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This article participates on the following special index pages:
Talks, dialogue, negotiations and GNU - Post June 2008 "elections" - Index of articles
Kenya and Zimbabwe: No size fits both
Tajudeen
Abdul Raheem, Pambazuka News
September 11, 2008
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/panafrican/50455
There are indications
that after so many false starts, grand standing, braggadocio and
unrealistic demands, both sides in the Zimbabwe conflict are finally
negotiating genuinely and a deal may be reached soon. It will be
a tribute to the much criticised President Thabo Mbeki's tenacity
but also a final realisation by the hawks on both sides that neither
can finish the other without finishing the country.
One recalls a statement
I made at a public meeting in Harare in 2000 soon after the unexpected
defeat of Mugabe and ZANU PF in the referendum on the constitution.
The Public Forum at Hotel Monomopata was organised by SARIPS (a
formidable institute then, under the leadership of Prof Sam Moyo).
The CDD Observer Group was led by Former President of Liberia, Prof
Amos Sawyer, who also spoke at the forum. One of the speakers, Dr
Ibbo Mandaza was booed because of his pro-Zanu PF stance.
My key contribution in
that Forum was that the government was not prepared for defeat while
the opposition was not prepared for victory. My conclusion was based
on extensive conversations we had with different groups and leading
figures on both sides. When we met Prof Jonathan Moyo, one of the
key figures propelling the government proposals, at his Sheraton
residence and office the day before the referendum, I asked him
what will happen if they were defeated. His answer was that there
was no way they could be defeated and if it happened, there was
going to be chaos. When the delegation met Morgan Tsvangirai, the
MDC leader, the same day, his response when I asked him what would
happen if they won, was that there was no way Mugabe would allow
it. He was convinced that the government would jail all opposition
leaders.
Forty Eight Hours later
the opposition had won the referendum and the government had sadza
on its face. Since that day, the doomsday scenario feared for different
reasons by either side had been unleashed on the people of Zimbabwe.
The fundamental reasons
for the seeming unbridgeable gulf between the MDC and ZANU PF are
not that many.
For one, neither of them
thought the other was such a formidable opponent. ZANU PF hardliners
believe themselves the liberators of the country and its only legitimate
leaders into perpetuity. Worse still, the older liberators saw Morgan
Tsvangirai and the youthful urban base of the MDC as a mere rebellion
of prodigal kids that will come to pass. The MDC on its part underestimated
the entrenchment of ZANU PF in the state and society and triumphantly
thought that it could just sweep to power with its urban guerrillas
armed with nothing more than their votes!
Secondly, after the referendum
a reassessment began, but both sides went into the mutual delegitimation
phase which has continued till now. ZANU PF denounced MDC as the
creation and puppet of white settlers and their Anglo-American imperialist
interests. Unfortunately, dominant sections of the MDC reinforced
that image because of the way they attacked the liberation war heritage
and everything ZANU PF did including the Land reform, which happens
to be a very with the Black populations. By so doing, the MDC denied
itself a share of the patriotic constituency.
Thirdly, the delegitimation
produced different coalitions both internally and externally that
encouraged belligerence. Internally and externally Mugabe, who was
knighted by the British Crown and enjoyed cordial relations with
the former colonial power for more than 10 years of his presidency,
now became the Chimurenga war hero again promising to deliver what
he could not do to the masses after 17 years in power. Internally,
the MDC's ambiguities about historical wrongs made it appear politically
closer to settler interests and more friendly to imperialism. Many
Zimbabweans who were tired of ZANU PF became uncomfortable with
MDC thereby furthering the stalemate.
Fouthly, the external
dimension of the support for both sides created a racialist solidarity
that made many Africans and peoples in the Third World to choose
Mugabe and ZANU PF while people in Europe and America and other
pro-western leaders were more sympathetic to the MDC. This made
it difficult to get honest brokers.
And Fifth -
As a result of the pattern of international alliances the MDC became
dismissive of the African dimension of the conflict believing African
leaders and states were as undemocratic as Mugabe, and therefore
cannot call him to order. It took many years for the MDC to start
taking intra African diplomacy seriously, thereby countering the
historical identification with and sympathy for ZANU PF and MUGABE.
Mugabe, having taken African and anti-imperialist support for granted
did realise that people were no longer taking his vitriolic attacks
on colonialism at face value. After the general elections which
he lost in March 2008 before running against himself in the run-off
in June, he became a complete embarrassment. He now needs Africa
more than Africa needs him. In Cairo at the last AU summit, some
leaders regained their public voice on the matter. Also, MDC was
talking more and explaining its position to African audiences and
players on the scene at the political, diplomatic and CSO levels.
How
does Kenya inform the Zimbabwean situation?
The Kenyan crisis and
the role of the AU and the legitimate political framework it provided
through Kofi Annan's mediation and the support it got from the international
community became a possible course for resolving the Zimbabwe crisis.
However similar
they may seem, the parallels should not be forced. The Grand Coalition
of Kenya was possible because composition of government was the
main issue negotiated. In Zimbabwe it is the composition of the
state that needs to be negotiated. If there are parallels between
Kenya and Zimbabwe it is not 2007, but 1992. Imagine if Moi and
KANU had been defeated in 1992 instead of his self chosen heir being
humiliated in 2002?
*Tajudeen Abdul Raheem is the Deputy Director of the UN Millennium
Campaign in Africa, based in Nairobi, Kenya. He writes this article
in his personal capacity as a concerned Pan-Africanist.
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