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What
today's looting of Africa tells us about tomorrow's looting of Zimbabwe
Patrick
Bond, Professor, School of Development Studies, Director, Centre
for Civil Society University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
July 31, 2007
Pinpointing
Zimbabwe's economic crisis
When did Zimbabwe's
apparently endless economic downturn actually begin? Here are some
answers:
- February
2000 when Robert Mugabe began authorising land invasions;
- November
1997 when 'Black Friday' decimated the currency's value (by 74%
in four hours);
- the prior
months when war vets were given pensions and Zimbabwe put troops
into the Democratic Republic of the Congo to back the Kabila regime
and secure investment sites;
- September
1991 when the stock market crashed once interest rates were raised
to high real levels at the outset of the Economic Structural Adjustment
Programme (Esap);
- the early
1980s, not long after Mugabe took power; or
- around 1974,
when per capita Gross Domestic Product began a fall which has
not yet reversed itself.
If your answer
to the question is within the past decade, I want to argue tonight,
you run a huge risk of endorsing the kinds of policies which have
impoverished Africa over the last three decades. And there are many
powerful people who want precisely that kind of an answer.
As an example
of convential elite wisdom, consider Harvard academic and Pulitzer
Prize-winner Samantha Power: 'The country's economy in 1997 was
the fastest growing in all of Africa; now it is the fastest shrinking...
How could the breadbasket of Africa have deteriorated so quickly
into the continent's basket case? The answer is Robert Mugabe.'
A somewhat deeper
summary position was offered by the US State Department's lead Africa
official, Walter Kansteiner, in 2001:
"The current
crisis in Zimbabwe has its roots in many areas. Broadly speaking,
poor fiscal policies and rampant government spending - including
the cost of Zimbabwe's military involvement in the Congo - set the
stage for the present economic meltdown. Due in large part to an
illegal and chaotic 'fast track' land reform program pursued by
the government, the agricultural sector has been badly disrupted."
Economist Rob
Davies may put the date of crisis in 1997 but turn immediately to
blame wealth accumulation - 'a peculiarly rampant form of absolute
extraction' - by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic
Front) (ZanuPF), in contrast to Sam Moyo, who insists that the post-2000
land invasions take forward the 'national democratic revolution.'
Like Power,
many others simply blame Mugabe, often for his allegedly socialist
orientation. For the US Agency for International Development, 'the
country's deep economic crisis is the result of the government's
flawed economic and public management policies.'
How flawed?
In 2001, Thabo Mbeki, who will have more than a small say in Zimbabwe's
future, publicly attributed the severe problems to 'twenty years
of economic policies'. His spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama blamed the
Zimbabwean economic mess on too many 'subsidies.' Mbeki's most likely
successor, Jacob Zuma, offered the following theory at the same
time, according to a press report:
"President
Robert Mugabe's government embarked on a huge social spending spree
without analysing social needs, which caused inflation to spiral.
'We do not want to follow the same route,' said Zuma. 'We have a
responsibility to more than just the sectarian needs of the union
movement. We have to serve the broader population as a whole.'"
A much richer
South African analysis comes from Thabo's younger brother Moeletsi,
former Herald reporter and Cold Comfort Farm researcher. In March
this year, Moeletsi Mbeki set out the political balance of forces
on Sky News Sunday Live:
"You are
very unlikely to get any meaningful intervention by South Africa
or other Southern African countries, because [for] all of them,
the trade union inspired political party led by Morgan Tsvangirai
is a threat also to them... You know our own government is faced
with challenges from the trade unions, so if you are faced with
that situation I think the priority for any politician is his own
power, his own opportunity to stay in power rather than issues of
conscience. So I think in terms of South Africa the issue of how
to frustrate the trade unions taking power and challenging the power
of the ruling parties is more of a priority than the beating of
opposition demonstrators and their leader."
What of the
opposition, though? The most extreme logic of the neoliberal argument,
as Eddie Cross of the Movement for Democratic Change put it in the
immediate wake of the opposition's early 2000 constitutional referendum
victory, culminates in a programme of total liberalisation:
"We believe in the free market. We do not support price control...
We are going to fast track privatisation. All fifty government parastatals
will be privatised within a two-year time frame, but we are going
far beyond that... We are going to privatise virtually the entire
school delivery system. And you know, we have looked at the numbers
and we think we can get government employment down from about 300,000
at the present time to about 75,000 in five years."
For those who
instead would seek a more just Zimbabwe, the early 1990s introduction
of Esap is often the preferred starting point of critique. To be
sure, such analysis also emanates from the ruling party. Information
officer and former minister Nathan Shamuyarira once remarked of
Esap, 'I'm glad that it failed... it was a capitalist project'.
At the same time, vice president Simon Muzenda and then state information
minister Jonathan Moyo strongly condemned Esap, and Mugabe vowed
never to return to structural adjustment in October 2001.
The Zimbabwe government still blames the crisis upon Western states
and institutions angry about land reform, or mythical 'sanctions'
(there are only minor smart sanctions against a few dozen individuals
in operation), or 'the country's detractors' for causing shortages
'every time the country comes out of elections', or even the US
and UK governments for allegedly controlling weather patterns to
cause droughts.
The regime's
self-serving analysis aside, it is true that Zimbabwe's major advances
in education and health of the early 1980s were in part reversed
by Esap user fees, and the solid growth rates of the mid/late-1980s
under a more controlled economic regime look excellent in retrospect.
As articulated by Keynesian economists such as Godfrey Kinyenze
in the major civil society analysis of the Zimbabwe economy, the
Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative,
"The Zimbabwean
economy is in crisis. Economic growth remains erratic and below
targets. The balance-of-payments problems that have plagued the
economy since the last quarter of 1997 persist. The failure of Esap
to redress the inequalities inherent in the Zimbabwean economy means
the majority of the people cannot take advantage of the opportunities
that are offered. This is a major impediment to the success of reforms.
Forum participants said that the highly dualistic nature of Zimbabwe's
economy (in which the white minority dominates formal-sector economic
activity and owns two-thirds of high-potential land and the black
majority is concentrated in rural, communal areas and urban informal
sectors) was never adequately addressed when planning economic reform.
By focusing exclusively on the formal sector for economic growth,
Esap neglected the sectors with the greatest potential for employment
creation: the informal, small and medium-sized enterprises."
In the wake
of Gono's failed August 2006 'zero to hero' anti-inflation gimmickry
aimed at rejigging
the currency, it is important to look beyond both the machinations
of a dying dictatorship and the market-based reforms Gono's
59-page mid-2007 economic strategy suggests (as summarised
by the Mail&Guardian):
- stop land
invasions and the criminality that has affected conservancies,
including poaching and cutting down trees;
- protect private
property;
- rationalise
external trade tariffs to enhance producer viability;
- exercise
restraint in setting prices;
- respect existing
and future investment protection agreements;
- privatise
key parastatals;
- engage business
in a social contract;
- stamp out
corruption;
- provide subsidies
for actual production as opposed to pre-production free handouts;
and
- build an
environment free of disruptive policy inconsistencies and enhance
the viability of business.
With the exception
of 'subsidies for actual production', the points above are remarkably
similar to the kinds of policy suggestions for Africa made by global
elites. But those policies are failing.
The
looting of Africa
And yet, all
evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, the likes of Bono,
Geldof, Jeffrey Sachs, Paul
Collier and others still argue forcefully for more market penetration
of Africa as the solution to the continent's poverty.
But the balance of the evidence does indeed point to the contrary.
Wealth flows out of sub-Saharan Africa to the North occur primarily
through exploitative debt and finance, phantom aid, capital flight,
unfair trade, and distorted investment. Although the resource drain
from Africa dates back many centuries, beginning with unfair terms
of trade, and then being amplified through slavery, colonialism
and neo-colonialism, today, neoliberal policies are the most direct
causes of inequality and poverty. They tend to amplify uneven and
combined development, especially pre-existing gender, race and regional
disparities.
Poverty across
Africa worsened in 1990-2001, with 77% of the citizenry surviving
on less than $2.15/day, according to the 2005 report of the British
government's Commission for Africa. Common - and incorrect - explanations
mask both the causes of African poverty and the implications of
recent global policy reforms.
A chart prepared
for the Commission for Africa leaves the impression of a vast inflow
of aid, rising foreign investment, sustainable debt payments and
adequate remittances from the African diaspora to fund development.
This analysis ignores the losses due to 'phantom aid' , the attribution
of increased foreign direct investment to just three recipient countries
since 1997, a net negative debt service payment since 1990 and the
fact the capital flight significantly outweighs remittances.
In reality,
as Africa's many outstanding political economists have documented
for years, finance, trade, and foreign direct investment remain
central to the continent's ongoing underdevelopment. Let's consider
each in turn.
Africa's debt crisis worsened during the era of globalisation. The
continent now repays more than it ever received, according to the
World Bank, with outflow in the form of debt repayments equivalent
to three times the inflow in loans and, in most African countries,
far exceeding export earnings. The debt-relief measures announced
in 2005 by G8 finance ministers do not disturb either the process
of draining Africa's financial accounts or the maintenance of debt-associated
control functions.
Underlying the
G8's 2005 Gleneagles proposals is the notion of sustainable service
repayments, but Africa has actually repaid more than it received
since the 1990s. Overall, during the 1980s and 90s, Africa repaid
$255 billion, or 4.2 times the original 1980 debt. For some countries
(including Cameroon, the Gambia, Mauritania, Senegal and Zambia),
servicing the debt far exceeded government health spending. To get
debt relief in Nigeria in late 2005 required an astounding $12 billion
downpayment, draining newly-accumulated oil resources.
In 1980, with
inflow comfortably higher than the debt repayment outflow, Africa
continued to pay abnormally high interest to service loans, and
did so with new loans. By 2000, however, the net flow deficit was
$6.2 billion, so new loans no longer paid the interest on old loans
- those resources were squeezed from already impoverished economies.
For 21 African countries, the debt reached at least 300% of exports
by 2002, and for countries such as Sudan, Burundi, Sierra Leone
and Guinea-Bissau, it was 15 times greater than annual export earnings.
In at least
16 countries, according to Eric Toussaint, debt inherited from dictators
could be defined as legally 'Odious' and therefore eligible for
cancellation since citizens were victimised both in the debt's original
accumulation (and use of monies against the society) and in subsequent
demands that it be repaid. These amounts easily exceed 50% of Africa's
outstanding debt.
In addition,
'hot money' sometimes flows in and out of Africa. The effects of
portfolio investment in African stock and currency markets include
three crashes in the South African rand between 1996 and 2001, while
in Zimbabwe the November 1997 outflow of hot money crashed the currency
by 74% in just four hours of trading.
Aid to Africa
dropped 40% during the 1990s. Contributions from almost all developed
countries fall well below the UN-agreed target of 0.7% of GDP, with
0.12% of US GDP and 0.23% of Japanese GDP as extreme examples. In
a 2005 study by ActionAid, the NGO estimates that the 2003 total
official aid of $69 billion is reduced to just $27 billion in 'real'
aid to poor people because of a variety of 'phantom' aid mechanisms.
'Untied' aid rose from $2.3 billion in 1999 to $4.3 billion in 2003,
but declined as a proportion of total 'aid'.
Measuring capital
flight, the IMF found that in 2004 official outflows from Africa
by residents exceeded $10 billion a year, on average, from 1998.
Estimates put the total overseas accounts of African citizens in
Northern banks and tax havens at $80 billion in 2003. At the same
time, African countries owed $30 billion to those very banks.
Considering
the vast sums - in excess of R300 billion - removed from Africa
over the past two decades, the two leading scholars of capital flight,
James Boyce and Léonce Ndikumana, conclude that 'sub-Saharan
Africa thus appears to be a net creditor vis-à-vis the rest
of the world.'
Trade liberalisation
has exacted a heavy toll on sub-Saharan Africa - $272 billion over
the past 20 years, according to Christian Aid. Dependence on primary
commodities, worsening terms of trade, northern subsidies and long-term
falling prices for most exports together grip African producers
in a price trap, as they increase production levels but generate
decreasing revenues.
Across Africa,
four or fewer products make up three quarters of export revenues.
Natural resources accounted for nearly 80% of African exports in
2000, compared to 31% of all developing countries and 16% of the
advanced capitalist economies. Trade related processes, say Abrahim
Elbadawi and Benni Ndulu, cost Africa an estimated 4% of GDP each
year during the 1970s and 80s, an income loss twice as high as that
of other countries, while the cumulative loss from declining terms
of trade cost non-oil exporting African countries 119% of their
total GDP.
Agricultural
subsidies to Northern farmers (mainly corporate producers) have
risen steeply - 15% between the late 1980s and 2004, according to
the UNDP, to $360 billion per year - which has greatly intensified
North-South trade inequalities. Developing countries lose $35 billion
annually as a result of industrialised countries' protectionist
tariffs, $24 billion of this as a result of the Multifibre Agreement.
Non-financial
investment flows are driven less by policy - although liberalisation
has also been important - and more by accumulation opportunities.
During the 1970s, according to the Commission on Africa, roughly
one third of FDI to the 'Third World' went to Africa; by the 1990s,
this had declined to 5%. Thereafter, what seems like significantly
rising Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the late 1990s and 2001
can be accounted for by the relocation of South African companies'
financial headquarters to London, and by resurgent oil investments
in Angola and military-ruled Nigeria.
Tax fraud, transfer
pricing and other multinational corporate techniques also reduce
Africa's income. In 1994, for example, an estimated 14% of the total
value of exported oil went unaccounted for.
Privatisation-related
FDI (14% of total recent FDI) has proved disappointing or worse
throughout the continent, including in South Africa where foreign
investors have made exceptionally high returns on privatised assets
- 108%, for example, on shares in Airports Company of South Africa.
The repurchase of shares by state agencies (including Telkom) negates
any 'expertise' rationale behind such privatisation.
It is increasingly
clear that the depletion of natural resources must be factored into
any calculation of national wealth. For example, according to the
UN Development Programme, the estimated value of minerals in South
Africa's soil fell from US$112 billion in 1960 to US$55 billion
in 2000. The World Bank has proposed a corrective method that, despite
under-estimations, reveals stagnant and net negative 'genuine savings'
in countries characterised by high resource dependence, extractive
FDI and low capital accumulation.
According to
this method, a country's potential GDP falls by 9% for every percentage
point increase in a country's extractive-resource dependency, with
Gabon's people losing a net $2,241 each in 2000, as oil companies
depleted the country's tangible wealth, investing very little in
return and providing few royalties.
In a related
category, the North owes the South, especially Africa, a vast amount
in 'ecological debt', because developed countries use or destroy
a hugely disproportionate measure of the global 'commons'. A member
of the UN International Panel on Climate Change calculates that
forests in the South absorbing carbon from the atmosphere in effect
provide Northern polluters an annual subsidy of $75 billion.
Whether in
sweatshop-based production systems in several African countries
or in the sphere of household and community reproduction, women
- already suffering intense patriarchal oppression - are the main
victims of neoliberalism. Because they rear children and provide
elder- and healthcare, rural women ensure an artificially inexpensive
supply of migrant labour.
The recent global
reform proposals will not reverse the outflow of African wealth.
Instead, campaigns to reverse resource flows and challenge perverse
subsidies are emerging from grassroots struggles and progressive
social movements, such as:
- 'decommodification'
movements to establish basic needs as human rights, rather than
as privatised commodities that must be paid for;
- campaigns
to 'deglobalise' capital, such as defunding the World Bank and
securing the right to produce generic (not patented) anti-retroviral
medicines;
- demands
for civil society oversight of national budgets; and
- activism
to ensure equitable redistribution of resources in ways that benefit
low-income households, grassroots communities and shop-floor workers.
Were there even
a single genuinely left government in Africa (Zimbabwe does not
qualify, of course), a variety of national policies could be applied
to reverse socio-economic collapse:
- systematic
default on foreign debt repayments;
- strategies
to enforce domestic reinvestment of pensions and other funds;
- reintroduction
of currency exchange controls and prohibition of tax-haven transfers;
- refusal of
tied and phantom aid, along with naming and shaming fraudulent
'aid';
- inward-oriented
import-substitution development strategies;
- refusal of
foreign investments that prove unfavourable when realistic projections
factor in costs such as natural resource depletion, transfer pricing
and profit/dividend outflows; and
- reversal
of macroeconomic policies that increase inequality.
It is true that
the Mugabe regime has tried some of these policy initiatives, and
that they have thus failed. The key reason is not that the policies
are incorrect - for after all, most of these were also the policies
of East Asian developmental states during their periods of foundational
growth - but instead, cronyism, namely a class project that has
hard-wired corruption and the elite's primitive accumulation into
virtually every state initiative. It's for this reason that the
elite transition that Mbeki is attempting to stitch together, will
be immensely frustrating to Zimbabwe.
Indeed, the key lesson from the looting of Zimbabwe, by Zimbabwean
elites, is that any moves in this direction require bottom-up social
movements to intensify their work. There are a great many Zimbabwean
examples to be found in the work of progressives active in the Zimbabwe
Social Forum, the Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Unions, Women
of Zimbabwe Arise, the National
Constitutional Assembly, the Zimbabwe
Coalition on Debt and Development, students and so many other
courageous democrats.
Across the continent,
Africa's most hopeful examples include (but are not limited to)
general strikes by revitalised labour movements in countries ranging
from Swaziland (July) to South Africa (June-July) and Nigeria (June);
campaigning for reparations and the closure of the World Bank and
IMF by Jubilee Africa; AIDS treatment advocates breaking the hold
of pharmaceutical corporations on monopoly antiretroviral patents;
activists fighting Monsanto's GM drive from the US to South Africa
to several African countries; blood-diamonds victims from Sierra
Leone and Angola generating a partially-successful global deal at
Kimberley; Kalahari Basarwa-San Bushmen raising publicity against
forced removals, as the Botswana government clears the way for DeBeers
and World Bank investments; Lesotho peasants objecting to displacement
during construction of the continent's largest dam system (solely
to quench Johannesburg's irrational and hedonistic thirst), along
with Ugandans similarly threatened at the overly expensive, corruption-ridden
Bujagali Dam; a growing network questioning Liberia's long exploitation
by Firestone Rubber; Chadian and Cameroonian activists pressuring
the World Bank not to continue funding their repression and environmental
degradation; Oil Watch linkages of Nigerian Delta and many other
Gulf of Guinea communities; and Ghanaian, South African and Dutch
activists opposing water privatization.
How far they
go in part depends upon how far valued allies in not only the Third
World but also the advanced capitalist financial and corporate centres
recognise the merits of their analysis, strategy and tactics --
and offer the solidarity that African and other Third World activists
can repay many times over, once the Northern boot is lifted from
their countries' necks and they gain the space to win lasting, emancipatory
objectives. But setting out campaigns for reparations, IFI closure,
corporate malfeasance and an end to many specific other forms of
looting is only part of an even bigger challenge for bottom-up construction:
establishing a durable programmatic approach that the world's progressive
movements can unite behind.
With this sort
of assistance, we can begin to ask the question of what kind of
resistance to the future looting of Zimbabwe can be built now, before
even more damage is done?
Whose
Zimbabwe economy?
For Zimbabwe's
first post-Mugabe government, perhaps as early as next March if
elite deal-making unfolds as promised, job number two (after restoring
a semblance of democracy) is economic. Given the meltdown of the
present version of crony-statist-capitalism, a system terribly hostile
to the country's poor and working people, the new model chosen will
reverberate across the world.
On the one
hand, The Economist spells out why Zimbabwe should take 'Washington
Consensus' advice: 'Nowhere has withdrawn so swiftly from the global
economy, nor seen such a thorough reversal of neo-liberal policies.
The results--an economy that has contracted by 35% in five years,
and half the population in need of food aid--are hard to paper over.'
On the other
hand, countries like Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia,
and the Philippines are throwing off the yoke of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), repaying loans early and thus pushing it into
serious financial crisis.
With several
Latin American countries veering sharply leftwards, out of Washington's
orbit, little Zimbabwe could become the IMF's next big ideological
battle ground.
Let's not forget
that Robert Mugabe adopted structural adjustment at a time of relative
economic health, and by 1995 received the World Bank's highest possible
rating for following the Washington Consensus: 'highly satisfactory'.
This was not an aberration, for Mugabe painfully and wastefully
spent more than $190 million to partially clear IMF arrears in 2005-06
(leaving $130 million still to repay plus $4+ billion in other foreign
credits). But there is no hint of any fresh loans until he departs
- and then the searing strings attached to an IMF programme might
generate new riots.
According to
the last IMF statement on Zimbabwe, in December: 'Going forward,
the key will be first to ensure that sharp cuts are made in real
terms in fiscal spending... Strong fiscal adjustment will need to
be supported by moving a unified exchange rate towards market-determined
levels, removing restrictions on current account payments and transfers,
liberalizing price controls and imposing hard budget constraints
on public enterprises.'
The last time
the IMF exerted real power over Zimbabwe was when it lent $53 million
in 1999, which was meant to release another $800 million from other
creditors. According to leading IMF negotiator Michael Nowak: 'We
want the government to reduce the tariffs slapped on luxury goods
last September, and second, we also want the government to give
us a clear timetable as to when and how they will remove the price
controls they have imposed on some goods.'
Five months
later, the IMF agreed to increase the loan amount to $200 million,
but more conditions were reportedly added: access to classified
DRC war information and a commitment to pay new war expenditure
from the existing budget.
This meant the
IMF encouraged Mugabe to penalise health, education and other badly-defended
sectors on behalf of military adventures and business cronies, and
also ordered Mugabe to immediately reverse the only redistributive
policies he had adopted in a long time: a) a ban on holding foreign
exchange accounts in local banks (which immediately halted the easiest
form of capital flight by the country's elites); b) a 100% customs
tax on imported luxury goods; and c) price controls on staple foods
in the wake of several urban riots.
That deal quickly
fell apart, however, when fiscal targets were missed. Harare was,
quite simply, broke. The previous year, Mugabe had spent an historically-unprecedented
38% of export earnings on servicing foreign loans, exceeded that
year only by Brazil and Burundi.
To be sure,
last December's IMF statement also called for social security protections,
but the IMF's most essential medicine - 'sharp cuts' in an already
broken state - will not cure this wretched patient.
This is merely
one case, the problem of the future repayment of debt whose status
should logically be considered 'odious', because the majority of
people had no role in the borrowing and did not benefit from the
investments.
Another crucial
case is how to address huge idle capacity, in part the result of
the flubbed price control strategy now in place. As Mugabe put it
recently, 'Factories must produce. If they don't, we will take you
over ... We will seize the factories.' Judging by the way the land
acquisition process was handled by 'cell-phone farmers', cell-phone
factory owners will turn potentially productive assets into rust.
There are,
in contrast, crucial bottom-up strategies to recuperate factories,
including the Buenos Aires movement that began after that country's
meltdown of late 2001; as well as sites in Venezuela which I was
fortunate to visit last week. Politicised workers and a progressive,
pro-labour government are crucial, but even without the latter,
the Argentine movement has made great progress, and Venezuelan workers
are self-managing factories across that country even in areas where
residual old-guard bureaucracy is foiling the Chavez government's
initiatives.
Finally, because
time is not our ally here, the problem of price controls is most
crucial in a country with so many bare shelves. Today's Business
Day newspaper, from Johannesburg, carries a leading opinion-editorial
column by Norman Reynolds,
formerly the chief economist in the early 1980s Zimbabwe Ministry
of Finance. What Norman - whom I admire for many accomplishments
- does in his 'when we' column, is inadvertently justify Mugabe's
most painful interventions. Discussing National Breweries' attempt
to circumvent price controls in 1983, Reynolds recounts:
"Unless
something changed, the price freeze would bring beer production
to a standstill within a year. The MD was a school friend. We still
talked. He became an emotional wreck as the breweries sank into
mounting losses. Finally, we met. I explained that this mess was
not going to go away quickly. My only suggestion was to play the
'game'. I advised: 'Dry up three small towns before the next long
weekend.' The breweries did. The following Tuesday it received a
price increase. The price freeze was effectively over."
Is there an
alternative that would control prices through popular, democratic
strategies instead of by direct order from an unpopular, corrupt
regime? The last time Zimbabwean civil society generated an analysis
and strategy was 2000, alongside a progressive group within the
UN Development Programme. The approach was developmental, basic-needs
driven and patriotic - and now needs urgent fleshing out by organisations
like the Zimbabwe Social Forum, trade unions, Women of Zimbabwe
Arise and churches.
SA's Mass Democratic
Movement rose to a similar challenge in 1993, producing the Reconstruction
and Development Programme. Then the really tough job looms: ensuring
accountability of the state to the people. Where South Africans
failed in large part, Zimbabweans may have a better chance to succeed,
by preparing now, with the knowledge of how to combat both exhausted
nationalism and neoliberalism.
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