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A state-s celebration of denial: Political uses of national healing
Brilliant Mhlanga
July 30, 2009

In a much needed and overdue discourse of national healing, it is advisable to begin by stating that it is very difficult to clearly state who should qualify to spearhead the process of national healing without being understood as being divisive in a state that suffers so much polarity like Zimbabwe. Further, the problem arises when the process is headed by political figures that are merely bent on fostering a cover-up to the crimes committed so as to post a pretentious finality to whatever issues are at hand. However, history has taught us that diluting such a much needed national process and creating a farce out of it has a way of haunting future generations. Furthermore, history teaches us that a case like the Zimbabwean one so far provides a good example of a national healing process which is conjured and managed by politicians as a niche for elite transition. A statement of caution to most political leaders and some characters at the forefront of Zimbabwe-s seemingly nefarious national healing process; is to bear in mind that in their attempt to address systematic abuses and gross violations of human rights which led to a genocide in Zimbabwe, there is need to avoid endangering the political transformation they are trying to purvey. Let alone to short-circuit it. In my contribution to this very pertinent discourse, I will briefly use examples from Rwanda and South Africa.

As stated above, it may be necessary at this juncture to begin this discussion by borrowing a leaf from Rwanda-s Gacaca participatory programme and South Africa-s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

What we have been witnessing in South Africa is commonly known as a Truth and Reconciliation state project with little or no justice. This is a good example of a project whose purveyors had to be alive to the realities of their time; that if they had prosecuted the main culprits that alone would have endangered the transitional process they were trying to engineer, while at the same time they had to appease an angry expectant South African black population. But there is also another very interesting dimension in South Africa's TRC; a) truth seeking and revelation, and b) the whole notion of reconciliation without justice as a pseudo-political-legal arrangement.

However, the first problem arising out of the TRC is that there is no proof that all those who committed those abuses and all manner of crimes against humanity were high on drugs, possessed or had lost their mental faculties, and that they would therefore tell the whole truth now that they were no longer in a state of "temporary madness." Instead, such a process merely says, 'let bygones be bygones-, 'let us bury the past and move on.- Usually, it works very well for politicians as the elite and not for the ordinary masses. It usually gains acceptance in a state if there a strong promise for meaningful change.

Zimbabwe definitely has lessons to learn from the case of South Africa; that FORGIVENESS should as a state aided project not end up being a spoken word whose meaning is dangerously hollow and elusive. If anything, it must translate into meaningful ways in society with people gaining confidence in systems and structures being put in place to aid transition. It must usher with it equity and equality in most spheres of life. Justice without these is as hollow as any politician with no conscience. It has no meaning. Further, it must enable citizens to come out of their victimhood, and as survivors to also participate in the process of national healing without fear. If citizens participate in such a process when they are still engulfed in fear then the wound being healed may become even more septic. There is nothing that is as dangerous in life as a social wound that fails to heal properly and ends up festering. Such a wound has a way of recurring and causing so much of problems in a state. Zimbabwe-s leaders must be alive to this fact.

The second problem is that, those who appeared before the TRC in SA did so knowing that a hand of amnesty had been extended. And so, they could appear before the TRC knowing fully well, that they would tell whatever they narrate, then show unparalleled remorse, cry bitterly in the name of God, the angels and all heavens and still get away with murder. In essence, Justice as a sociological reward, particularly to the aggravator and the survivors was not fully achieved. But the main underlying reality was that there had been a transplacement of sorts and South Africa was definitely in a transitional mode. People could glean change.

However, the case of South Africa had one major advantage for its posted successes; the facade of black majority rule and the presence of Nelson Mandela as the luminary, with Desmond Tutu appearing to be in control of the process and preaching peace, forgiveness and reconciliation. The whole notion of Nelson Mandela as 'utata/ubaba- (father-figure) had an anaesthetizing effect, obviously rooted in the belief that 'utata/ubaba- suffered for 27 horrible years in Robben Island; a situation which was always posted in the media as unparalleled. This success has been concretised by the attempt to immortalise Nelson Mandela, and so it makes it difficult for those who feel short-changed to stand up to such a towering figure.

Then in the case of Rwanda we witnessed the Gacaca programme, which forms part of what is called participatory justice as a form of transitional justice. It has the following components: 1) justice, 2) punishment (as a sociological form of reward to both the perpetrator and survivor), 3) truth revelation, 4) community participation, and hopefully, reconciliation! Due to limited space, I will not discuss the above components in detail.

In Rwanda, we also notice that Paul Kagame and his army had captured the state. A form of transition commonly referred to as replacement had taken place, and so, even the ordinary people were bound to perceive of the Gacaca participatory project as plausible for these reasons and a number of them. The Gacaca programme is not yet over, it is still an ongoing process. But we must also bear in mind that the Rwandan case has the potential to be a time bomb, whichever way you look at it.

However, it is worth noting that these processes as ways of nurturing national healing and progress tend to create several dilemmas. These dilemmas were registered in both the Rwandan and South African cases, for example, how do you tell the truth when you have been or may be incarcerated for more years, as is the case with most people, particularly those of Matatebeleland/Midlands in Zimbabwe where there is an undefined taboo of raising the subject of Gukurahundi genocide in public? Given the fact that openly talking about Gukurahundi genocide is considered a serious taboo, how then do we convince our people who are still traumatised to openly talk about it this time around, when all the perpetrators are still in power? How do you reconcile with one who murdered your father, raped and killed your sisters, mother, children, and that person still controls the levers of power? Here I am referring to the repressive state apparatus (the whole security machinery or defence forces as is the case of Zimbabwe). How do you build democracy and democratic culture in such a polarized society, like Zimbabwe? How do you live, in the same neighbourhood with a person you saw doing all these heinous crimes and they are going Scott-free? Here I am referring to the recent spate of violence in Zimbabwe which was concentrated in the regions of Mashonaland, between April and June 2008, where a villager turned against another villager. Are there any mechanisms that will be put in place, both legally and politically to ensure that crimes of this nature are not committed again? Or to use Robert Mugabe-s phrase, what measures will be in place to ensure that those "moments of madness" do not visit us as a people and end up leading us to hack each other to death?

Rwanda-s Gacaca participatory project and South Africa-s TRC were the only alternatives for the respective states albeit the difficulties. Further, in the case of South Africa, the TRC also faced some problems, hence the clandestine killings that followed when ordinary citizens (Blacks) began killing those whites who had killed their relatives during apartheid. This provided SA with another dilemma; of a situation where the victim turns perpetrator of violence, in what can be termed 'retributive- justice. And so, some people were arrested, although, this form of social upheaval had to be managed and made low key even to the media, which otherwise is often considered 'loud mouthed.'

Two common factors emerge in the cases of Rwanda and South Africa which leaders in Zimbabwe must know; first, the case of transitional arrangements with clear structures and mandate in place to enable transition, most of them headed by a new leadership, again with clear legal mechanisms being curved or already in place. Second, the formation of a government sanctioned quasi-independent structure headed either by a respectable religious figure, a former judge or a person of high standing in society, and not a political rascal like John Landa Nkomo. Another important point is that, while politicians were involved from the sidelines and behind the curtains in directing the scenes in the puppet theatre, those who were fronted were people of seemingly 'unquestionable- character with some kind of aura and stature in society.

In Zimbabwe, the situation is completely different in that; Robert Mugabe is still in power. He remains the main perpetrator of all these crimes and most of his criminals who are answerable for the Gukurahundi Genocide, for example, are still in control of various structures of the state. This makes the whole notion of national healing a mere farce. Also as years passed opportunities to further engage Joshua Nkomo as a towering luminary to play the Mandela father-figure in Zimbabwe-s national healing process were lost. Besides, the death of Joshua Nkomo dealt a heavy blow to the superficial unity accord of 1987 which was an elite 'let bygones be bygones- arrangement. This was further entrenched by the fresh wounds that ZANU PF decided to inflict on all those who were considered to be against the gains of the struggle, whatever that meant.

Further, the attempt to immortalise Joshua Nkomo at his death as 'ubaba- (father-figure), through bashes and over night galas came very late. After all, those galas and bashes as nationalist pantheon resembled ZANLA pungwes of the liberation struggle where people were often coerced to attend overnight vigils that were characterised by massive human rights violations, such as torture, killings and rape, punctuated by teachings on the course and cause of the liberation struggle. The only difference between these galas or bashes as revised forms of pungwes (overnight vigils) and the original ZANLA pungwes was that the former had the advantage of using live broadcasting (television) and also that this time around people could attend these galas out of their own volition, at least those who chose to, but they still had to be subjected to intermittent revised liberation narratives, of course with no violence this time around. Whereas in the case of ZANLA pungwes much as there was lots of singing, with violence as part of teaching and the order of the day, again this time around people could still afford to follow the teachings on television and in the comfort of their homes. And so, these galas as ways of immortalising Joshua Nkomo and attempts to revise the history of the liberation struggle, by including those who had been previously excluded further disenfranchised a lot of people, particularly those that were organised after 2005.

Again the case of Rwanda like the case of Matebeleland/Midlands serves as an example of genocide. At least, in Rwanda as stated above, the government that fomented it and executed it was forcibly removed and a new one established out of military victory. Similarities between the genocide cases of Rwanda and Matebeleland/Midlands involve the state; the government officials, the state security and the people themselves but encouraged by the system. The only difference is that in the case of Rwanda, those who committed the genocide murdered people they knew, neighbours, friends and even relatives where intermarriages had taken place, whereas in Matebeleland/Midlands a special force from the army would burn down a whole village, maim, rape, torture and kill but still remain with no knowledge of who exactly they are killing except that they belong to a particular ethnic group. The other difference is that in the Rwandan case the perpetrators were removed from power and have been brought to book, while in Zimbabwe the difference is that those who fomented and executed it most of them are still in power and still raring to go.

In conclusion, both the Gacaca participatory programme and TRC managed to post some successes, although, in the case of the TRC there was limited justice in the whole process. It was a result of a political scenario arrived at after assessing the realities and a negotiated agreement. The basis of such a scenario was the assumption that crimes committed were essentially of political nature. Therefore requiring an enabling political environment when handling them, hence the attempt to tackle and handle the situation with a pseudo-political-legal approach with little legality. Further in such a situation any thing else was criminalised and presented as endless retribution in the name of justice. It become a political cover up to allow life to continue, since it was found necessary to avoid vendettas

Following these scenarios one can clearly see that Zimbabwe-s national healing process is a serious scandal in making. What is worse is the tragedy of failing to clearly state the period within which crimes were committed in order to cause for national healing and seek forgiveness and justice by covering all concerned sections of the Zimbabwean society. Thus pegging everything considered worth discussion as issues of the last ten years. This is a serious scandal, worse with the attempt to posture John Landa Nkomo, as the leading figure in organising these meaningless so called 'national healing functions.' More so, the fact of a national healing crusade presents to us a clear case of political settlement arrived at, again, by politicians, as the elite. So, this is elite national healing possibly arrived at in their previous bonding bash in Victoria Falls. But ordinary people will not heal.

It also serves as a very good example of planting landmines that will explode in the future; a typical case of a leadership whose vision is blurred. It is even clear here that justice is not an option together with its sociological meaning. Any attempt that ignores the Gukurahundi genocide is just a joke, if not a complete farce. It is also common knowledge that these elite in seeking to champion their agenda, they might window dress it by having a few individuals brought to justice, thereby giving credence to the assertion that, '.....in Africa a prison is where big criminals put smaller ones.' Is this not anecdotal?

* Brilliant Mhlanga is an academic and a human rights activist from the National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Zimbabwe. He is currently a Doctoral Researcher at the University of Westminster, London.

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