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No time for 'quiet diplomacy'
Sean Jacobs, Amandla!
April 14, 2008

http://www.amandlapublishers.co.za/content/view/496/154/

The ANC president Jacob Zuma's public criticism of Robert Mugabe's government for its failure to release two week-old presidential election results in neighboring Zimbabwe, contrasts sharply with South African president Thabo Mbeki's announcement this weekend - following a meeting with Mugabe at the regional summit called to address the post-election crisis in Zimbabwe - that there is "no crisis" in Zimbabwe.

Zuma's statement certainly breaks with his previous position. In the past when confronted with Mugabe's despotism, he noted: "If the people love him ... how can we condemn him?" Zuma's statement also appears more in tune with reality. Anyone who's been following the news knows that Mbeki is wrong. As independent observers of the elections have noted: in the run-up to the elections the ruling Zanu-PF used the police and army to intimidate opposition supporters, the government banned critical media (al-Jazeera, whose correspondent is openly pro-Zanu-PF, was the only non-African TV news station allowed to report the elections), packed the electoral commission, and prevented Zimbabwean exiles from voting.

The truth, however, is that Zuma will have little influence on Mugabe or Zanu-PF partly because the faction that took control of the ANC under Zuma has more in common with the Zimbabwean opposition. Zuma became ANC president through a loose coalition in which the leadership of South Africa's largest trade union federation played a central

role. It has not helped that MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai on his visit to South Africa last week actively sought out Zuma's advice or that key MDC leaders laud the current ANC leadership as a "more trade-union backed ANC". This analysis is shared by Mbeki's brother, Moeletsi, who spent his political exile in independent Zimbabwe before returning to South Africa.

More importantly, political power in the ANC is now shared by two duelling factions: the Zuma-controlled ANC on the one hand and on the other, a government dominated by Mbeki loyalists. The second faction still holds the cards on government policy, including when it comes to Zimbabwe (the two leading government-ANC figures mediating on Mbeki's behalf are both in his camp.)

Nevertheless, all this does not matter much since the leaders of the 12-nation Southern African Development Community (SADC) supports Mbeki as the preferred negotiator between Zanu-PF and the MDC. Mbeki therefore enjoys more of a structural relationship with Mugabe that Zuma does not have.

So Zimbabweans and those with an interest to (at least) see the electoral crisis resolved (that the ballots be counted openly for one), should keep putting pressure on Mbeki.

One other note: Mbeki finds himself in a difficult position. This is partly of Mbeki's own doing. He has not endeared himself to the Zimbabwean opposition as an honest broker with his policy of "quiet diplomacy", which has effectively served as cover for Mugabe and the armed forces, the ruling party and its paramilitaries to abuse the people of Zimbabwe.

On the other hand, however, Mbeki's supporters (and defenders) point out that he has had to thread softly around Mugabe (and the latter's inner circle, including senior army officers who have publicly stated their refusal to serve an MDC government) who appear impervious to the opinions or arguments of even its allies and who are now more than ever wounded by their evident defeat in last month's elections. They are armed, wealthy and have some support and could return to the repression of the early 2000s (with their farm invasions, and violence against and displacement of opposition supporters).

Nevertheless, that alliance - sources from inside Zimbabwe indicate - seems fraught at present (some generals seemed willing to "talk" to MDC leader Tsvangirai and Mugabe's candidature was not unanimously supported within Zanu-PF), while Mugabe is in perhaps the weakest position in his own party since he lost the 2000 presidential referendum vote.

As a result this may also be an opportune time for Mbeki to seize the initiative and abandon his policy of quiet diplomacy and force Mugabe to negotiate openly with the MDC.

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