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Talks, dialogue, negotiations and GNU - Post June 2008 "elections" - Index of articles
Zimbabwe deal sounds fair at first, but the fine print clearly favours
Mugabe
Peter Fabricius,
Cape Times (SA)
August 25, 2008
http://www.zwnews.com/issuefull.cfm?ArticleID=19401
Kids have a
pretty foolproof method of ensuring the cake is divided equally;
one cuts and the other chooses. Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai tried that method last weekend.
President Thabo Mbeki, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and other
leaders of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) offered
him the prime ministership in a new "power-sharing" government
in which Mugabe would remain president. Tsvangirai didn't think
this new prime minister was being given any real executive powers.
So he said to them: "Ok, why don't you, Mr Mugabe, become prime
minister and I will become president?" Mugabe, Mbeki and the
rest all declined. Not surprisingly, when you examine the deal on
the table. On the face of it, it looks alright. It divides cabinet
positions among the parties fairly equally, though Mugabe's Zanu
PF gets a few more than Tsvangirai's MDC (MDC-T) even though MDC-T
has one more seat in Parliament.
But when you add the few that would go to Arthur Mutambara's smaller
MDC (MDC-M), the MDCs together would have a majority. One of the
documents accompanying the deal says the executive authority of
the "inclusive government" would reside in the president
and the prime minister, and would give cabinet the principal responsibility
for formulating and implementing policy. The prime minister would
oversee the formulation of policies by the cabinet.
So far, so good. Then
the catch: Tsvangirai would only be deputy chair of cabinet, while
Mugabe would remain in the chair. That would effectively leave Mugabe
in charge of government and negate MDC-T's proposal, to share power
by leaving the president in charge of the state - the army, foreign
relations etc - while putting the prime minister in charge of government.
Apart from leaving Mugabe in charge of government, Mbeki seems deliberately
to have given the Mutambara MDC - which he reputedly favours - the
balance of power in cabinet. But with the coalition between the
two MDCs apparently crumbling, this distribution of ministries could
leave Zanu PF with an effective majority in cabinet too - though
presumably MDC-M would not agree to anything nasty. With Mugabe
chairing cabinet, it is not clear whether this potentially pivotal
role by MDC-M would count for much.
For rejecting
the deal, Tsvangirai has been accused - by MDC-M and presumably
also the South African government and most other governments in
SADC - of demanding power transfer to himself rather than power-sharing.
However, Marinus Wiechers, former professor of constitutional law
at Unisa and veteran of South Africa's own negotiations for a new
constitution, believes that Tsvangirai was right to reject the Mbeki-SADC
offer because it is not a real power-sharing deal. "It's just
jostling for positions - the really operative side is not addressed."
He says that despite the attempt to dish out ministerships and deputy
ministerships fairly equally, the clincher is that Mugabe retains
the chair of cabinet, which could prove decisive (there is no suggestion
in the deal that cabinet will decide issues by voting - the implication,
at least, is that decisions would be made by consensus). Wiechers
dubs the deal an "incestuous merging" of presidential
and prime ministerial systems. Wiechers says there is no other conflict-resolution
mechanism in the deal, which becomes, therefore, a "recipe
for disaster" - in the form of inevitable deadlock. Wiechers
suggests that SADC should take a leaf out of the international community's
handling of the Kosovo crisis by creating a superior SADC body standing
above all the Zimbabwean parties to arbitrate the deadlocks which
he believes must inevitably arise from the power-sharing deal.
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