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The sanctions debate on Zimbabwe
Brian Raftopoulos
September 19, 2007

http://www.africanews.com/site/list_messages/11629

Since the explosive politics of the period of 2000 and beyond in Zimbabwe the issue of sanctions against the Zimbabwean state has been a nagging question at both national and international levels. In 2001 both the US and the EU imposed targeted travel and financial sanctions against selected Zanu PF officials, and the US passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA). The latter prevents representatives of the US on the boards of the International Financial Institutions from voting in favour of renewing allocations to Zimbabwe or canceling debt under the prevailing conditions in the country. Moreover it sets out that certain actions have to be taken around the restoration of the rule of law, free and fair electoral conditions and protection of private property, before any changes to these restrictions. The formal case for the prohibition of loans from the IMF and World Bank therefore relates to the poor economic policies that have been carried out by the Zimbabwe government in recent years.

Targeted Sanctions

More recently this year the Australian government has imposed academic study restrictions on the children of Zanu PF leaders. Moreover a major Australian Bank, Westpac Bank of Australia, has severed business ties with Zimbabwe financial institutions, citing credit and country risk and the targeted sanctions from the West. Beyond these restrictions there are at present no UN sanctions against Zimbabwe, and therefore the punitive actions remain at the "smart sanctions- level.

For both the civic groups and the MDC there has been a certain uncertainty about how to position opposition groups on the sanctions question. There has been a great deal of uncertainty and ambiguity within both MDC formations over the issue. The uncertainty and ambiguity stems from the fact that the sanctions issue has been seen to be more an outside agenda, than one driven by national forces within Zimbabwe. There has been very little open discussion of the issue amongst the democratic forces in the country, and therefore no cogent position and mobilization strategy around sanctions has emerged from either the opposition political party or the civic groups.

There has been a great deal of apprehension about being seen to be pushing an outside, "Western" agenda, and one that has not found ownership amongst Zimbabwean citizens. All the factors which have allowed Mugabe to paint himself as the "anti-imperialist" warrior have prohibited a clearer position from the opposition forces on this issue. The broadly African-Western state opposition on the Zimbabwe question has meant a very serious lack of international consensus on the causes of, and prescriptions on, the Zimbabwe problem. Because of this lack of an international consensus, constructed around North-South differences, the civic and opposition forces have wavered in clearly articulating their own position.

SADC Position

This has been a genuine dilemma for the opposition forces in Zimbabwe. It should also be said that the way that SADC is currently structured makes it unable to deal with such authoritarian states as the Mugabe regime. This has meant that the regional body has been very weak in pre-empting the imposition of various forms of Western sanctions, by undertaking its own effective measures against such states. The result has been a greater space for political maneuverability by such repressive states as the Harare regime.

At present any further discussions on other forms of sanctions on the Zimbabwean state will depend on the outcome of the current Mbeki-led SADC mediation. If, as seems possible, some form of compromise is reached through the mediation, any further talk of sanctions will become largely redundant. The division in the MDC has also undermined consideration on further sanctions by weakening the possibility of a political alternative, and increasing the attraction of a 'reformed- Zanu PF agenda for the international community. This is in any case the preferred option of SADC and the Mbeki government. The debate on Mugabe attending the EU-Africa summit in Portugal later this year has revealed the divisions within the EU on the Zimbabwe question, with the German government appearing to be something of the wild card on this issue.

Thus as matters stand the combination of African solidarity on the Zimbabwe issue, the SADC mediation, lack of international consensus, division within the opposition, and increasing EU equivocation on what actions to take against the Mugabe regime, makes the issue of sanctions an increasingly difficult strategy around which national democratic forces can mobilize around. There is a sense that much of the political initiative has now moved to the Mugabe regime, notwithstanding the grave economic crisis in the country. Further opportunities to discuss more sanctions will in large measure depend on whether the recalcitrance of Zanu PF politics and the crisis of leadership in the ruling party will prevent it from taking the opportunities presented by the SADC mediation, which, given the current balance of political forces in the country, very much favour Mugabe-s party. The effectiveness of political sanctions depends fundamentally on a broad consensus on the political crisis in a particular country. The clear absence of this on the Zimbabwe crisis makes the option of broader sanctions against the Zimbabwean state an increasingly difficult proposition.

The reality of the balance of political forces within Zimbabwe is that the both the MDC and the civic movement have been gravely weakened over the last few years, as a result of both state repression and internal organizational and ideological weakness. This has impacted on the capacity of opposition forces in the country to articulate clearer positions and mobilize on issues such as the sanction question. The result has been that this issue has been largely constructed as an external initiative with no support from African states. This stand-off has meant that the opposition in Zimbabwe has been seen to benefit from a policy that has not been sufficiently canvassed at national level. The implications of this have been quickly and repeatedly exploited by the Mugabe regime.

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