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We desire a future that is not like the present: On Zimbabwe, SADC and Dag Hammarskjöld
Henning Melber
Extracted from Pambazuka 321
September 27, 2007

http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/43473

This paper was presented to the Africa University Annual Conference on the 'Commemoration of the Legacy of Dag Hammarskjöld', held in Mutare, Zimbabwe, 24-26 September 2007. The author, Henning Melber, was prevented from participating in the event, since the Zimbabwean embassy had informed him a day before his departure from Sweden that the immigration authorities in Harare had turned down his visa application.

During a visit to India in early February 1956, Dag Hammarskjöld presented one of the very rare impromptu speeches of his career as second Secretary General to the United Nations (1953-61) when addressing the Indian Council of World Affairs. Prompted by a moving encounter with local culture performed in his honour earlier on, his mainly extemporaneous speech explored the dimensions of human universalism. A commonality beyond Western - or, indeed, any other culturally, religiously or geographically limited - ideology or conviction.

'It is no news to anybody, but we sense it in different degrees, that our world of today is more than ever before one world. The weakness of one is the weakness of all, and the strength of one - not the military strength, but the real strength, the economic and social strength, the happiness of people - is indirectly the strength of all. Through various developments which are familiar to all, world solidarity has, so to say, been forced upon us. This is no longer a choice of enlightened spirits; it is something which those whose temperament leads them in the direction of isolationism have also to accept.'

Isolationism is a phenomenon guided by a lack of reality, or by selective perceptions, found often by leaders and their followers. It is a universal feature, and not confined to any particular society or group. By no coincidence it was the British Lord Acton, who stated, within the society considered to be one of the cradles of the modern day political system called democracy, that power corrupts, and that absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Former liberation movements, who, after long and painful sacrifices by the oppressed people fighting against colonial occupation ultimately secured the fundamental right of self-determination and seized the legitimate political power based on popular vote, are not protected from these temptations. As a result of such 'limits to liberation', Zimbabwe is in the midst of an ongoing crisis. The 'political economy of decline' can hardly be ignored by anyone living in or having insights into the social and political realities. Even though Zimbabwe has frequently denied the freedom of movement and the freedom of expression to those seeking to form or to articulate a view on the ground; just as the apartheid settler colonial regimes of Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa had done during earlier (and definitely not so good old) days.

Notwithstanding such disturbing features of limiting the freedom of individuals, to which numerous (and much more serious) incidences against its own people over the years since the Gukurahundi of the mid-1980s in Matabeleland have alerted us, some maintain the impression that 'business as usual' exists (and maybe it does?). There remain 'professional denialists', who continue to dismiss any such notion - even if the authorities of a state without any serious crisis of legitimacy could afford to allow visitors to enter their country freely. Zimbabwe's ambassador to neighbouring Namibia (where an increasing number of Zimbabweans are seeking refuge and thereby testify to the ongoing crisis at home) stated in an interview to the state-owned daily newspaper as late as mid-September 2007 that, 'Zimbabwe [ . . . ] is a peaceful paradise and politically stable since 1980'. Asked how the political situation in his country can be resolved, he answered: 'The question is misleading because it assumes that there is a political problem in Zimbabwe. This is not the case. There is no political situation in Zimbabwe.' According to most others, and in direct contradiction to the diplomat's view, there clearly is.

These more critical views do not have to be a part of or closely affiliated to any of the organised political rival groupings contributing to a chronic state of protest, unrest and repression spiralling the country's people further into misery and suffering. The sub-regional body, SADC, has officially acknowledged the need to mediate, with the goal to bring the decline to a halt and the country back on track towards a peaceful future in stability. The Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State held, because of the Zimbabwe crisis, on 28-29 March 2007 in Dar-es-Salaam, however, provided a classic example of a dilemma, when it 'reaffirmed its solidarity with the Government and people of Zimbabwe'. In this case, obviously, one can hardly have it both ways.

It is fair to assume that Zimbabwe 'has posed fundamental questions about the extent to which SADC members can and should intervene in the internal affairs of other member countries for the sake of regional interests. [ . . . ] SADC has been slow to respond to the crisis. It has failed to replicate the positive solidarity that SADCC members once levelled against apartheid South Africa.'

Notwithstanding the reservations provoked by the ongoing double-bind message by SADC as the sub-regional organisation as well as individual SADC member countries, the latest assessment of the International Crisis Group (ICG) concludes that the regionally negotiated solution would be the most feasible option for Zimbabwe:

'The next few months present a moment of truth. [ . . . ] SADC and its member states have the capacity to reverse a downward spiral which increasingly threatens the region's stability but they must be prepared to support the initiative they have begun and Mbeki's mandate. This means using economic leverage, conditioning a recovery package on performance and making clear that if there is no cooperation they will not hesitate to call the initiative a failure and reject elections that are not a product of their mediation and do not comply with SADC's own democratic standards.'

Such pro-active policy is a kind of interference, which corresponds with the new political realities and a common understanding as codified in the currently applicable documents guiding African continental politics. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) deviated in a substantial paradigm from the fundamental principles of the earlier Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

The non-intervention into matters of member states had been a hitherto holy principle, on which the OAU based its continental policies. The AU constitution has replaced this by a clear notion of collective responsibilities, which under grave circumstances even justify joint intervention into the internal affairs of the member states. This new approach has already provided results by means of a visible implementation on several occasions.

Along similar lines and despite all critical analyses - justified with regard to the reluctant pursuance of the noble goals defined - The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) have created a corresponding new paradigmatic framework for good governance and the commitment by African states to comply with such defined standards. It could do no harm to measure those governments not volunteering to this screening exercise according to similar criteria and seek their application. Similarly, as suggested by SADC at its last ordinary summit in August 2007 in Lusaka, a few among the growing number of voluntarily retiring elder statesmen and former presidents might be a suitable task force to seek negotiations with an aging autocrat reluctant to give up power.

But seeking a lasting solution for Zimbabweans means more than entering into a negotiated compromise in terms of power sharing among segmented political elites representing different interests, while offering guaranteed protection for perpetrators if they comply with such controlled change. In an analytically remarkable Pastoral Letter released by the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops' Conference on Holy Thursday of 2007, the internal, class-related roots of the current Zimbabwean crisis were highlighted:

'Black Zimbabweans today fight for the same basic rights they fought for during the liberation struggle. It is the same conflict between those who possess power and wealth in abundance, and those who do not; between those who are determined to maintain their privileges of power and wealth at any cost, even at the cost of bloodshed, and those who demand their democratic rights and a share in the fruits of independence; between those who continue to benefit from the present system of inequality and injustice, because it favours them and enables them to maintain an exceptionally high standard of living, and those who go to bed hungry at night and wake up in the morning to another day without work and without income; between those who only know the language of violence and intimidation, and those who feel they have nothing more to loose because their Constitutional rights have been abrogated and their votes rigged.'

This insight is of relevance not only for Zimbabwe. It is relevant for all societies marred by antagonistic forces culminating in extreme social disparities, where a privileged few feast at the expense of the marginalised majority. This includes (though is anything but confined to) the societies in (southern) Africa, who for both external as well as internal limiting factors have not managed to overcome the colonial legacy and its fundamentally unjust and discriminating social structures and corresponding mental dispositions.

This paper opened with a quote from a rather spontaneously motivated speech by Dag Hammarskjöld in 1956, documenting his firm belief in the unity of humankind and its shared values and norms. Much remains in this world, even half a century later, as a continuing challenge to enhance such understanding. A challenge, which clearly embraces the need to reduce the gross imbalances, which, in a very concrete and lasting material sense, prevent the full implementation of such universal ethical and moral norms to the benefit of most, if not all, in this world of the early 21st century.

But the lack of progress does not mean that Hammarskjöld's words and visions were neither practical nor realistic. For him, the work of the United Nations should build on the commonality of humankind, its conduct and experience:

'With respect to the United Nations as a symbol of faith, it may [ . . . ] be said that to every man it stands as a kind of "yes' to the ability of man to form his own destiny, and form his own destiny so as to create a world where the dignity of man can come fully into its own.'

These words should continue to serve as an invitation to jointly turn all corners of this world into a better one to the benefit of the ordinary people. 'In such a world', the late Secretary General further clarified in no uncertain terms, 'it is impossible to maintain the status of "haves" and "have-nots", just as impossible as it has grown to be inside the nation state'. The challenge to turn his words into social and political realities remains on our agenda. It includes the southern African region in general, and, in particular, Zimbabwe.

Such a demand is by no means a Eurocentric fantasy of neocolonial or imperialist interventions, as so often claimed by those local elites under siege, simply because they are measured and judged against universal standards and values relating to fundamental and undivided human rights based principles and norms: the same principles and norms, they claimed to be fighting for, when fighting against settler-colonial minority regimes denying them those rights. The same rights they are now denying to so many among their 'liberated' people. The current necessity to take sides is by no means drawing a dividing line along race or the North-South axis, as relevant as such criteria for historically rooted privileges, identities and interests might generally be. Instead, such dismissals of human rights-related notions are nothing more than a smokescreen, a constructed escape route for those, who try to get away with cheating again the 'wretched of the earth'. As a pan-African human rights campaigner clarified:

'I have heard some people argue that the "enemies" of Africa now crying about human rights did not burden their conscience with such luxuries when benefiting from 400 years of industrial scale slavery, colonialism and brutal exploitation of Africa and its peoples. In other words, that 'white farmers' deserve some of their own medicine. Not only does such thinking reduce Africans to the moral bankruptcy of colonialists, it also fails to understand that it risks granting unlimited and indefinite power to Africa's actual and imaginary liberators such that we may all end up being shackled by them. Africa's liberation movements drew their moral strength from the fact that on the balance, they fought for social justice, human rights, equality and democracy - for all [ . . . ].'

The 25-year old unemployed Harare woman Ndakaitei captured the sentiments after three chimurengas on behalf of a frustrated post-independent urban youth when she cried out: 'We desire a future that is not like the present!'

Notes and references

I owe this information (and the quotes) to the fascinating manuscript submitted by Manuel Fröhlich on 'The Unknown Assignation'. Dag Hammarskjöld in the Papers of George Ivan Smith for forthcoming publication with the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in its new Critical Currents occasional paper series. This will then - like many other publications - also be available on the Foundation's web site: http://www.dhf.uu.se

Dag Hammarskjöld, 'The United Nations - Its Ideology and Activities. Address before the Indian Council of World Affairs 3 February 1956'. In: Andrew W. Cordier/Wilder Foote (eds), Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Volume II: Dag Hammarskjöld 1953-1956. New York and London 1972.

Henning Melber (ed.), Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa. The unfinished business of democratic consolidation. Cape Town: HSRC Press 2003.

Suzanne Dansereau/Mario Zamponi, Zimbabwe - The Political Economy of Decline. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute 2005 (Discussion Paper; 27).

A recent volume included a variety of case studies from SADC countries ranging from better to worse practices with regard to state presidents (not) leaving office, including Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; see Roger Southall/Henning Melber (eds), Legacies of Power. Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics. Cape Town: HSRC Press and Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute 2006.

Rotimi Sankore, 'Pan Africanism and the Zimbabwe Crisis', Pambazuka News, no. 319, 12 September 2007.

* Henning Melber came to Namibia as a son of German immigrants in 1967, where he joined the liberation movement SWAPO in 1974. He was director of The Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU) in Windhoek (1992 to 2000) and research director at The Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala/Sweden (2000 to 2006). He is presently the executive director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation.

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