Back to Index

Liberation movements in government: Betraying the ideals?
Mary Ndlovu
June 05, 2008

There appears to be a conventional wisdom about the reasons for failure of liberation movements to transform themselves into democratic governments delivering social justice to the people. It has two strands, which complement each other. The first is that the militarization of the movements after opting for armed struggle pre-empted the construction of democratic practice, leaving a top-down command structure which carried over into government; the second is that the pleasures of wielding power led individuals into corruption which then engulfed the whole political process. I would not deny either of these propositions - in fact both are plausible. However, I think they do not go far enough to describe or explain what has happened to the struggle for democracy and social justice which initially inspired liberation movements in Southern Africa.

As we look back to the late fifties and early sixties when liberation movements which still hold power emerged, we need to examine carefully what the actors themselves understood by democracy and we need to consider how the rest of society viewed them, their political activity, and their leadership. I think we will find that there has been a great deal of myth building, born from wishful thinking and unrealistic expectations of leadership emerging from an undemocratic environment. My presentation will apply to Zimbabwe only, but probably many of my musings will have relevance to other states in the region.

The dream
Nationalist parties set out on their struggle for black African government in order to install democracy and equality, which could then lead to social justice and a better life for their people. Their concept of democracy and social justice was hardly developed and rarely questioned. Equality was clearly a dominating concept - but its meaning was limited to racial equality. The context was white rule, where being black meant a limited or non-existent vote, accompanied by restricted educational, employment, property and business owning opportunities.

Other watchwords of nationalists were "freedom", "independence", "one man one vote", and "majority rule". Kwame Nkrumah had advised Africans "Seek ye first the political kingdom". This advice was taken to heart, and the emphasis was on gaining political control through the universal ballot. This would lead to an African government which would implement policies in the interests of Africans. Once an African government was in place, all other racially determined social justice issues would be resolved - including education, health, employment and land issues. Thus struggle from the beginning focused on the constitution, on obtaining the vote for Africans. Issues of the inner workings of democracy did not play a role. Equality meant dismantling the racial structures of government, the franchise, land ownership, education and health provisions so that black people could have equal opportunities. Freedom meant freedom from white rule and replacing it with black rule. The possibility of having to protect that freedom from black oppression was hardly imagined. Thus the vision of a democratic Zimbabwe was limited to the achievement of black majority rule.

The reality pre-Independence
If we look into Zimbabwean politics in the period before the armed struggle was launched, we find very little promise that democracy was being practiced or created by the nationalist parties. In Southern Rhodesia, nationalist parties were led by the so-called petty bourgeoisie - the few educated, some with degrees, some secondary certificates, but the majority with primary school, or trades training. They were frustrated by their own inabilities to progress in society and were able to mobilize the people because they were admired by the people, who were prepared to follow their lead towards a promised land. Their practice was hardly democratic - top-down party organization in which once the leadership was elected they made all the decisions and used the structures to communicate downwards. This style of politics was apparently accepted by the people, who wanted their leaders, who were generally more educated than the rest of the population, to lead, while they were prepared to follow, frequently unquestioningly. Doubtless an anthropologist would relate this to traditional pre-colonial styles of governance, where consultation with a spectrum of the elite would be consulted, but once consensus was reached, it had to be adhered to. From the top to the bottom of the parties, there was an intolerance for alternative views - witness the bitter attacks on anyone who chose to co-operate with government, labeled as sell-outs, traitors. In 1963, when ZANU was formed, violence broke out between members of the two parties, neither accepting that there could be this type of disunity in the struggle. While there may have been some truth to the need for unity, and doubtless too considerable infiltration and instigation of violence by Rhodesian agents, the viciousness of the insistence that everyone must be together that was disturbing. Each claimed to be the genuine liberation movement; refusing to admit that there could be room for more than one.

During the armed struggle there was little sign of democracy anywhere. A military operation can hardly be democratic. It was necessary to build command structures and develop cadres who could follow orders. But even the political structures, where they existed within the country, were distorted to become feeders to the armed struggle, rather than representative voices of the people. Their existence was illegal so they operated underground and their role was to provide recruits, and support the fighters with shelter, food, clothing and intelligence. It was understood that those within the community who expressed a view other than support were in danger, even when they were under pressure from the Smith government or army. Even within the political structures established in exile, the branches, district and province committees had the role of supporting the struggle - whether logistically if they were in Zambia or Botswana - or financially if they were in the further diaspora. And throughout the years of struggle it was not possible to renew representative leadership through elections or congresses. In 1963 Joshua Nkomo had been elected leader for life and there was little challenge to this within ZAPU. Even the rebellions of 1970 and 1971 did not challenge Nkomo-s leadership, but that of his lieutenants. ZANU had even greater internecine power conflicts, both within the political elite and within the military, and between them, and leadership renewal did not come through elected fora, but through power deals by kingmakers.

>From the mid 1970-s the influx of refugees to Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique created a new dimension to the democracy and governance issues. From the early days of the struggle, in 1964, liberation movements were able to operate in Zambia through negotiation with the Zambian government. Their activities were undertaken with the permission and the knowledge of Zambian authorities. The Zambians trusted ZAPU and ZANU - and later the same arrangements were made with the Mozambiquans - to control their own members who entered the country to join the struggle. This meant that the liberation movements became governments in fact if not in name. They had always controlled the military personnel, deciding who was to go where, who would be trained, which camp they would be assigned to, which department they would join, where they would stay. They were accountable to the Zambians for the activities of all their personnel, the passage of material etc. Hence those who entered Zambia under the auspices of liberation movements, primarily without documentation, were not free individuals - their activities and movements were restricted by the party. This might not be surprising for military operations. However, when the refugees started flooding in, there were now also civilians to be administered. These were thousands of people, primarily women and children but also men, who came under the authority of the liberation movements - by this time ZAPU in Zambia and ZANU in Mozambique. The movements would arrange travel documents, food, shelter, education, health, productive activities. They controlled the lives of all these Zimbabweans, none of whom had a voice in their administration. The movement leaders controlled resources on a large scale and already used their positions to enrich themselves and to practice patronage. It is in fact at this stage of the struggle that corruption became endemic, not after independence.

It was also during the struggle that women were exploited in new ways that did not normally happen in rural villages. Several studies have exposed the violation of girls and women in the camps - many even raped by so-called freedom fighters while being escorted out of the country to join the struggle. Sexual favors were used extensively by some of the girls once they understood the situation, to gain advantage in access to food, to safety and protection, to education. Many girls vied for the attentions of more senior military cadres.

What we might consider normal civil liberties did not belong to refugees or fighters. This was the necessity created by the situation, nevertheless it entrenched a pattern of political and administrative control over lives of individuals. In modern refugee camps administered by the United Nations, individuals are not free to move in the host country either, but it is an ostensibly neutral body which controls them. Zimbabwean refugees were placed in camps under the control of their political parties turned liberation movements, and this surely had an impact on how relationships developed between leaders and people. Anyone who became "undisciplined" - i.e. questioned the leadership - could be punished as a security risk or at a minimum denied privileges. The adulation of leadership which began before the armed struggle continued, enabling those in military, political and administrative positions to misuse the power which they held both to enhance their own comforts and to abuse others under their control. Democracy was light years away.

What happened to social justice issues during the struggle? These were tackled in the context of humanitarian assistance to refugees. Children under 16 were not recruited to the armies, but were placed in schools, even though these were subject to air and land attack and were hence guarded and took on a military aspect. The camps provided food, shelter, education, health care and also skills training as a variety of projects were introduced both to help the camps become self-sufficient and to provide some kind of base for trained civilian personnel after independence. Within Zimbabwe, social justice was considered something to be achieved only in the future, under black rule. Military necessity took priority, and schools, clinics, transport, communications and irrigation and dipping infrastructure became targets, simply because they were operated by government.

It is clear, then, that the political kingdom of independence and African majority rule took priority through the sixties and 70-s. There was little concern for creating any checks and balances to curb excesses of power or misrule by the party leadership; nor was there any expectation that individuals would develop or express views at variance with the political policies of the leadership. Fighters and civilians to some extent were encouraged to learn Marxist or socialist theory and even to debate its application, but it was not expected that they would challenge it. Resistance to the leadership consequently came through military-based rebellions; even disputes over policy were settled by force, being considered challenges to leadership. It may have been assumed that this militarized situation would not continue after independence, but behaviors were being unconsciously learned which could prevent any flowering of democracy after the birth of Zimbabwe as a nation.

Zimbabwean independence was negotiated at Lancaster House after the liberation armies had gained sufficient military advantage to force Ian Smith to the table for a compromise deal. At Lancaster House, the focus was on racial equality, but compromises had to be made by the Patriotic Front in the area of voting and representation rights and land ownership. Thus seats were reserved for white voters out of proportion to the numbers in the population, and their land rights were guaranteed for ten years. A Declaration of Rights was included in the Westminster-style constitution, but these were all civil and political rights, not economic, social and cultural rights. In the historical context this should not be surprising. The African Charter was not yet in force, and no African country yet had these rights in their constitution. The political was still seen as primary - as long as there was representation of the majority and those representatives formed the government, they would do the right thing for the people.

The reality post-Independence
The enthusiasm with which Zimbabweans flocked to the polls in March 1980 demonstrated their belief that the vote could realize their dreams of a better life. Beyond that they did not see a role for themselves - government would provide, government would decide - and the people would enjoy the fruits. Democracy was limited to voting for representatives; once again, the patterns of the 60-s were repeated - simply vote leaders into power and let them get on with it. This form of shallow democracy reflected the experience of many developed countries as well, but in the hands of a political leadership whose experience was of military organization it quickly betrayed the hopes of the people. The village and ward committees which were organized in the rural areas were little more than party structures, vehicles again for communication top-down and control of all development activity. Democracy at local government level was limited by the continued restriction of voting rights to property owners, while central government retained powers of control over finance and appointments. But no one seemed to be very much concerned. Residents- associations which had been active in the pre-Independence period became moribund, apparently not seeing any meaningful role for themselves now that black government was in place. Non-government organisations focused on development and service provision. Again, the expectation was widespread that government would do its work for the people. Issues of racial equality were still being worked through; issues of social equality across class lines were considered by very few commentators, as the progress of the people through education in particular was manifest. Leaders were there to lead, and they should be allowed to do their work. At the same time, leaders were still adored and raised on pedestals of unassailability, even expected to benefit materially from their high positions. Concern when it did come was from within ZANU PF, as some of its less self-serving members attempted to introduce a leadership code to restrict the accumulation of private wealth by leaders.

The authoritarian political style which existed before the armed struggle and which was reinforced by the dominance of military structures in exile continued. By 1983 ZANU PF had made it clear that it would not tolerate any organisation based on popular structures outside its own. Government quickly to establish control over the media. Radio and television were already a state monopoly, but the main daily newspapers were bought out from their private owners and became government mouthpieces.

The labour movement was the first to succumb, as strikes only weeks after Independence were crudely suppressed and participants jailed. Government then moved quickly to pre-empt any revitalization of an independent labour movement, placing its own cadres in key positions, and later wrapping the unions up in restrictive legislation.

Political opposition, even though it represented no meaningful threat to ZANU PF-s supremacy, was treated even more roughly. Space for the development of other political parties was closed down as the ZAPU leadership and party structures were systematically eliminated between in 1983 and 1985. Non-ZANU voices quickly became labeled as "dissident" and equated with the alleged armed resistance of ex-ZIPRA army deserters. While there may have been ex ZIPRA deserters from the ZNA who returned to the bush, and there may have been weapons caches destined either for the ANC or for internal use, no sober analyst could have regarded these as any serious danger. ZIPRA-s strength as an independent force had been destroyed in the second Entumbane conflict and the few cadres who did make contact with the South African Defence Force were neither a military nor a political threat. Nevertheless ZANU PF-s punishment of the Ndebele people and those who they called their leaders was nothing short of a genocidal massacre. ZAPU leaders at the top were mostly detained without trial, the lower level leaders were abducted, tortured and eliminated and their followers were starved, displaced, tortured and murdered. Any resemblance to present events is not coincidental; the patterns being observed today were drawn in the 1980-s. The message then came through loud and clear - no political opposition would be tolerated, even if it posed no threat to ZANU PF-s rule.

The corruption scandals emerged equally quickly, the first widely publicized one being that involving Paweni-s falsification of documentation regarding the supply of food during the 1982 drought relief programme. Paweni himself was arrested and incarcerated at Chikurubi, but the politician who was said to have benefited the most remains a senior member of government. Evidence of further widespread corruption emerged in the following years, as did the subversion of the judiciary.

Looking backwards from nearly thirty years on, one can recognize the priorities of the liberation movement in power: the political kingdom still came first; if it was secured, social justice would be on the agenda. But social justice would not be achieved through further democratization of the political process - it would be a gift of the government in power, the government of liberation.

Thus the liberation movement in power failed to introduce democracy, showed itself prepared to subvert its institutions, and became rapidly mired in corruption. The causes are not difficult to establish. First, the understanding of democracy was a shallow one, with the nationalists, both leaders and members, accepting that the role of the people in a democracy was simply to elect leaders who would then deliver the goods. Second the ideal established view of leadership was authoritarian, stemming at least partly from traditional culture. Thirdly, the militarization of the struggle in the late 60-s and 70-s allowed for the entrenchment of a command leadership, with decisions taken by a small elite and passed down the structures both military and political. The administration of refugee populations established the practice of tight control over civilian lives as well as corruption and patronage systems. Thus when Independence finally came, the experience of democratic practice was weak if it existed at all. It was easy to continue the established forms of decision-making, leadership and control, but legitimize it through a popular election allowing everyone to vote.

Too late came the realization on the part of citizens that they had neglected to assume responsibilities of participating in the development of democracy through civil society. It was only at the end of the 80-s and the beginning of the 90-s when ZAPU had succumbed to terror tactics and corruption was clearly endemic while economic and social progress had stalled that civil society began slowly to emerge from its cocoon - first the students, then the trade unions, and finally organisations dedicated specifically to rights and governance - Zimrights, NCA, and then a plethora of others. By the time they had grown sufficiently strong to make a difference, ZANU PF was very firmly entrenched, entirely corrupt, had perfected the patronage system and finally, completely abandoning the pretence of democracy, claimed entitlement to rule by virtue of having "liberated" the country from white domination.

Civil society has a great deal of catching up to do. What is most disturbing is the growing understanding that current opposition parties are cast largely in the same mold as ZANU PF. People talk about the zanufication of politics - the authoritarian leadership styles, corruption, use of violence, top-down communication and absence of democracy which seems to characterize the MDC as well. While some would say this is because its members were generally politically schooled within ZANU PF, it could equally be argued that this was the political culture of Zimbabwe even before the beginning of the armed struggle, and was solidified by the experiences of the liberation war, within both liberation movements.

Zimbabweans who feel that the liberation ideals have been betrayed are surely not wrong - today we have neither democracy nor social justice. But we must remember that those were ideals only, and each of us has our own interpretation of what they mean. Looking back, we might ask ourselves why anyone ever expected a liberation movement such as ZANU PF to build democracy in Zimbabwe. Their failure lies as much in the nature of democracy itself as in failings of organisations. Democracy is a form of accountable government which grows and develops through experience and practice. Many nations have taken centuries to nurture its evolution, to create that symbiosis between leadership and citizens which can produce the "growth with equity" envisaged by our celebrated Minister Chidzero; others, such as Germany or Japan, appear to have created successful models in shorter periods. But thirty years is hardly long enough to establish a deep political culture which is at variance with what went before. Together as Zimbabweans the challenge of democracy still confronts us. It is now for a new generation to begin again, to accept that civil society has as important a role to play as do politicians in helping to build democratic structures and democratic practice in our own organisations and to hold accountable any government which accedes to power.

Please credit www.kubatana.net if you make use of material from this website. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License unless stated otherwise.

TOP