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Crisis
group-s Zimbabwe report doubly flawed
Nicole Fritz, Business Day (SA)
September 27, 2007
http://allafrica.com/stories/200709270359.html
The International
Crisis Group (ICG) released a new report on Zimbabwe recently titled
Zimbabwe: A Regional
Solution? Any report issued by the ICG is to be taken seriously.
Strangled neither by the grubby compromises of realpolitik, nor
inflated by the quixotic visions characteristic of so much nongovernmental
organisation activism, the ICG is able to walk a middle ground,
often proposing the most sensible and effective solutions for countries
in crisis. Yet, surprisingly, its most recent report, calling on
the extension of a large aid package to Zimbabwe conditional on
full co-operation with the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) mediation process, suffers the flaws of an approach that
is both too pragmatic and too idealistic.
Although the report insists
that the objective of any Zimbabwe reform process cannot be regime
change but must be the guarantee that all adult Zimbabweans are
able freely and fairly to elect their next government, the report
also contends, without any suggestion that this might be problematic,
that SA and SADC mistrust the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC),
especially the larger faction led by Morgan Tsvangirai. If that
is so - given the ICG-s access to various high-level sources
there is no reason to doubt this - that hardly suggests that SA
or SADC are well positioned to act as good-faith mediators or to
best secure an environment in which free and fair elections can
be held. The report maintains, also without critical comment, that
given the fracturing of the MDC, "the political risks the ruling
party and SADC members who distrust the opposition are being asked
to take are relatively limited".
In essence: neither Pretoria
nor SADC should be concerned about the reform process ahead of the
Zimbabwe elections as those elections will almost certainly return
to power the party of their preference: Zanu PF. But this would
seem, again, quite at odds with engagement in a process aimed at
securing free and fair participation. In footnotes, the report attributes
suspicion of the MDC to its association with white farming interests,
the west, etc, and remarkably suggests that ethnic considerations
might lie behind Pretoria-s ostensible preference for the
Arthur Mutambara-led faction of the MDC. Allegedly, Pretoria wants
the Ndebele, closely aligned with the Mutambara faction, represented
in government. If there is any credibility to such claims, it seems
to follow that the South African government should at least be called
on to explain such preference.
The report-s central
recommendation is that President Thabo Mbeki and SADC should require
the west to lift sanctions and extend a large aid package conditional
on full Zanu PF co-operation with the mediation process and implementation
of reforms. And yet, as the report admits, Mugabe has been particularly
adept in outmanoeuvring his opponents within Zimbabwe and outside.
This leaves the reader to question why, if Zimbabwe under Mugabe
were to be offered such relief, he would, in fact, honour any undertaken
given. What leverage might be used once the package has been extended?
If the ICG report maintains that the best hope for a resolution
to the Zimbabwe crisis is a seemingly deeply partisan SADC-driven
mediation process, it says too that the only real prospect for change
in Zimbabwe comes from Zanu PF itself and not the fractured political
opposition.
Here it appears to forget
its own insistence on preconditions essential to free and fair elections
- such as the removal of ghost voters and the enfranchisement of
the diaspora. With those secured, who knows the result a free and
fair election might yield and what response the fractured opposition
might offer if, combined, it commands a majority? The risk with
this type of pragmatism-heavy analysis is that it pre-emptively
forecloses on other outcomes, conditioning ways forward on only
a very few alternatives. In fact, it is exactly this type of approach
- an insistence that SADC is the only way ahead - that may help
explain the MDC-s rather surprising recent support for a constitutional
amendment that seems only to prejudice its chances in any ensuing
elections.
But if the report is
too pragmatic it is also unreasonably idealistic. Its premise -
that SADC is potentially able to and will exert meaningful pressure
and criticism in respect of Zimbabwe, and can avoid the duplicity
and hypocrisy of the west - ignores real regional alliances within
SADC. As the report itself acknowledges - and then seems to discount
- "some members (of SADC), Namibia and Malawi in particular,
remain Mugabe supporters; Angola, often a regional rival, would
not be dissatisfied to see SA-s mediation fail." But
whatever the geopolitical or personal alliances, can it really be
expected that SADC states will blithely ignore their own political
realities? Can Angola, long overdue elections, let alone free and
fair ones, genuinely insist on such a process for Zimbabwe? And
will Swaziland-s king, who brooks no political opposition,
be meaningfully concerned about the Zimbabwean government-s
failure to allow the same?
* Fritz is the
director of the Southern Africa Litigation Centre
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