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Demystifying
the matrix of the Third Way: A product of failed political focus
Sydney Chisi
November 23, 2007
The mediation
talks seem to be taking a new twist all together and Morgan is finding
the terrain very difficult as the crisis within his formation is
deteriorating at an alarming rate, whilst Zanu has shown that it
was never going to negotiate itself out of power neither was it
willing to treat MDC as an equal negotiating partner. It is clearer
now that Zanu has been in these talks so that it deals and does
away once and for all the issue of its illegitimacy. As drama unfolds
it is untrue that the current crisis within the MDC will grandly
affect the way people are going to vote, thanks to Zanu-s
media monopoly and the jamming of radio stations such as Studio
7. The pulse of the people on the ground is not going to be seriously
affected as the economic meltdown, cash shortages and shortages
of basic commodities are at the centre stage of people-s needs
and livelihood. The media blackout that Zimbabwe has suffered over
the years compounded by the partisan stance that the state media
has adopted, will mean that the common person in the political process
in Zimbabwe will be quick to dismiss all allegations against MDC,
and justify it by saying it is the work of the CIO. Those people
who are going to be affected are the ones who are emotionally attached
and have access to internal dynamics within the MDC. The last ten
eight years of MDC-s existence, has taught the people the
tricks that the current regime can do to remain in power. All this
becomes an entry point for Morgan to solve the problems bedeviling
the MDC as soon as possible, before it degenerate to an extend that
even the non suspecting customers will begin to doubt the capacity
of MDC as an alternative democratic vehicle. Morgan should celebrate
the existence of blind followers!
It is with this
background that the third
way will remain a mirage, with anyone imagining that being unrealistic
given the political climate, the investment that the MDC has put
into the electorate over the past years. The idea of the third way
is elitist and will remain so. This is because its thrust is centred
around the constitution as the means to an end of the Zimbabwean
crisis . This means that, following that school of thought will
ultimately mean that justifying a new political force will be limited
to academia, and those who on their own small groupings can break
down the matrix so as to answer the needs and expectation of the
general population of Zimbabwe. These factors will mean that the
thrust of mobilizing the people for that agenda will be minimum
as a movement can never be formed around the mistakes of another
movement. Zanu has a constant support base which is consistent,
on the other hand, MDC has a fragile but equally religious support
base whose electorate shifts between serious participants and vulnerable
to apathy. For the third way to be built enough to have a support
base that challenges any force in any election can only be done
upon the collapse of MDC or Zanu, not from a bunch of disgruntled
members of the two forces. Third force does not have the capacity
to mobilize before the next election and without individuals who
currently appeal to the electorate
Looking beyond the people
who might be given the mandate to lead the third way as a product
of the People-s Convention can only come from already organized
movements. This puts and leaves the ZCTU and NCA as potential hubs
to which they can provide leadership for that third force, however
if we look at people like Wellington Chibebe or Lovemore Madhuku,
they are individuals who have tactically chose to be on the periphery
of the party processes whilst their own movements have been weakening
as the democratic space crushed for all those in the democratic
movement. Thus their life in the political arena can only be defined
well if the people-s convention come up with clear political
options and alternatives, which would mandate a movement to be revamped.
The only people who can form the third way and in conjunction with
anyone who might be disgruntled from Zanu especially are those with
a political mandate, and Mudzuri is the person at this particular
time. What I therefore seen is that any definition of a third force
is in actual fact the reconstitution of the leadership of the MDC
with maybe a new name, a discourse that has begun to take centre
stage within the party corridors. There are however chances that
a reformed MDC could be on the cards soon after elections where
a 'special congress- might be held in the most likely
event that MDC loses those elections. People like Gorden Moyo of
Bulawayo Agenda, might take this time to be in the political limelight
and join the band.
What we must all realize
is that Zanu has 'intact- factions. From the Zapu oldgurad
vs Zapu extremists, Zvobgo Vs Muzenda and now the so called Mujuru
Vs Mnangagwa-Mugabe factions. It should thus be interesting to note
that the later faction is in actual fact nonexistent. It is typical
of the Zanu culture to which speculation becomes rife in the media
more than in real terms. The so called Mujuru faction is a consortium
of business people whose interest is to keep political power, but
more so their investments. What they need thus is an economic solution
rather than a political solution centered on Mugabe. That is the
reason why there is clear bad blood between Joice Mujuru and Gedion
Gono the Reserve Bank Chief. What we should understand thus is whether
Mujuru will be able to convince the people of Zimbabwe without a
Mugabe mask? Can Simba demystify the rhetoric of sanctions, puppets
of the west, in the event that he joins hands with Morgan or he
opposes Mugabe. There has not been any meaningful strategy of exposing
the ills of the current leadership in such a way that the die-hard
Zanu supporters will begin to see alternative leadership in the
Mujuru faction. There is very little room left for any person to
imagine a fall out within Zanu since Zanu has already started campaigning
for elections, with Mugabe in picture as evidenced by the new campaigning
regalia. MDC on the other hand has been waking up to a shock as
their energy is on the talks, clean-up process, compounded by a
weak information and counter intelligence strategy and overally
a clear road map to which people can be currently be rallying behind.
This kind of a situation has been left to deteriorate to the extent
that even the leadership of MDC started to see mediocrity, irrelevance,
and that the weak end became was Morgan as an individual and not
MDC as an organisation. As a leader, he did not make matters any
good as he became prone to misinformation and ill advice, a product
of the secrecy and non inclusivity of the mediation talks with dead
wood ending up as his confidantes.
This secrecy then brought
out a product that many people assumed was informed by the talks.
In real terms Constitutional Amendment 18 is not a product of talks,
but of the Goromonzi Zanu congress of 2006. It was at this congress
that Mugabe realized that he was no longer popular, as his candidature
was not confirmed automatically as had been the case in the previous
pre-election sessions. Between December 2006 and May 2007, we then
witnessed internal dynamics within Zanu, to which Joice Mujuru lost
the president-s favour. Chinamasa (a natural anti Mujuru fanatic,
recall the Tsholotsho debacle) and Munangagwa (Mujuru-s competitor
and Mugabe-s secret choice) were appointed to deal with Mujuru
technically and CA18 was the code. What then MDC agreed to or claim
to have changed in CA18, was a Zanu agenda, which they brought to
the talks as way of 'lightening up the stage- and not
a product of how the talks were proceeding. The amendment to the
electoral act as seen in the bill is beyond the talks as Mugabe
prepares for the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon. This can also be seen
by the hurried 'reconstitution- of the Media Commission
and the team tasked to deal with the Daily News case. All these
acts are a quest to give an impression that something is shaping
up because of talks, without Zanu being committed to it that is
the reason all these processes do not have a time frame attached.
This and any provisions of electoral law, requires a massive institutional
reform and the opening of citizen participation space.
The question then comes
as to where we are as a people and as an organized platform called
the civic society. What we have failed to do over the years is to
make sure that as we supported the new democratic dispensation,
with the MDC as the political option, we failed to retain our role
of being the watchdog. Being a watchdog the terms of reference is
not only to educate people to vote, citizen participation, decision
making, gender mainstreaming, but that of making sure that we define
the technical route to which that population would travel post conflict
era. This means there is need for a serious transitional framework
formulation, not only to inform the MDC but to start owning a process
to which the donor community can entrust their funding through organizations
that understand political and economic dynamics in a way that they
would be able to influence policy in the new government. Whilst
the MDC has been working on different policies including its RESTART,
it is critical for the relationship of the civic society of Zimbabwe
and the MDC to be centred on such fundamentals and allow to a greater
extend MDC-s influence and to make informed political decisions.
The role of the civic society is thus to break down those policies
and repackage them in such a manner that it allows people to see
the future, and more importantly what to vote for if not whom to
vote for. Whilst a new constitution could be one of those frameworks,
it is should be understood that even with a good constitution there
could still be systematic abductions, torture or intimidation.
But how do we define
transition in the Zimbabwean context? To me transition is beyond
just having a new government, it is about dealing with the current
crisis of legitimacy that the current regime faces, and the formation
of governance structures that will make sure that government as
a functional unit is capable of delivering. This transition can
only be possible if MDC participates in the elections, and even
if it losses, possibilities of EU/US accepting the results are high
so as to enable the opening up of a platform of to which Zimbabwe
can be able to move forward as a nation. Whilst it is clear that
Mugabe does not have rich vein to produce expertise to be ministers
anymore, he might find it difficult to continue with his recycling
agenda. Thus a government of national unity might be the best option
so that he deals with delivering but his quest for legitimacy, it
is about how that government will be prepared to do away with Zanu
culture of continuity on a destructive path, and allow the separation
of powers to be real. A weaker core (executive) and a strong periphery
(judiciary and legislator) should be the road map to which donor
assistance can be prepared to assist in post conflict transformation.
These aspects and that of demanding an environment that will ensure
a free and fair election should be core to the civic agenda.
This thought will allow
the new government to seriously strategies on its short term plan
of action, which includes dealing with confidence building mechanisms
at all levels of national development including the economy and
international community. The civic society thus should note that
it has a role to play beyond the coming of a new government, whether
that government is an MDC or Zanu (PF) government.
Thus Zimbabwe as a nation
has a chance, whilst the democratic force has to focus on their
core priorities.
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