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The
sanctions debate on Zimbabwe
Brian Raftopoulos
September 19, 2007
http://www.africanews.com/site/list_messages/11629
Since the explosive politics
of the period of 2000 and beyond in Zimbabwe the issue of sanctions
against the Zimbabwean state has been a nagging question at both
national and international levels. In 2001 both the US and the EU
imposed targeted travel and financial sanctions against selected
Zanu PF officials, and the US passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and
Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA). The latter prevents representatives
of the US on the boards of the International Financial Institutions
from voting in favour of renewing allocations to Zimbabwe or canceling
debt under the prevailing conditions in the country. Moreover it
sets out that certain actions have to be taken around the restoration
of the rule of law, free and fair electoral conditions and protection
of private property, before any changes to these restrictions. The
formal case for the prohibition of loans from the IMF and World
Bank therefore relates to the poor economic policies that have been
carried out by the Zimbabwe government in recent years.
Targeted
Sanctions
More recently this year
the Australian government has imposed academic study restrictions
on the children of Zanu PF leaders. Moreover a major Australian
Bank, Westpac Bank of Australia, has severed business ties with
Zimbabwe financial institutions, citing credit and country risk
and the targeted sanctions from the West. Beyond these restrictions
there are at present no UN sanctions against Zimbabwe, and therefore
the punitive actions remain at the "smart sanctions-
level.
For both the civic groups
and the MDC there has been a certain uncertainty about how to position
opposition groups on the sanctions question. There has been a great
deal of uncertainty and ambiguity within both MDC formations over
the issue. The uncertainty and ambiguity stems from the fact that
the sanctions issue has been seen to be more an outside agenda,
than one driven by national forces within Zimbabwe. There has been
very little open discussion of the issue amongst the democratic
forces in the country, and therefore no cogent position and mobilization
strategy around sanctions has emerged from either the opposition
political party or the civic groups.
There has been a great
deal of apprehension about being seen to be pushing an outside,
"Western" agenda, and one that has not found ownership
amongst Zimbabwean citizens. All the factors which have allowed
Mugabe to paint himself as the "anti-imperialist" warrior
have prohibited a clearer position from the opposition forces on
this issue. The broadly African-Western state opposition on the
Zimbabwe question has meant a very serious lack of international
consensus on the causes of, and prescriptions on, the Zimbabwe problem.
Because of this lack of an international consensus, constructed
around North-South differences, the civic and opposition forces
have wavered in clearly articulating their own position.
SADC
Position
This has been a genuine
dilemma for the opposition forces in Zimbabwe. It should also be
said that the way that SADC is currently structured makes it unable
to deal with such authoritarian states as the Mugabe regime. This
has meant that the regional body has been very weak in pre-empting
the imposition of various forms of Western sanctions, by undertaking
its own effective measures against such states. The result has been
a greater space for political maneuverability by such repressive
states as the Harare regime.
At present any further
discussions on other forms of sanctions on the Zimbabwean state
will depend on the outcome of the current Mbeki-led SADC mediation.
If, as seems possible, some form of compromise is reached through
the mediation, any further talk of sanctions will become largely
redundant. The division in the MDC has also undermined consideration
on further sanctions by weakening the possibility of a political
alternative, and increasing the attraction of a 'reformed-
Zanu PF agenda for the international community. This is in any case
the preferred option of SADC and the Mbeki government. The debate
on Mugabe attending the EU-Africa summit in Portugal later this
year has revealed the divisions within the EU on the Zimbabwe question,
with the German government appearing to be something of the wild
card on this issue.
Thus as matters stand
the combination of African solidarity on the Zimbabwe issue, the
SADC mediation, lack of international consensus, division within
the opposition, and increasing EU equivocation on what actions to
take against the Mugabe regime, makes the issue of sanctions an
increasingly difficult strategy around which national democratic
forces can mobilize around. There is a sense that much of the political
initiative has now moved to the Mugabe regime, notwithstanding the
grave economic crisis in the country. Further opportunities to discuss
more sanctions will in large measure depend on whether the recalcitrance
of Zanu PF politics and the crisis of leadership in the ruling party
will prevent it from taking the opportunities presented by the SADC
mediation, which, given the current balance of political forces
in the country, very much favour Mugabe-s party. The effectiveness
of political sanctions depends fundamentally on a broad consensus
on the political crisis in a particular country. The clear absence
of this on the Zimbabwe crisis makes the option of broader sanctions
against the Zimbabwean state an increasingly difficult proposition.
The reality of the balance
of political forces within Zimbabwe is that the both the MDC and
the civic movement have been gravely weakened over the last few
years, as a result of both state repression and internal organizational
and ideological weakness. This has impacted on the capacity of opposition
forces in the country to articulate clearer positions and mobilize
on issues such as the sanction question. The result has been that
this issue has been largely constructed as an external initiative
with no support from African states. This stand-off has meant that
the opposition in Zimbabwe has been seen to benefit from a policy
that has not been sufficiently canvassed at national level. The
implications of this have been quickly and repeatedly exploited
by the Mugabe regime.
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