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This article participates on the following special index pages:
Talks, dialogue, negotiations and GNU - Post June 2008 "elections" - Index of articles
History
making and historicity of political party MOU's in Zimbabwe
Takura Zhangazha
July 22, 2008
The memorandum
of understanding signed by Zanu PF, MDC Tsvangirai and MDC Mutambara
in Harare this week has been hailed in some quarters as historic,
and its 'historicity- is tellingly in two parts. The
first being that it is a reflection of historical traits since our
national independence in 1980, where we have witnessed two processes
that led to power sharing between belligerent political entities.
These two would be the Lancaster House Conference of 1979 in tandem
with a Unity government of the first year of independence and the
Zanu PF/PF ZAPU Unity Accord of 1987. They were not identical in
terms of content, or all of the issues raised, but as indicators
of Zimbabwean political culture, they are the forebears of what
we witnessed this week on 21 July 2008.
They indicate a general
trait in which Zimbabwean political leaders have followed a pattern
of undertaking national political missions that have caused tremendous
suffering to the people and then either with claims of having shown
magnanimity or put a rival in a corner he/she couldn-t get
out of , call for drawn out inter party negotiations. And in these
two initial examples, there has been one common denominator, Robert
Mugabe and Zanu PF, who has always, sad to say, emerged with an
upper hand after protracted talks.
So the historic nature
of the MOU, can at first be understood from the point of view of
the fact that it has sort of been 'done- before and
in its being done has not yielded results that address the problems
of good governance, democracy and a people-centred national economy.
It has, in the memories of many Zimbabweans, been about Robert Mugabe
and Zanu PF brokering power for their sole benefit at the expense
of the re-legitimization of the Zimbabwean State.
The second perspective
on the historical nature of the MOU resides in the truth that the
MDC Tsvangirai won the March 29 election with a sizeable majority
in the local government and Presidential election ballot count,
whereas in previous Zimbabwean negotiated settlements, Zanu PF had
always been in the lead, especially in a context where an election
had been held. This means that, historically, the context of this
sort of negotiating between political parties is unique largely
through the fact that Zanu PF is on the back foot, and is negotiating
from a position of weakness. It has fewer seats in Parliament, and
the Presidential election run-off of June 27 has been discredited
by influential countries in both the world as well as in Africa.
The presence of a SADC mediator has also made this MOU significant
from the manner in which other eventually negotiated settlements
have come to being. Never in the history of independent Zimbabwe,
has the direct involvement of the regional, continental and international
community been so apparent, and with full engagement of the United
Nations as well as the African Union.
But be that
as it may, why then would there be a mixture of both hope and skepticism
on the part of Zimbabwean citizens around July 21 2008? The answers
reside mainly in the fact that, the MOU, and its declarations of
secrecy draw parallels with closeted power sharing agreements that
suit more political expediency than democratic change. There is
no doubt and perhaps even understandably so that the political leaders
that are involved in these negotiations will be feeling a sense
of entitlement about this secrecy, as was the case with Constitutional
Amendment Number 18. And in addition, they might feel an urge
to play out the politics of negotiations in clear and unmitigated
pursuit of power for its own sake either to spite one side over
the other or leverage themselves for eventual total victory.
In this vein, it is imperative
that the political leaders be made conscious of the fact that Zimbabwe
is not only in need of their sometimes brilliant political acumen
when it comes to political cakes or sharing the spoils of a low
scale mainly one sided war. In other words, this is not and cannot
be allowed to be another round of talks that are akin to previous
ones that merely sought to share power.
These post March 29 2008
election round of talks must be able to identify what exactly have
been the problems with the ones that have occurred before and also
be able to identify these as threefold.
In the first instance,
the July 2008 MOU cannot merely be a prelude to a power sharing
agreement fashioned along Kenya because this has been tried before
without producing a democratic dispensation. In fact, the products
of the Lancaster House Conference and the Unity Accord missed out
on the critical point that in both instances, Zimbabwe was a society
that had to grapple with a post conflict situation that needed to
be addressed at its roots, as opposed to a political party 'sharing
of spoils- agreement. And this partially explains why Zanu
PF has always resorted to violence as a campaign strategy, even
after negotiated agreements, in order to keep itself in power.
A second lesson that
can be learnt from the past negotiated settlements is that those
that Zanu PF has negotiated with were essentially being cornered
into the negotiations in order to either end violence against their
supporters or ordinary citizens. In this instance, whilst there
has been an unacceptable loss of life, the critical difference is
that Zanu PF is on the losing side in terms of the March 29 electoral
results. Because of this, the opportunity must not be lost and the
people-s verdict must be vigilantly defended by all of the
parties involved in the negotiations.
A third and
final lesson that can be drawn from history and historicity is that
in the past the input of civil society was minimal to such processes.
In 2008, Zimbabwean civil society is ready and willing to input
into these processes with the Zimbabwe People-s
Charter as its foundation stone. This means, civil society must
as of necessity be included in these talks if mistakes of the past
are to be avoided, and its input treated with the respect due to
an equal stakeholder. If this is done, there will be no doubt that
there will be a shift from the narrative of past negotiated settlements,
where the apolitical but nationally important and comprehensive
people-s will was not taken into cognizance. There is now
a critical need to ensure that if any negotiations do take place,
they must depart from the political culture of the past while at
the same time drawing lessons from it. To do this, they must include
the seemingly apolitical will and intentions of a people that are
living in a society that has seen four national violent conflicts
unaccounted for, a national economy that is incapacitated to heal
itself, and a political culture that has the nasty tendency of always
seeking to repeat history.
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