the rebel movement. The fighting
escalates as rebel soldiers close in on the capital city.
A bitter lesson
in the post-colonial era is that no African government has successfully
put down a rebel insurgency. Unpaid and demoralised government troops
(loyalists in the case of the Ivory Coast), often abandon posts
or join the rebels (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Zaire).
The despot may
attempt to flee and be grabbed at the airport (Moussa Traore), or
succeed and run out of gas (Siad Barre) or die in exile (Mobutu).
It should be
abundantly clear to ZANU PF hard-knocks that the hardline position
is really a death wish.
2. The
conciliatory approach
As stated earlier,
Africans are forgiving people. They are willing to forgive those
who have harmed them if the culprits are willing to admit their
errors and make amends. Political leaders who were willing to yield
to the popular will and make amends saved not only themselves but
their countries as well. There are many examples: Cape Verde Islands,
Benin, Sao Tome & Principe, South Africa and Zambia under Kenneth
Kaunda.
These countries
followed African-s own indigenous system of crisis resolution.
When a crisis
erupts in an African village, the chief will call a village meeting
and put the issue before the people. It will be debated until a
consensus is reached. Once reached, all, including the chief, are
required to abide by it.
In recent years,
this indigenous African tradition was revived by pro-democracy forces
in the form of "national conferences" to chart a new political
future in the countries listed above.
Benin's nine-day
"national conference" began on 19 February 1990, with
488 delegates, representing various political, religious, trade
union, and other groups encompassing the broad spectrum of Beninois
society.
Sovereign
power
The conference,
whose chairman was Father Isidore de Souza, held "sovereign
power" and its decisions were binding on all, including the
government. It stripped President Matthieu Kerekou of power, scheduled
multiparty elections that ended 17 years of autocratic Marxist rule.
In South Africa,
the vehicle used to make that difficult but peaceful transition
to a multiracial democratic society was the Convention for a Democratic
South Africa. It began deliberations in July 1991, with 228 delegates
drawn from about 25 political parties and various anti-apartheid
groups.
The de Klerk
government made no effort to "control" the composition
of CODESA. Political parties were not excluded; not even ultra right-wing
political groups, although they chose to boycott its deliberations.
CODESA strove
to reach a "working consensus" on an interim constitution
and set a date for the March 1994 elections. It established the
composition of an interim or transitional government that would
rule until the elections were held.
More important,
CODESA was "sovereign." Its decisions were binding on
the de Klerk government. De Klerk could not abrogate any decision
made by CODESA - just as the African chief could not disregard
any decision arrived at the village meeting.
Zimbabwe can
pull itself from the brink by holding a "sovereign national
conference" - not just craft a Global
Political Agreement (GPA). That approach is flawed because it
excludes civil society - teacher-s groups, student groups,
church groups, women groups, etc. It is for this reason -
the exclusion of civil society groups - why governments of
national unity (GNU) have never worked in Africa.
The choice before
ZANU PF is stark clear: It can maintain its hardline stance or adopt
a conciliatory approach. Their own survival and that of Zimbabwe
will depend on which choice they make. There are plenty of lessons
to draw from on the African continent.
The wise learn
from the mistakes of others while fools repeat them. Idiots, on
the other hand, repeat their own stupid mistakes.
*George
B. N. Ayittey is Distinguished Economist in Residence in the Department
of Economics at American University in Washington DC. He received
his PhD from the University of Manitoba, and he is the author of
the books, Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Development, Africa
in Chaos, The Blueprint for Ghana-s Economic Recovery, Africa
Betrayed, and Indigenous African Institutions. A contributor to
numerous scholarly volumes, Professor Ayittey-s articles have
been published in numerous journals.
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