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This article participates on the following special index pages:

  • SADC mediated talks between ZANU (PF) and MDC - Index of articles


  • Zimbabwe mediation - lessons from Lancaster House
    Emily Wellman
    September 26, 2007

    " Who are you, Mwanawasa? Who are you? Who do you think you are?" No, these are not words uttered by Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa' s psychologist during an afternoon session on the couch. According to South Africa' s Business Day these are words shouted at Mwanawasa by no other than Robert Gabriel Mugabe, president-under-pressure of Zimbabwe

    This comes as no surprise. Mugabe is no longer only under siege by the international community, with some exceptions such as Malaysia, Libya, China and Guinea-Bissau, his brothers and sisters of the South African Development Community have now also had more than enough of Mugabe's dictatorial and deceiving shenanigans.

    With the crisis in Zimbabwe reaching incomprehensible levels from week to week and with human suffering increasing at an alarming rate, the country has been turned from regional breadbasket to international basket case. Several SADC members have recently stepped up the pressure on Harare to
    reform.

    SADC increases pressure

    Tanzanian diplomats reported that behind closed doors at the SADC heads of state meeting in Dar Es Salaam in March of this year several presidents made appeals to Mugabe to change his ways, even step down. SADC countries that are said to be most vocal in their disagreement with President Mugabe are
    Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and South Africa. Behind closed doors, that is. Angola and Namibia are seen to be Zimbabwe supporters.

    What Mugabe's tantrum at the August SADC summit makes blatantly clear is that he has no respect, nor ever will have, for certain of his fellow African, let alone SADC, Presidents. He has no respect for Mwanawasa and no respect for Mbeki. "Who are they?" In his mind they are junior presidents who have no business telling a senior 'liberation hero' such as Mugabe anything, let alone giving him advice on pension packages.

    It is time SADC repaid Mugabe in kind. Mugabe only listens to and perhaps even respects might, power and strength. He is a classic authoritarian in that sense. This would also explain why he gets along so well with people such as president-for-life Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, although Nguema's oil may add to fostering the friendship. So what SADC needs to consider is showing him as little respect as he gives them: bring diplomatic pressure to bear.

    Threaten expulsion from SADC, do not invite him to heads of state meetings, or leave him out of a few meetings at the next summit. There are many diplomatic measures that can drive home the message that the Zimbabwe Presidency and Government are increasingly isolated.

    Zimbabwe's possible exclusion

    To strengthen this point all one has to do is draw some lessons from zimbabwe's history. More specifically from those infamous negotiations of 1979 which produced the Lancaster House agreement. These lessons are critical for the South Africa lead talks. And they identify some challenges for the success of these talks. At least for the prospect of true democratic
    change in Zimbabwe.

    The most important factor that assured a negotiated settlement in 1979 was that the frontline states, Zapu and Zanu's strongest allies in the civil war against Ian Smith's racist minority regime, were prepared to use coercive measures against Zanu and Zapu in order to get them to truly commit to negotiations and the outcome.

    They were prepared to withhold any further support of Zapu and Zanu and their armed forces. Mugabe specifically was told that his Zanla forces would be kicked out of Mozambique and that its command would face arrest if he didn't commit to a peaceful and negotiated settlement.

    This earlier example puts paid to the myth that African states and presidents do not use coercive incentives on each other. Let us look at the leading southern African statesmen of the 1970s Nyerere, Machel and Kaunda.
    They gave it to Mugabe straight - commit or face sanctions. And while he would rather have returned to the bush, Mugabe recommitted to the negotiations and to the outcome of Lancaster.

    So there are a multitude of lessons to be learnt from the Lancaster process:
    African leaders have used coercive measure against one another and actually got things done as a consequence - it must be noted that they also brokered extra financial commitments, carrots, from the international community for a
    new Zimbabwe in return; Mugabe mostly, if not only reacts to the proper use of sticks and carrots, namely the use of power and coercive measures in a well timed combination with the use of freebees and financial assistance; Mugabe is indeed the 'freedom fighter' style politician and always reverts back to those strategies when necessary, he is conservative; and he would rather fight than talk.

    Most importantly SADC must close ranks and isolate fighter-president Mugabe.
    The brotherhood is already in tatters over Zimbabwe. Consensus about not only the use of incentives such as the 2005 SA conditional offer of financial support and the now conditional SADC offer of financial support must be counterbalanced by the timely use of sticks. If not, Mugabe will
    continue to manipulate the region and build on the minority-complexes and lofty pan-African ideologies of some of its leaders.

    SADC Mediation

    A big challenge to this end is South Africa's role as facilitator or mediator. South Africa, despite a perceived political, ideological, economic - depending on the analyst one listens to - unwillingness to use sticks against the Zimbabwe state does not have much choice as the supposed neutral mediator. If as mediator they would threaten coercive measures, conflict management theory tells us the confidence of the Zimbabwe Government would falter forthwith and the talks would break down.

    However, if SADC is to entertain the idea of motivating the Zimbabwe Government to truly commit to change, not only will they need to close ranks but as the economic and political power house South Africa may need to play a role in assisting with coercive measures.

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