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This article participates on the following special index pages:

  • 2008 harmonised elections - Index of articles


  • The crisis in Zimbabwe and prospects for resolution
    Michelle D. Gavin, Christian Science Monitor
    July 15, 2008

    http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Zim%20testimony%20FINAL.pdf

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    I am grateful to Chairman Feingold and Senator Isakson for this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, and I thank the Subcommittee for its consistent and thoughtful efforts on the issue of Zimbabwe.

    The current state of play with regard to Zimbabwe is characterized by a desperate internal situation, a divided and ineffective set of international responses, and a troubling lack of clarity and consensus regarding the most promising way forward. The United States has limited options, but there are steps that can and should be taken to improve the prospects for a peaceful and swift resolution to the crisis.

    A manmade disaster
    This Subcommittee is more than familiar with Zimbabwe-s recent history. By the late 1990s, economic mismanagement, official corruption, and the dominance of the ruling ZANU-PF party had stoked significant frustration within the country. A referendum on constitutional change that would have strengthened President Mugabe considerably catalyzed the forces opposed to the status quo and led to the emergence of a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), with roots in the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. When the electorate rejected the government backed draft constitution in February 2000, the ruling party embarked on an increasingly costly campaign to shore up its power and guarantee its continued dominance.

    Over the course of parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2005 and presidential elections in 2002, ZANU-PF continued a campaign of intimidation aimed at the MDC, its supporters, independent journalists, civil society activists, and ordinary Zimbabweans (especially the 700,000 Zimbabweans displaced in 2005-s Operation Murambatsvina). The ruling party employed youth militia forces and "war veterans" in addition to using the regular security services to further its agenda. Senior security officers came to have a decisive role in all government decisions. Over time, the MDC was weakened to the point of splitting in 2005, with one faction led by Morgan Tsvangirai and another by Arthur Mutambara.

    Meanwhile, as the economy went into freefall, lucrative opportunities were provided to ZANU-PF elites to ensure their continued loyalty.

    The most recent round of elections demonstrated just how deep dissatisfaction with the ruling party has become within Zimbabwe - and just how far the Mugabe regime is willing to go to cling to power. The extraordinary nature of the MDC-s victories in the March 29, 2008, parliamentary and presidential elections can only be understood when combined with a full appreciation for just how unfair he pre-election conditions were in the run-up to the balloting. Voting day itself was peaceful, but the campaigning period featured incidents of state harassment of opposition candidates, an extraordinarily strong state media bias in favor of the ruling party, manipulation of subsidized food to favor ZANU-PF, and widely publicized statements from senior security officials indicating that they would not recognize any victor but President Mugabe. Even with the deck stacked steeply against them, the official tallies, which the ZANU-PF-dominated electoral commission took five weeks to announce, revealed that opposition candidates fared extremely well with voters, winning a narrow majority in the House of Assembly and a plurality of the votes for President, though not enough to avoid the need for a runoff.

    In the weeks before the runoff election, pre-election conditions went from problematic to terrifying. The Government of Zimbabwe banned many humanitarian and development NGOs from operating in the country and launched a vicious and far-reaching campaign of brutality and violence targeting MDC leaders and supporters as well as everyday citizens. Mugabe and members of his inner circle also made it clear that they would not respect any election result other than victory. In response, Tsvangirai withdrew from the June 27 sham exercise, which Mugabe won in a meaningless landslide.

    Zimbabwe today is a country held hostage by an illegitimate government. As the international community fails to come to consensus on a strategy for resolving the crisis, civilians suffer in the midst of a man-made economic catastrophe characterized by stratospheric hyperinflation, massive unemployment, and food shortages so severe that the World Food Program anticipates that some five million Zimbabweans will be in need of food aid by September. This humanitarian crisis is all the more alarming in light of the Government of Zimbabwe-s refusal to allow NGOs full access to populations in need.

    On top of this grim outlook, brutal political repression continues in Zimbabwe, as hardliners in ZANU-PF seek to continue punishing Zimbabweans for supporting democratic change and to decimate the organizational capacity of the opposition party and of independent civil society organizations. The ruling party continues to keep the
    press on a tight leash and takes deliberate steps isolate and misinform the Zimbabwean people.

    The international response
    The international community-s response to these developments has been disjointed for years, and unfortunately it remains incoherent today. Over the course of the past eight years, the United States, EU, Australia and others condemned the repression in Zimbabwe and in many cases pursued targeted sanctions policies while still trying to provide humanitarian support to the population. In 2004, Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth rather than face expulsion. But many African states have long been reluctant to condemn Mugabe, and South African President Thabo Mbeki-s efforts to mediate between the MDC and ZANU-PF on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have produced very little in the way of results.

    Mugabe has exploited these different reactions, and often characterizes the crisis in Zimbabwe as a new liberation struggle against neocolonial Western powers.

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