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Response to Professor Mamdani's article on the Lessons of Zimbabwe
Alex T. Magaisa
December 20, 2008

Professor Mamdani's article presents an interesting account. He is a scholar for whom I have much respect. He makes some very good points about one aspect of the Zimbabwe crisis. But as with all attempts to chronicle and analyse the story of Zimbabwe in a few pages his analysis runs the risk of generalisations and, unfortunately, some inaccuracies that fail to capture the dynamics of the crisis in that country.

By focussing his critique around the land question, Prof Mamdani's critique is narrow and seems to me to typify the approach that suggests that Zimbabwe's problems are only about land, thereby reducing it to the binary dimension of the land reformists and the anti-land reformists. In fact, what might have been a balanced critique seems to me to suggest an understanding of why Mugabe did what he did and therefore why the country is in the mess it is.

There can be no doubt that the land question was always critical. Prof. Mamdani reiterates what has been said before, about the failures of the Lancaster Constitution to address decisively the land question. That of itself is not new. I attach hereto an excerpt from a lecture that I gave in 2006 - regarding the matter. The full article is at http://www.tni.org/basker/magaisa.pdf although I am by no means suggesting that I do any better than the Prof. The point is that this is neither new nor a justification of what has gone on in that country, when one considers that land is but one issue in the Zimbabwe crisis.

It is correct that not enough was done to help Zimbabwe address the land question and that the white farmers perhaps sat on their laurels and got comfortable without realising that the social order was unsustainable in the long run. That indeed is a lesson that South African farmers must learn and very quickly too. If I had the opportunity I would advise them to give up some of their land early on but then capitalism and capitalists do not work like that.

However, there is a suggestion in the article that the land question has singularly defined political dynamics in Zimbabwe since 1980. To be sure, it was a factor but not the only one, certainly not the only one that drove Mugabe and ZANU PF to the kind of politics they practice today. There is little mention in the article of what happened to those funds that were given to Zimbabwe for land resettlement by the British government and other donors. There is also little mention of the fact that the bigger beneficiaries of the early resettlement exercise were not the peasants but the political elite. Most of them got their farms and properties way back in the 1980s, notwithstanding that they had a party leadership code that proscribed the holding of properties. The same people at the forefront of picking the best farms already had farms since the 1980s. Where did the guerrillas straight from the bush get money to buy farms? Mugabe himself has acknowledged that there is a problem of multiple-farm ownership among the political elite, ironically, the very same reason that Mugabe used for taking away farms from white farmers in the first place.

There is an inaccuracy where it is suggested that the ZCTU formed the NCA and that Mugabe decided to revise the Constitution in 1999 due to pressure from 'squatters, occupiers and their local leaders, as well as from sections of the new black elite'. The history of the NCA is very clear - the person who brought up the idea is Tawanda Mutasa, a lawyer then working for a civic organisation. He teamed up with a few other guys, including my colleague Brian Kagoro to initiate the idea. The ZCTU was only brought on board but after the idea had germinated and grown - the ZCTU was a convenient mass organisation to drive the process but it did not form the NCA. I don-t think it is correct to credit the ZCTU with organising the NCA.

As for the pressure for constitutional reform, Mugabe was adamant, until 1999 that there was any need for change. His supporters did not have the appetite for change. Rather, Mugabe reacted to the NCA campaign for a new constitution whereupon he set up the Constitutional Commission, headed by the present Chief Justice Chidyausiku. Those who remember the battles at the time may recall that the dispute was over the process, with the NCA insisting that the reform process be independent and people-driven (whatever that meant), whereas Mugabe insisted on unilaterally appointing the participants. As it happened there were parallel processes - the govt. led and the NCA-led. There is an interesting collection of work by the likes of Lovemore Madhuku and Welshman Ncube on this matter - it was through his work in the NCA that Ncube got into politics. As it happened the MDC was formed on the back of the NCA - Tsvangirai, who had been chairing the NCA left and took the presidency of the MDC. The organisation at the head of the campaign against the govt-s constitutional draft was the NCA - the MDC rode on the wave but it is incorrect to suggest as does the Prof. that the MDC was formed for that purpose. My understanding is that the MDC was created for a bigger purpose to challenge ZANU PF over governance issues.

I am also not sure that his characterisation of the labour unions as Ndebele-based is accurate but it is an area that I have little knowledge about so it is fair to give that the benefit of doubt. What I do recall is that the ZCTU was very pro-ZANU PF in the early eighties - Michael Mugabe, Robert Mugabe's brother was part of the leadership and I understand fairly close to Tsvangirai during those days. Tsvangirai himself ascended to the top of the unions on the back of ZANU PF, in which he held some junior position at the time.

As for the moves towards land reforms, it was not so much the desire to redistribute land due to war vets pressure - it was the fear of loss of political office that made land a convenient rallying point. And to be sure Mugabe used it well to his advantage, esp. in the region and other Africanists who saw this as the Prof still does, as an anti-colonial project. They did not see it as some of us do, as a strategy for political survival. It is easy to give too much credit to the War Vets - these fellows were still gloating over their bonuses granted in 1997, the largesse that purchased their loyalty.

Furthermore, nothing is mentioned here of the rampant looting of the War Victims Compensation Fund by politicians - some like Mai Mujuru claiming as much as 99% disability compensation (rather like our council estate loafers in this country!) and yet aspiring for higher office. The ordinary war vets, who should have benefited from that welfare scheme were angry about that flagrant abuse of office and that anger mirrored the general anger of ordinary people at the corruption and decadence in the corridors of power - something that is completely missing from the Prof's analysis.

To be sure, when the MDC was formed the human rights dimension was fairly limited the problem was about the decline in the economic station of the people - hence those demos in 1998 which the ZCTU led. The government' felt insecure because ESAP had caused problems and it found it very hard to meet people's expectations. Then they played a convenient card - the land card. The Prof omits that the referendum of 2000 itself was generally fair and peaceful. Things took a turn when ZANU PF lost and pursued an orgy of violence in the run up to the June Parliamentary election. In fact the lament by most in the opposition is that the parliamentary election should not have been preceded by the referendum because the latter reawakened ZANU PF from its deep slumber.

I am disappointed that the Prof. takes it as given that Mugabe won the 2002 Presidential election and that 'it was clear that support for Mugabe was higher than in the pre-fast-track elections of 2000' - this of course overlooking the dynamics of that hotly contested election. But even so is it really clear that Mugabe had more support in 2002 because of the land reform programme? Did he, really? I think that is open to contest and is not as clear-cut as the Prof says but I can understand that like most looking from the outside he takes the figures of that election as an accurate record and reflection of popularity. Using electoral figures to prove popularity is misleading because the process itself is questionable. Besides, also missing from the analysis is the millions who voted with their feet by leaving Zimbabwe during that very period - of itself an indication of the clear support that Mugabe enjoyed, or is it?

The Prof. rightly doubts the wisdom of excluding Zimbabwe from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS. At the time I thought it was madness. I do not know when the Prof. wrote his piece but he may have missed the news that the very funds that Zimbabwe got after inclusion were diverted by the government. 'Our' Governor Gono has publicly apologised for this and it has been a very embarrassing episode. Perhaps, with hindsight they were right to doubt the government's sincerity and commitment to use the funds for the intended purpose? Is this not the corruption and abuse of resources that has played a part in the demise of the nation?

As for the lack agricultural subsidies and support for the failure of agric production, there is omission of the fact that the RBZ has led numerous 'operations', including 'Bacossi- and many other schemes that come in different acronyms thrown about - provision of seed, tractors, fuel, etc. What has happened to these facilities? They have largely gone to the political elite and thereafter found their way to the parallel market. This dimension of mismanagement of resources, profligacy and irresponsibility on the part of the political leaders is sadly missing from the analysis.

Prof. Mamdani also falls for the usual trick - that Botswana and Zambia have castigated the Zimbabwe government simply because of pressure from Western countries. That may be so but that's perhaps because he regards some African leaders of not being able to see or think on their own without Western influence. In fact, such characterisation reduces the African to the colonial stereotype of a boy who is forever subordinate to the Westerner. For him perhaps Mbeki who says there is no crisis in Zimbabwe is the stronger man, unlike Botswana-s Ian Khama and the late Levy Mwanawasa (Zambia) who stood firm against Mugabe's rule. The trouble is as I have said earlier, Professor Mamdani continues to see the Zimbabwe problem through the prism of the land question. It is no longer an accurate representation of the Zimbabwean problem, given the clear human rights problems that Zimbabwe has faced in recent years; the clear humanitarian crisis that such countries like Botswana and Zambia see every day at their doorstep. Should Khama overlook these challenges and simply try to understand Mugabe because of the land question? Does he become a puppet of the West simply because he challenges Mugabe-s type opfmpolitics? For indeed, that is the language Mugabe uses against Tsvangirai and the likes of Khama, for daring to criticise and challenge him. And here, it is unfortunate that Prof. Mamdani appears to speak in the same language taking no account at all that these people speak the language of the suffering majority in Zimbabwe.

The same can be said of the Professor's characterisation of the refusal by COSATU members to unload the An Yue Jiang, the Chinese vessel carrying arms bound for Zimbabwe. These people are not aligning themselves with 'distant and long-standing enemies in an effort to dislodge an authoritarian government clinging to power on the basis of historic grievances about the colonial theft of land'. Prof. Mamdani does not see COSATU as aligning with the ordinary people of Zimbabwe - rather, he characterises them as aligning with Western countries. This, to my mind, is demeaning to both COSATU and the long suffering people of Zimbabwe. It is fair to say that here judgment is clouded by the pre-occupation with the land question and the West and overlooking the alignment between COSATU and the people of Zimbabwe, through the union movement. In other words, could it not be that COSATU was aligning with the people of Zimbabwe and not those long standing enemies? You have to understand the context in which this happened - the electoral problems, the despicable violence against ordinary Zimbabweans, people who have no food, no access to clean water, no access to hospitals, schools, etc. This context is, sadly, missing in the analysis.

Finally, there is, in the analysis a failure to appreciate the changes that have taken place in the rural electorate. The old myth is repeated that Mugabe enjoys massive support among the rural peasants. Why, I ask, does Mugabe perpetrate the violence that we saw in rural Mashonaland provinces between March and June 2008 if there is a guaranteed block of support which backs the thesis of the deep rural urban divide? The fact of the matter is that both urban and rural Zimbabweans have suffered under this regime and the existence of that divide is at best fanciful. Violence was used in the run-up to the run-off election because those rural people had most likely voted for the opposition and the terror and displacement of rural people was to thwart that block. This has been a usual tactic, right from the 1980 independence election.

Some of us have family and relatives in rural Zimbabwe - people who have lost everything under this regime; people who once supported Mugabe in droves but have long since pierced the veil and realised the charade in Harare. These people are worse off today than they were in 1979 when the war of independence ended. They supported Mugabe because they believed in him but over the years they have seen beyond the usual rhetoric spewed during election periods. They are the living reality of the trouble with Zimbabwe; they live through it every day and they don-t have to analyse grandiose statements or ideologies - they just know that they have got poorer over the years, oppressed by their own and that this has happened under Mugabe-s watch.

I am afraid, Professor Mamdani's critique is not as rigorous and balanced as I had expected. There are too many things that are missing. I would hate to think that it calls for an understanding of Mugabe's politics because I think the Prof. is well aware that what is going on in Zimbabwe is beyond the acceptable. I just hope that in his analysis he would factor in the Zimbabwean people who are opposed to Mugabe's politics and give them credit for their efforts and not simply characterise it as an anti-colonial project in which Mugabe is fighting the old imperialists who are refusing to give up. Mugabe is also fighting his own people, those who he wishes to liberate.

* Alex Magaisa is based at, Kent Law School, the University of Kent and can be contacted at wamagaisa@yahoo.co.uk or a.t.magaisa@kent.ac.uk

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