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Namibia
and Zimbabwe - the second liberation
Henning Melber, Pambazuka News
May 13, 2008
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/48050
Henning Melber looks
at the possibilities for a people-centred opposition and ultimately
a true liberation in Namibia and Zimbabwe, after years of misrule
by the liberation movements-turned-ruling parties.
'There is a need
for a healing of the nation. The process of national healing and
reconciliation is unlikely to proceed as long as society is still
polarised. In addition, without also addressing past crimes, corruption,
marginalisation and poverty, it is unlikely that reconciliation
can be achieved.-
This insight
was contained in the Kenya mission report of the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM). It was submitted by the APRM panel of eminent
persons to the continent-s heads of state at the African Union
summit in July 2006. One and a half years later, Kenyan society
was traumatized by the worst violence since independence and its
people more divided than ever. The (allegedly orchestrated) civil
war-like situation erupted over disputed election results. It showed
that, beneath the surface of a seemingly peaceful society, deep-rooted
antagonisms could be mobilized to unleash blind hatred and massive
destruction of property and lives between people who had hitherto
lived in relative peace with each other. In such circumstances an
assumed socio-political stability proved to be treacherous, fragile,
and prone to easy manipulation.
Many societies
in Africa are confronted with similar challenges. Since the mid-1990s
national reconciliation initiatives have emerged in a series of
African countries. These were inspired by the widely praised Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa, which symbolized
the country-s collective effort to come to terms with a past
that still dominated its present and could have a lasting impact
on its future. Despite all its limitations, the TRC has been widely
perceived as an encouraging initiative, as a lesson in bringing
skeletons out of the closet and dealing publicly with the lasting
effects of violence and counter-violence. Far from solving structurally
rooted historical legacies and their daily impact on the lives of
ordinary citizens, or ending discrimination, or bringing to task
many of the perpetrators, it brought to the fore the need to address
history in the present. Similar initiatives were taken in other
war-torn societies marred by organized repression and mass violence,
which had left festering wounds and scars among people now longing
for healing and seeking a common future.
Two former settler societies
neighboring South Africa are among the countries whose governments
did not follow this trend and refused to seek national reconciliation
by means of public debate and transitional forms of justice and
reconciliation. Zimbabwe and Namibia achieved their independence
through long anti-colonial struggles led by liberation movements.
In both cases the final defeat of colonialism was not achieved through
the barrel of a gun (although the military dimension had an important
role in forcing the colonial power to the negotiating table) but
through agreements reached between the parties for change. These
provided a transitional framework which limited the space for social
transformation and the redistribution of wealth.
As a result of this negotiated
decolonisation, the former liberation movements (Zanu PF in Zimbabwe
and SWAPO in Namibia) were elected as legitimate governments in
1980 and 1990 respectively and have held absolute political power
and control over the state bureaucracy since then (although, as
we can currently see in Zimbabwe, not for eternity). In contrast
to South Africa-s democratically elected government under
the ANC, the Zimbabwean and Namibian political leadership never
pursued anything similar to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Instead, they proclaimed national reconciliation as some kind of
pragmatic agreement which became effective with independence. Their
policy was to leave the past behind, with no public debate or dialogue
over the injustices committed (although selective reference to colonial
crimes was made when needed and commemorated as part of the liberation
gospel).
In both societies the
justification for casting this kind of official smokescreen over
the colonial past was rooted to some extent in the argument that
the repressive machinery of colonial occupation had been staffed
and executed by many who at independence could no longer be held
accountable. This was either because of an amnesty declared for
those on all sides of the conflict, or because some of the worst
abusers of human rights had retreated to their British or South
African countries of origin. National reconciliation was defined
in terms of closing the colonial chapter without seeking justice
through institutionalized hearings or other forms of coming to terms
with the past. The cleansing process, which to some extent was initiated
and implemented in the South African TRC, was conspicuously absent.
Not so, however, the collective blame placed on colonialism for
all subsequent failures in post-independence nation building and
re-structuring of society, which (despite some relevant aspects)
was often used as an excuse to evade responsibility for 'good
governance-.
This seemingly pragmatic
(and rather self-righteous) approach denied the need and missed
the opportunity to deal with failures in the ranks of the liberation
movements themselves. This had never been the main issue in the
TRC, but was unavoidably brought to the fore when the excesses of
the apartheid regime were laid open. Even though the degree of self-critical
examination of human rights violations within the ANC was rather
limited (and hampered the final process of publicizing the TRC report-s
findings), it nevertheless became an issue for which President Nelson
Mandela apologized to the victims and their families. Having been
imprisoned for almost three decades since the early 1960s, Madiba
was a charismatic leader and moral role model who could apologize
for failures in the exiled ANC, for which he was obviously not personally
responsible, nor perhaps even aware. This sign of remorse and indirect
moral responsibility only added to his aura.
In contrast,
both Robert Mugabe of Zanu PF and Sam Nujoma of SWAPO were active
leaders in exile, deeply involved in internal power struggles. They
were not only an integral part of the authoritarian hierarchy but
its personification. In ultimate charge of the command structures
dominating their liberation movements, they were to some degree
personally accountable for the abuses and malpractice within their
ranks. As heads of state they were not inclined to address such
issues. Instead, past injustices on all sides would be put to rest.
By doing so, however, the liberation movements sacrificed the moral
high ground they had been able to occupy vis-à-vis the oppressive
colonial regimes. Their own failures remained unfinished business
and left festering wounds within the new post-colonial societies.
The dominant mindsets emerging at independence represented more
of an old order than a new one and showed the limits to liberation.
In Zimbabwe,
violence within and between the liberation movements escalated soon
after independence in organized massacres in Matabeleland (the western
part of Zimbabwe occupied mostly by Ndebele-speakers considered
in large part to be supporters of the Joshua Nkomo-led ZAPU, which
competed with Zanu PF for power). Between early 1983 and late 1986,
an estimated 20,000 people were killed in horrific acts of barbarism
carried out by the Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe National Army,
trained by North Korean military advisors. Although known and reported
at the time, the massacres went largely ignored, even by the former
colonial power. Described by Robert Mugabe as Gukurahundi ('the
rain that washes away the chaff before the summer rains-),
this organized mass violence was a defining moment for his regime.
The Catholic church in Zimbabwe was a lonely voice in revealing
the scale of the atrocities. Since then, the openly violent character
of Mugabe-s rule has drawn worldwide attention. However, it
only became a concern for the international community (represented
by Western countries) when the so-called fast-track land reform
process dispossessed most of the commercial farmers and portrayed
the conflict (misleadingly so) as one between a remaining white
settler minority and the government. This suggests a moral selectivity
in Western perceptions, which the populist rhetoric of the despotic
regime managed to exploit.
As part of the
Namibian independence process, several hundred members of SWAPO
in exile, who were accused of being South African agents, were released
and repatriated in mid-1989. Known as 'ex-detainees-,
they shared their plight with the Namibian public at home. Since
the early 1980s several thousand were thought to have been imprisoned,
tortured and raped in camps in southern Angola. Many did not survive
the ordeal; others remain missing. Ever since their return, these
ex-detainees have asked for rehabilitation and an apology from SWAPO
for the human rights violations committed. But the liberation movement
in power has applied a policy of denial, on the grounds that this
would open wounds and thereby put peace and stability at risk. Moreover,
SWAPO argued the atrocities by the South African regime and its
local collaborators would also need to be scrutinized in return,
which would undermine national reconciliation. Instead, and similar
to the official narratives cultivated by Zanu PF in Zimbabwe, SWAPO
started a 'nation-building project- guided by what has
been termed 'patriotic history-, which cultivates the
gospel of an organization and its leaders as the morally impeccable
liberators of the people.
In both Zimbabwe and
Namibia the former liberation movements in political power were
also granted the power of defining the national interest. But the
political and ideological hegemony assumed at independence is now
deteriorating, with governments failing to maintain control over
the one-dimensional collective identity constructed and imposed
earlier on. This has been evident since the turn of the century
in Zimbabwe, with the emergence of the MDC as a meaningful political
opposition, suggesting that the liberation gospel has an expiry
date. The coerced legitimacy of the government has been eroded,
provoking intimidation, an ever-growing culture of fear, and ultimately
rule based on state terror. As we know from history, these kinds
of dictatorial regimes sooner or later come to an end through the
same popular movements that they intimidated and oppressed for so
long.
In Namibia, an opposition
emerged towards the end of 2007 from within the belly of the beast.
Former high-ranking SWAPO officials formed the Rally for Democracy
and Progress (RDP) to challenge the undisputed dominance of the
former liberation movement. The next presidential and parliamentary
elections, scheduled for the end of 2009, could result in SWAPO-s
loss of its two-thirds majority in parliament, and hence absolute
control over the country-s political and legal decision-making
process. Nervousness is mounting. Leading office-bearers in the
Namibian government warn of a Kenyan situation and blame the new
opposition for fuelling ethnic rivalries. This is an argument which
resorts to the culture of fear rather than seeks reconciliation
and common ground; it names and shames others rather than identifies
common denominators as Namibians. Such a knee-jerk response to political
challenge also suggests an inability to deal with one-s own
shortcomings and failures.
Leaders of the
Namibian Lutheran churches have responded to the growing polarization
by means of a pastoral letter read out during sermons on 23 March
2008 and later published. In light of the violence that erupted
between the two main rival parties, triggered by a local election
campaign, the bishops of the three churches expressed their fear
that the country is moving backwards rather than forwards in terms
of freedom and democracy. The bishops wrote in their letter of 'intolerance,
verbal and physical attacks and counter attacks-. They warned
that 'failure to redress this situation now can lead to mass
loss of lives country wide-. 'What we say as leaders . . .
is the seed which bears the consequential behavior for violence
and peace . . . Political opponents are not enemies, but participants
in a democratic set-up.- This is the first time since independence
that the church has commented on the country-s politics in
this way. Alarm bells are ringing, but Namibians still have the
opportunity to learn from the sad lessons in Kenya and elsewhere
- not least in neighboring Zimbabwe, which in many respects
is so close to home.
*Henning
Melber is Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
in Uppsala, Sweden. A son of German immigrants to Namibia, he joined
SWAPO in 1974. This text is a contribution to 'New Routes -
A Journal of Peace Research and Action' vol. 13, no. 2, 2008, to
be published by the Life & Peace Institute.
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