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Democracy without wealth, the Gordian knot in African politics
Alex T Magaisa
January 13, 2008

http://www.thestandard.co.zw/viewinfo.cfm?linkid=21&id=8155

A key structural weakness of aspiring African democracies is rooted in an old paradox, which, almost invariably, stifles them at birth. It is that, on the one hand, democracy confers political power to an impoverished political majority. On the other hand, the attendant neo-liberal economic policies tend to restrict wealth in an elitist minority. There is, therefore, a clash between a majority that is politically powerful but weak economically and a powerful market majority that is weak in political terms.

Significantly, the political and economic gains of democracy are not synchronised. Political power to the majority appears first but economic gains tend to emerge in the long term. This gap between expectations and reality causes a great amount of consternation among the impecunious political majority and this inherent imbalance threatens the sustainability of young democracies.

Whether there is a causal link between democracy and wealth is an old question. High priests of democracy are in no doubt that there is a positive causal connection. The economic success of Western democracies is often used as an example, which stands in contrast to most poor nations. It is a persuasive argument, though it conveniently ignores the weight of history - that the economic prosperity is also a product of complex historical dynamics, of which modern democracy is only a part.

These historical dynamics notwithstanding, the causal link between democracy and wealth is regarded as palpable. Politicians, a breed that thrives on hyperbole, tend to promise immediate material benefits based on that causal link. What this message does, however, is to raise expectations of the ordinary people, whereas in reality, the improvement of material conditions is a more complex and long term issue.

The result is that even if a government is making decent progress on the economic front, the impact on the ordinary people is less likely to be felt in the immediate term. Electoral democracy, with its term limits, provides little time for the economic gains to set in. Unsurprisingly, the political majority will tend to use its power to oust the government. The trouble is that this political majority is more likely to use this power to elect a new but similar set of politicians, making similar promises. Consequently, there is a persistent cycle of promises, frustration and ouster but little economic development.

The frustrations of the poor political majority in South Africa are directly related to the belief that they have not yet enjoyed tangible economic benefits of democracy. This is despite the widely acknowledged economic success steered by President Thabo Mbeki's government. Figures from Statistics South Africa show that economic growth over the last 5 years has averaged around 4.5%. International financial institutions such as the IMF acknowledge this economic progress.

This celebrated economic success notwithstanding, Mbeki lost the election for the ANC presidency in December 2007. Other faults are pointed out for his political demise, but the chief constituency of his opponents is the poor section of SA society. In Mbeki's place, they elected Jacob Zuma who revels under the title of champion of the poor. They have used their political power in the hope that Zuma will deliver economic success to their door-steps.

Similarly, the chief grievance that confronted President Mwai Kibaki in Kenya emanated from the belief that the new democracy had failed to bring economic gains to the poor political majority. This large political constituency used its political power to register its chagrin with his rule in his first term. It is palpable that economic watchers have been puzzled by this reaction. Only on 30 May 2007, the IMF Staff Mission issued a press release, commending Kenya for its strong economic performance. The IMF agreed with the Kenyan government's positive projections for the economy in the year 2007/8. But as recent events have shown, clearly, a large number of Kenyans do not share the optimism of economic interpreters. These large numbers on the periphery of the market economy have chosen to place faith in Raila Odinga, who, like Zuma, trades on the title of champion of the impoverished.

The democracy/wealth paradox in these two countries reverberates across young African countries. Electoral democracy gives political power to an impoverished majority but material gains take longer to materialise. Much of the disappointment is about wealth disparities, especially when the gains are restricted to the elites, who often engage in shameless conspicuous consumption.

In the growth trajectories, the force of democracy is more visible and has immediate impact, whereas the force of economic change is slower and less visible. The difficulty is that the opportunities for effecting change in politics are much quicker, in that a government's lifespan is only as long as the next election. But any new government elected by the impoverished political majority is likely to face similar expectations and frustrations because the delivery the economic gains takes time. They may find that, attempts to effect quick and radical wealth redistribution to please the political majority are likely to offend the market majority and upset the traditional macro-economic set up. Consequently, things can get even worse.

Yet these repeated cycles of governmental change are unlikely to produce sustained economic growth in the long term. The ordinary people are, therefore, likely to remain perpetually poor and frustrated. Without wealth to safeguard and aspirations to pursue, frustration tends to metamorphose into violent conduct. Developing a culture that is conducive to the growth of values that sustain a democracy cannot work in conditions of poverty and chaos.

A relatively wealthy society provides conditions to sustain a long-term democracy. It is important to reduce the wealth gap between the political majorities and the market majorities. Market majorities prefer order and security and are vulnerable to the threat of poor political majorities. It is therefore important to create incentives so that political majorities and market majorities share the similar values and aspirations. But can wealth redistribution be effected without stifling wealth creation? Can South Africa bring immediate material benefits of the economic growth to the poor political majority without upsetting the powerful market majority?

The poor political majority in South African may yet select Zuma for the presidency in the hope that he will do more than Mbeki to bring home the benefits of the strong economy. But Zuma himself will have no better example than Zimbabwe, north of the border, on the perils of sudden, radical and unplanned wealth redistribution. Whatever good intentions that the Zimbabwean government had in attempting wealth-redistribution it committed the cardinal mistake of doing so without having regard to the element of wealth creation. Zimbabwe provides the lesson that it is suicidal to attempt wealth redistribution whilst simultaneously stifling wealth creation.

If it is true that democracy creates the best conditions for wealth creation, it must also be true that sustainable democracy requires certain levels of wealth across society. It follows, in my view that the key to creating stable democracies is to fight poverty and improve the economic conditions of the ordinary people. The key to untying the Gordian knot is to unlock wealth to the poor political majority, whilst reassuring the rich market majority. This is a major challenge that confronts African democratic movements, including Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change as it seeks to become the next government in the forthcoming elections. A new era of responsible politics requires that politicians create reasonable and practical expectations among their supporters. Otherwise, they risk facing similar backlash when in government, as events in South Africa and Kenya demonstrate.

Dr Magaisa is based at Kent Law School, UK and can be contacted at wamagaisa@yahoo.co.uk or a.t.magaisa@kent.ac.uk

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