Back to Index

This article participates on the following special index pages:

The JOC and the viability of a transitional arrangement in Zimbabwe
Colin Felsman, Idasa
August 07, 2008

View article on the Idasa website

With the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, inaugural President Robert Mugabe and his partners in the liberation struggle promised "to campaign peacefully and without intimidation" and "to renounce the use of force for political ends." However, Zimbabwe-s recent history suggests that Robert Mugabe-s promise at the Lancaster talks, which signalled an end to Ian Smith-s Rhodesian government and paved the way for Zimbabwe-s first independent elections in 1980, was no more than a misleading pleasantry. Allegations of on-going state-sponsored violence, and the inextricable links between military commanders and the ruling party, underscore the failure of ZANU (PF) to transform from an armed liberation movement to a civilian political party. Moreover, given the political dominance of ZANU (PF) post-independence and the increasingly fictional distinction between state and party structures, the increased militarization of the party - and by extension the state - casts a shadow over both the current efforts to break the political impasse and the long-term stability of Zimbabwe.

With the mainstream media and many western powers electing to simplify Zimbabwe-s current political crisis by attributing it to the persona of Robert Mugabe, the role that the Joint Operations Command (JOC) plays in the political environment is consistently and dangerously overlooked. Although JOC-s role is not novel, it has in recent times become more pronounced as Mugabe appears to have lost political support, both from the electorate and within his own party. In the wake of the March 29 elections, this elite assembly- consisting of the chiefs of the army, the police, the prison service, the airforce, the intelligence services, the Reserve Bank and Mugabe himself - solidified its power by purportedly replacing the cabinet as the de facto decision-making body of the state. Through this 'silent coup-, JOC became the guardian of Mugabe-s continued rule and the guarantor of his success in the second round of elections.

Given the central role that JOC and its membership play - both individually and collectively - in Zimbabwe-s current power matrix, and the consequent potential it has to act as a supporter or spoiler of attempts to normalise the country politically and economically, it is imperative to critically analyse this hitherto amorphous clique. By exploring the internal dynamics of this body, from both a historical and contemporary context, this article assesses JOC-s potential impact on a transitional arrangement.

A key component of understanding the devolution of power within Zimbabwe - and within JOC itself - involves examining the historical relationship between the military and the ruling party. It is common knowledge that Robert Mugabe earned his political authority as a leader in the liberation struggle. Yet this legacy is also shared by other key government and military figures, who maintain powerful positions in the government and security structures - most notably JOC - and who share Mugabe-s apparent reticence to relinquish power.

After splintering from ZAPU in 1963, ZANU functioned largely as a guerrilla movement through its Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). As a movement operating from exile in Mozambique and Zambia, the emphasis rested on military action and not on establishing a decentralized party framework. From an organizational perspective, the course of the liberation war can be divided into several Chimurengas, or struggle periods. The First Chimurenga, which began in the early 1960-s, was fought against the British colonial administration while in the Second Chimurenga of the 1970-s the liberation forces competed against the white-minority Rhodesian government led by Ian Smith (created in 1965 through the Unilateral Declaration of Independence).

After independence elections in 1980, the once guerrilla army inherited an influential position as protector of the state. Between 1982 and 1987 Mugabe conducted a state-sponsored cleansing of opposition in the northern-province of Matabeleland. Now known as the Gukurahundi, the campaign targeted supporters of Joshua Nkomo and eventually forced his ZAPU party to accept a marginalized position in a unity government. Though largely ignored by the international community, clear parallels can be drawn between the violence immediately following independence and the current campaign against the MDC. Tellingly, several of its key engineers now grace the ranks of JOC.

During its 28 years in power, ZANU (PF) has crafted a hybrid party structure that ensured its dominance across the country. In order to ascend the political ladder one sought posts within the ruling party. As Mugabe gradually lost popularity it appears the military gained a more and more prominent role. Following this trajectory, after losing the 2000 Constitutional Referendum President Mugabe-s government initiated a "Third Chimurenga" for economic liberation and against enemies of the state. By invoking the politically charged term "Chimurenga," the regime forged a rhetorical link between its struggle against colonialism and its mission to maintain control of the state. This in turn framed the campaign not as one-party oppression but rather as necessary to preserve and safeguard the ideals of the liberation struggle at any cost. Protecting the image of the liberation struggle supersedes the Zimbabwean constitution and outweighs criticism of the substantial policy failures of the ruling regime. Hence robust criticism from the international community is deemed not only irrelevant but in direct opposition to the core ideals of the state. Furthermore, the "Third Chimurenga" collectively identified as "enemies of the state" all opposition to Mugabe-s rule, including legitimate political opposition, and the perceived neo-colonial ambitions of Britain and the United States. Using this link as a justification to securitize the state, Mugabe convened the JOC. Ironically, just as JOC is now meant to defend the state from opposition, it was originally convened by Ian Smith to defend Rhodesia against ZANU and ZAPU insurgents in the 1970-s.

Since its formation, JOC has played an integral role in stifling opposition to Mugabe from both within and outside of ZANU (PF). Prior to the elections of 2002, influential military chiefs announced they would not salute a president lacking "liberation credentials," a telling slight against MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangirai. Lending credence to this claim, JOC played a seminal role in the organization and execution of both "Operation Murambatsvina" (clean-up), the 2005 urban "clean-up" operation, and more recently in "Operation Dzikisa Mitengo" (reduce prices), which enforced national price cuts and resulted in wide-spread looting of stores. In the course of these campaigns JOC employed and coordinated war veterans, "green bomber" youth militia (a reference to their green fatigues), and ZANU (PF) supporters.

Since the March 29 elections, there is clear evidence of a state-sponsored campaign of violence and intimidation. A recent International Crisis Group report asserts that on 2 April a private meeting was held in which members of JOC convinced Mugabe to contest the run-off and guaranteed him victory. These meetings served as the basis for "Operation Makavhoterapapi" (Where did you put your cross?), a reference to those that voted against the MDC in the first round. By establishing 900 command centres across the country and using the polling station returns to easily identify "dissident areas", JOC targeted areas where pockets of MDC supporters voted against ZANU (PF).

The post-election violence has been both highly structured and coordinated. It has involved the abduction or arrest of multiple opposition MPs and raids on the MDC headquarters in Harare. However the campaign has also targeted civilians through the systematic beating of opposition activists, use of rape as a weapon, and the torching and seizure of private property. According to a study by Solidarity Peace Trust, JOC is implicated in 56 percent of the violence committed after the March 29 elections. Harking back to its pre-independence tactics, the regime has resumed holding regular pungwes, or all night campaign rallies, for its youth militia and the broader civilian population. Through these events, a distinct sense of group identity is constructed, based largely on the internalization of ZANU (PF)s- ideology. For militia members, this psychological training validates the use of violence as a means of perpetuating the core interests of the state. In a sense this militarization of the state represents a return to the liberation mentality of violence as governance. Their intimidation tactics are in part reminiscent of the infamous Gukurahundi campaign warranting the nickname, Gukurahundi II.

Although the powerful role that JOC plays in the broader political context in Zimbabwe has become more apparent of late, the distribution of power within JOC remains opaque. The political ambitions and subsequent preferences of these key figures are far from certain. What is clear is that the JOC is not a homogenous body. This prevents any accurate attempt to predict their potential reaction(s) to the SADC mediations. Although JOC appears unified, with a redistribution of power as a result of negotiations it could splinter. Previously, regardless of personal political ambition, ZANU (PF)-s dominance meant that it was always better for an ambitious political-cum-military chief to remain within the party-s structures in pursuit of power. However, with the party facing mounting pressure to share the political mantle from all sides and these structures being the most susceptible to fracture that they have ever been, this is no longer the case.

Mugabe-s near unchallenged 28-year reign is a product of his ability to understand and manipulate power relations amongst friends and foes alike. To this end, loyalty is maintained through an expansive system of patronage politics. Utilizing a controversial land reform program, Mugabe rewarded senior military officials with large tracts of land, while war veterans receive sizable monthly stipends. In addition the majority of state-owned enterprises like the Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) are directed by military officials. The corruption and nepotism inherent to Mugabe-s patronage politics are partly to blame for the country-s demise. But as the economy continues to implode and targeted financial sanctions pressure top officials this intricate system is being placed under considerable pressure, and might collapse. The result would be intense infighting and jockeying for position in a post-Mugabe government.

It appears this process has already begun. Emmerson Mnangagwa, who oversaw the Gukurahundi massacres of the 1980-s as security minister and now directs JOC is viewed by some as Mugabe-s anointed successor. He favors an outcome that retains executive authority for Mugabe and would transition power into his hands after Mugabe retires. Leading an opposing faction is General Solomon Mujuru, the husband of Vice-president Joyce Mujuru, and the most senior surviving member of the liberation struggle. Mujuru is credited with convincing the military to back Mugabe after independence but has since fallen out of favour with Mugabe. After allegedly backing Simba Makoni-s run for president there is speculation that he now seeks a negotiated settlement that would include Tsvangirai. Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono is yet another wildcard. Crisis group reports that Army Commander Phillip Sibanda and Intelligence Director General Happyton Bonyongwe, might have accepted a power-sharing arrangement while Defence Force Commander Constantine Chiwenga, Air Marshall Perence Shiri and Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri were adamantly opposed to a Tsvangirai led government.

In an April 16 interview the ubiquitous Jonathan Moyo - formerly a Mugabe loyalist cabinet member, then an independent politician and now allegedly a key architect of the re-election campaign- described Mugabe "as a weakened CEO . . . still CEO, but one who cannot disagree with his boss." Analysts argue that the increasing role of JOC indicates that Mugabe no longer enjoys the autonomy to unilaterally commit to any agreement or even resign, which calls into question the sustainability of any negotiated political solution that does not directly include JOC. MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai-s has himself said that Zimbabwe is stuck in "a constitutional crisis which is now being presided over by the Joint Operations Command. For all intents and purposes, we are in a military state."

On the back of this position, it is difficult to see how the MDC can commit to any substantive negotiated settlement that does not enjoy JOC acquiescence. Most recently, the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding for the latest round of SADC-mediated talks on July 21 prompted mixed responses on the viability of negotiations to provide a sustainable solution to Zimbabwe-s political crisis. Troublingly enough, the framework for negotiations lacks any mention of the security apparatus, be it the dismantling of JOC or even reforming military institutions under a transitional government. This calls into question attempts to deal with the issue of political violence and the capacity of a transitional government to institute necessary reforms. Given rumors that JOC chair Emmerson Mnangagwa is a favored candidate for deputy Prime Minister, continued influence by the security sector cannot be ignored.

If negotiations are to fail, some worry that the military might emerge as the sole arbiter of the state. This transition would eliminate the need for a decentralized party apparatus or democratic credibility and instead place authority in a military junta that can survive international isolation and rule by the sword. However there is hope that a key member in JOC, like Mnangagwa, can be lured into a power sharing agreement in the interest of long-term political stability and personal gain. At 61, Mnangagwa can still play a prominent role in Zimbabwe's political future. If he is to agree to an amnesty deal and prominent position in a GNU, then perhaps he can also bring along several key members of JOC, effectively bridging the gap between what is now a military state and a future as a civilian government.

Since its re-establishment in 2000, JOC has played a central role in defending the current regime. In exchange for wealth and power these officials coordinated campaigns of intimidation and violence that have undermined the opposition. Yet with an uncertain future and Mugabe-s departure increasingly imminent, the regime-s gatekeepers will be forced to decide between backing a transitional arrangement and dragging the country into further chaos. After inevitable infighting, one can only hope the former prevails.

In recent days there have been reports of JOC members and other political elites transferring their funds to safe locations abroad. It is feared that JOC may slide by quietly during the negotiation process, only to emerge from hibernation to manipulate a Government of National Unity or a future administration. With an apprehensive MDC and ZANU-PF members vying to succeed Mugabe, a lasting solution will be unlikely without a resolution to the all important JOC question.

Please credit www.kubatana.net if you make use of material from this website. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License unless stated otherwise.

TOP