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Zimbabwe: Splitting Africa from the West
Hugh McCullum
June 24, 2007

http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=15184

"Today, Zimbabweans and the myriad of critics of their country and government are encouraged to take the easy, shallow route of analysis. We are urged by media and self-serving politicians in the West to assume that the story began in 2000 with Robert Mugabe and his rough treatment of the white farmers. We need to be reminded that it actually began a long time before, circa 1890, with the occupation of Cecil Rhodes-s British South Africa Company and its equally rough treatment of black farmers."
- Tsitsi Dangaremba in The Book of Not (Ayedbia Publishing, 2006).

Mugabe's Zimbabwe: Between Africa and the West

President Robert Mugabe, 82, or maybe 83, has been described as an "appalling, bloodstained old tyrant" almost without exception in the British, Canadian, American, European and liberal South African media. And it is undoubtedly true, especially if we recall the bloody Matabeleland massacres of the early 1980s just after he took power in 1980. And his murderous control of the liberation struggle in the 1970s.

And the brutal way he has dealt with his own people in 27 years of absolute rule. And the way he threw almost all the white farmers off the farms - and even killed and brutalized a few - that supported Zimbabwe-s once burgeoning economy.

And Operation Murambatsvina, the monstrous class cleansing against the poor, when thousands of hard-working traders and other poor people were forced into starvation, homelessness and deprivation.

And the way his pretend prime minister, one evangelical Christian by the name of Gideon Gono, has leached the country of its foreign exchange and run up the worst inflation in the world, relying on the remittances from the three million Zimbabweans in diaspora to keep the corrupt machinery of power in place even as the economy itself has collapsed.

And the murders, regular beatings and torture of the political opposition and all other parts of civil society . . . and, and, and.

Yes, that may all well be true, but then why is Mugabe-s arch-enemy, Britain (which has still not taken Sir Robert-s honorary knighthood away from him), doing nothing more than issuing fatuous statements and wringing its impotent hands? Margaret Becket, the foreign secretary, says "there is nothing we can do", "we cannot wave a magic wand", "the UK has a great deal of concern." The United States has a travel and bank account boycott of Mugabe and his closest cohorts and won-t let them inside their borders except to attend endless and meaningless UN meetings for which they have a kind if diplomatic exemption from the boycotts allowing free crossing of otherwise closed (to the Zimbabwean elite) borders. So does the European Union.

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country so gunboat diplomacy has to be ruled out. But why not helicopter gunboat diplomacy, which Britain and the U.S. have been so fond of in the Balkans and the Middle East? Regime change now apparently has a legitimate role in superpower diplomacy. When Ian Smith, the white supremacist who preceded Mugabe, issued Rhodesia-s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, another Labour government responded with - for that era - lightning speed. Now, although the situation of "liberated" Zimbabwe is unimaginably worse, the West plays the politics of hand-wringing. Britain, Europe and the U.S. are "exerting pressure" and "expressing concern" but are actually unable to do anything.

Indeed, the UN General Assembly, in another display of hypocrisy, recently elected Zimbabwe-s environment and tourism minister, Francis Nhema, to head the fairly prestigious UN Commission on Sustainable Development for a year, representing a country with at least an inflation rate exceeding 4,200 percent. Nhema-s critics say he has rendered useless the lush farms he was given illegally during the land distribution.

By giving Zimbabwe the year-long chairmanship in a close vote (26-21, three abstentions), Africa has signalled the widening split with, and its defiance of, the West, which has attempted to isolate Zimbabwe for human rights abuses and economic mismanagement. Many African nations have grown so frustrated by the development policies of Western donors that they see them as intrusive and harsh. When Australia cancels a cricket tour to Zimbabwe, as it did in May, or when the European Union refuses to hold an EU-Africa summit, as it has for the past six years, because of Mugabe, many Africans see the pressure as neo-colonial habits that must be broken. For many across the continent, Mugabe's muscular land confiscation from white farmers and talk of a sort of African style of Marxist social justice still have appeal.

"This is African brinkmanship with the West," says Peter Kagwanja, a senior researcher for the Human Sciences Research Council in Tshwane (formerly Pretoria). "Many African nations are still struggling to get over the economic and political legacy of past colonial and racist regimes, and so they are more or less sympathetic with the bold moves taken by Zimbabwe," moves that "they are not capable of doing themselves." While most African leaders recognize that following Zimbabwe's anti-Western stance would be an act of economic suicide, Kagwanja says that Africa is throwing its support behind Zimbabwe to show its disinclination to be pushed around by the powerful West. In practice, this means that the nomination of Zimbabwe for the UN agency this year is just the beginning. "All these things that come up, Zimbabwe will be promoted as Africa's choice," he says.

"The resonance behind what Mugabe says is a result of what Africans see as the duplicity of the Western international institutions" such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, says Chris Maroleng, a top Zimbabwe expert at the Institute for Security Studies in Tshwane. There is anger over "the imposition of the conditions on aid," he says. But while he understands the reasons for this gap between Africa and the West, he sees the selection of Zimbabwe to head the UN commission as a mistake. "Hoisting the mantle of a known autocrat and dictator in order to make a statement is regrettable. Certainly there is a need for more African voices on development issues. But I don't think that Mugabe is that poster boy."

For the West, Zimbabwe is a pariah nation. British newspapers regularly refer to Mugabe as "Mad Bob", and Australia, just a day after banning the cricket tour, said it would spend $15 million backing Mugabe's critics. But, for many in Africa, Mugabe is a hero, perhaps second only to the sainted Nelson Mandela who is beloved by the West. Mugabe is remembered and vilified as the man who took land away from whites whose ancestors swindled or stole it from blacks nearly a century ago.

This is not the first time Africa has shown its independence on matters of international import. Over the past decade, African leaders have welcomed Chinese development loans, which, unlike those of the World Bank, don't make aid conditional on economic or political reforms.

In its year-long stint on the UN Security Council, South Africa has voted against sanctioning Burma and Zimbabwe for their human rights records and backed Iran's efforts to avoid sanctions because of its uranium-enrichment programs. Burma and Zimbabwe probably do have the worst human rights records until you count the dead in Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere.

At a March 28 conference of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Dar es Salaam, South African President Thabo Mbeki called for African unity above all:

The fight against Zimbabwe is a fight against us all. Today it is Zimbabwe; tomorrow it will be South Africa, it will be Mozambique, it will be Angola, it will be any other African country. And any government that is perceived to be strong and to be resistant to imperialists would be made a target and would be undermined. So let us not allow any point of weakness in the solidarity of SADC, because that weakness will also be transferred to the rest of Africa.

At the end of the conference, SADC leaders threw their unanimous support behind Mugabe and called on Mbeki (not the West) to mediate between Mugabe and the political opposition. Leaders who had been critical of Mugabe before the conference, including Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa, fell silent.

South Africa's attempt at "quiet diplomacy" needs time to bear fruit, says Maroleng. By taking the West out of the negotiation process, Mbeki may have disarmed Mugabe of his most resonant arguments for holding on to power. "It shifted the battleground from the international arena, which Mugabe loves," he added, "to the domestic issues of economic recovery and constitutional reform and the violent nature with which Mugabe engages his opponents. And, to a degree, this strategy may be working." Zimbabwe insiders (ie those at home and in the diaspora close to Zimbabwe African National Union Popular Front - ZANU PF) recently revealed that Mbeki has imposed conditions - including the acceptance of Mugabe as president and the renunciation of violence - on the two main opposition leaders, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara, leaders of the factionalized and badly weakened Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in order for talks to proceed. No such conditions have been imposed on Mugabe.

Mugabe and the Catholic Church

On April 5, (Holy Thursday in the Christian calendar) Zimbabwe-s Roman Catholic bishops, all nine of them, issued a scathing and courageous pastoral letter calling, in biblical and prophetic language, for Mugabe, himself a Jesuit-trained, practising Roman Catholic, to end the violence. Entitled "God hears the cry of the oppressed", the letter is in the spirit and history of the Catholic Church in Zimbabwe which comprises about 40 percent of the population. It was the Catholic bishops, priests and religious (especially the Jesuits and Maryknoll sisters) who supported Mugabe and the liberation movements during the long and vicious bush war which led to independence from Britain in 1980. Two bishops, several priests and sisters were imprisoned and then deported by Smith. Ironically, Smith drew much of his religious support from Anglicans and Protestants. Today, again - with some notable exceptions - it is the non-Catholics, especially the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), who are just as divided, weak and lacking in courage as were their Rhodesian predecessors - and, in some cases such as the Anglican bishop of Harare, ardently supportive of ZANU PF and Mugabe.

In their powerful letter, the Catholic bishops (including both archbishops of the main cities of Harare and Bulawayo) analyze the situation as a series of crises, including governance and loss of moral leadership, thereby facing Mugabe head-on.

The night Mugabe-s fearless arch-foe, Archbishop Pius Ncube flew home to Bulawayo recently from an overseas trip to explain the hard-hitting pastoral letter he had helped to draft and had signed, he said he was returning to the darkest of times in his tortured homeland. The lights of the city were out. The state-owned electricity company had cut back power supplied to homes to 20 hours a day - power supplied to them at special low rates by South Africa-s giant Eskom. Instead the precious current is fed into failing farms, far too few to provide enough wheat to sustain the starving population or nose-diving economy.

Ncube-s Zimbabwe has become a nation where deprivation is measured in extremes. The Zimbabwe Crisis has become almost a proper name. Life expectancy has plummeted to around 40 years. Grave diggers can't keep up. Morgues are overflowing with bodies, especially those who have died of AIDS, and which families can't afford to claim them. A loaf of bread costs $Z6,875. A bus fare to work will wipe out a worker's earnings. School fees in Bulawayo were $Z500,000 for first term this year, says Ncube. When children returned for second term this week, the figure had doubled.

Shadows hang over the Archbishop's own life. Mugabe warned the bishops — of whom Ncube has long been the most outspoken — that they had embarked on a "dangerous path" when they read the pastoral letter to their congregations condemning his government as "racist, corrupt and lawless." "The bishops have decided to turn political," Mugabe told the state-owned Herald newspaper. "And once they turn political, we regard them as no longer being spiritual."

As to the spiritual merit of his campaign, Ncube cites the Bible, chapter and verse, in defence of his activism. Look to Luke's Nazareth Manifesto, he says, or Matthew's account of the Sermon on the Mount. "We defend the poor and the disadvantaged," he says. "Christ teaches love for your neighbour and respect. He preaches justice, peace, compassion. Uplifting people. Humility. And care for the disadvantaged — the widowed, the orphaned, the poor."

Ncube's words are the uncomfortable words of the preacher with a prophetic message no one, especially in the West or Africa, wants to hear. But they are powerful, passionate, provocative words. "(Mugabe) is a killer and a murderer. He is a liar. We ask him to stop lying and murdering. To uphold your people." They are the words of a martyr, reminding many of El Salvador-s Archbishop Oscar Romero. Church and aid organizations had grave concerns for Ncube-s safety even before Mugabe's ominous recent pronouncements.

Non-Party Political Actors

Brian Raftopolous is a Zimbawean academic who used to chair the Zimbabwe Crisis Committee and teach at the prestigious Institute for Development Studies at the University of Zimbabwe. He is a respected analyst of the current crisis and a prolific writer and speaker who hews to a centrist line. He reminds those outside the country that the situation is vastly more complex than Mugabe and ZANU PF versus the West and MDC.

Establishing this, he focuses on eight key groups who make up the principal non-party political actors. They include the armed forces, civil society in general and specific civil society groups such as the churches, the labour movement, the media, the legal profession, women's organizations and diaspora political groups.

The armed forces comprise the army, air force, war veterans, militia and paramilitary, police, prison service and Central Intelligence Organization. Since 1980, they have been the most important factor in post-colonial Zimbabwean politics, despite a façade of neutrality.

From 1999, when ZANU PF began to face intense challenges to its political hegemony, the armed forces began to openly support the ruling party, including public pronouncements on "acceptable" electoral outcomes. The armed forces have also used force to suppress anti-government protests and have been implicated in mass assaults on opposition supporters. A steady trend towards the militarization of civilian posts can be documented with the government appointing serving or retired military officers to key government positions.

Civil society has gone through various stages since 1980 when most NGOs were welfare-orientated and dependent on Western donors, very much including churches which focused on supplementing the state's social programmes. This shifted in the mid 1980s to development activities. When the government started implementing an economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) in the late 1980s, most NGOs shifted their focus again to poverty-alleviation programmes.

However, as Zimbabwe's corruption, economic mismanagement and political misrule became more evident from the mid-1990s, civil society groups turned their attention mainly to human rights, constitutional reform and other governance and democratization issues.

The most significant of these was the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) launched in 1998. It included trade unions, student and women's organizations and, for a time, the ZCC. It established a broad consensus for constitutional reform and played a key role in the rejection, in a referendum held in 2000, of an undemocratic draft constitution produced by the government-controlled constitutional commission. It was Mugabe-s first, and so far only, electoral defeat and it infuriated him.

Churches have always been divided and these splits came to the fore during the constitutional debate of 1999-2000. The ZCC and a number of prominent church leaders switched their support from NCA to the government-led constitutional commission while the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) supported the NCA. (See also above.)

The multiple roles that the churches tried during the current Zimbabwe crisis include that of mediator, between ZANU PF and the opposition MDC after the corrupt presidential elections of 2002; and provider of humanitarian assistance to the hundreds of thousands of victims of the government's widely condemned Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) of 2005.

Labour is made up of numerous trade unions mostly affiliated to the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). In the 1980s, the labour movement was weak, and subordinate to ZANU-PF. However, the adverse impact of ESAP combined with growing state authoritarianism led to a militant labour movement that began to challenge the political hegemony of ZANU PF.

The ZCTU established alliances with other civil society groups and in the late 1990s organized successful general strikes and several "stay-aways". Labour also began to link the economic problems with corrupt and inept governance and democratization. As democratic pressures mounted in the second half of the 1990s, the ZCTU's influence continued to grow. It played a fundamental role in forming the opposition MDC in 1999, providing much of the top leadership and grassroots support base for the new party. That the ZCTU has remained an important player for democratization is a function of the authoritarian state's unrelenting assault on its leadership and structures.

Women with many diverse organizations have, since independence, been an important part of civil-society. A series of gender sensitive laws passed by the government in the early 1980s encouraged most women's organizations to work towards eliminating discrimination. By 1983, however, the state's unwillingness to genuinely transform gender relations led to the emergence of women's organizations outside the state, determined to confront it in their fight against patriarchal power and oppression.

Between 1995 and 2000, women, convinced that much of the discrimination against them was founded on customary law, saw this as a unique opportunity to lobby for constitutional reforms. This led in 1999 to the Women's Coalition on the Constitution in the NCA-led constitutional reform. One of the most visible women's organizations that continues to militantly pursue this double struggle is Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) established in 2003. WOZA has staged more than 30 anti-government protests in which the police have arrested over 1,000 women.

The legal profession encompasses the judiciary, lawyers in academia and in public and private practice, such as the Law Society of Zimbabwe and others have formed civil society organizations such as Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights.

The legal profession started assuming a high level of public visibility in February 1999 when some High Court judges presented a petition to Mugabe about the state's growing subversion of the rule of law. The petition met with an angry response. The president demanded they resign and denounced them as a racist white bench.

The conflict increased when in 2000 the judiciary issued rulings confirming the unconstitutionality of the violent land reform programme. The judiciary were subsequently subjected to sustained legal and extra-legal attacks by the government. Many judges, among them, the chief justice, were forced to resign. The government, under the guise of Africanizing the bench, appointed pliant black judges susceptible to political manipulation. This legacy includes the current widespread public perception that the independence of the judiciary has been compromised.

The media, in all forms - print and electronic, state and private - has always played a part in democratic politics with the state-owned media supporting government and the private media open to voices critical of, or opposed to, government, allowing them to be heard. The intense political crises ever since1999 led the media to assume a more important role in reporting on events in the country. The state-owned newspapers went to unprecedented lengths to uncritically support the government's actions and policies. Private newspapers, among them the now closed Daily News, challenged the official versions of the crisis by exposing, especially during the 2000 and 2002 elections, the government's subversion of the rule of law and its widespread violations of human rights.

Since 1999, the private media has worked in one of the harshest media environments in the world. The government has resorted to draconian legal and extra-legal measures to curtail the freedom of the press. The notorious Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Broadcasting Services Act have been used to close down newspapers considered critical of government and to deny broadcasting licences to any independent broadcasters. These developments have contributed to the emergence of diaspora electronic and print media organizations that are playing an increasingly important role.

The diaspora movement comprises numerous pressure groups and media organizations, based outside Zimbabwe working in various and often competing ways to bring about democratic change. Though it has historical antecedents in pre-independence Zimbabwe, current diaspora activism is in many ways a logical outcome of Zimbabwe's politically repressive and economically harsh climate.

The Zimbabwean government has established at least one diaspora civic group to try and give the impression that it also enjoys considerable political support and the government has also resorted to jamming the broadcasts of independent radio stations. All this indicates how seriously it takes diaspora activism.

Future challenges

The outcome of the struggles for democratization currently taking place in Zimbabwe is still unknown because of the major challenges that face the various non-party political actors in moving the democratic struggle forward.

1. The successful reform of the armed forces is only possible when internal stability has been established through political reconciliation in the country.

2. Civil society, to be more effective in its struggle against dictatorship, needs to move away from the urban focus of its activities and make a serious effort to operate in rural areas to empower them to stand up for their right to hold diverse views from the state. This will require shifting of resources to rural groups centred in smaller towns and rural areas. Such groups include burial societies, church groups, shopping clubs and residents associations.

Opposition MDC and civil society have, since the deeply flawed presidential election of 2002, been debating whether it is worth participating in elections under the present conditions characterized by state-sponsored political violence and open electoral fraud. Conflicting views were most recently evident in the MDC split over participation in the senate elections of 2005. One camp argues that elections are the only effective way of bringing about democratic change in Zimbabwe. The other camp has essentially abandoned elections as a route to democratic change and advocates extra-parliamentary strategies such as mass action. Most of the major civil-society groups, such as the NCA and the ZCTU have aligned themselves with the latter camp. Finally, civil society groups need to foster democratic practice and culture within their own organizations. The complex internal politics surrounding the rift in the MDC highlights the ways in which opposition political parties can assume or replicate the authoritarian political culture of the regimes they seek to remove from power.

3. The church, in order to perform its important role effectively needs to show far more cohesion and unity in responding to state authoritarianism. It should also be much less hesitant in confronting the state over its extensive human rights violations and its habitual refusal to ensure accountability. The history of church-state relations has shown the foolishness of any church decision to abandon the political realm to politicians. The church needs to rise above the limited visions of Zimbabwe's democratic future and, as the Catholic Bishops have done this year, come up with its own biblically-based vision of democratic politics. The church needs always to show its unwavering critical solidarity with the victims of oppression.

4. The challenge confronting labour is to break out of the current economic and political stalemate that exists between it and the state. It needs to come to grips with the deepening economic crisis that has had a negative impact on its organizational capacity and militancy. However, it cannot on its own provide an alternative economic policy or programme so it must develop a blueprint for a future economic policy.

Another strategy is to revive and implement the concept of social dialogue, although it is doubtful the authoritarian regime will enter into a social contract without pressure. The social dialogue route remains important because labour cannot break the stalemate in the absence of dialogue with other stakeholders, such as business and the state.

The labour movement needs to grapple with whether or not it should align itself with political parties. While this would not be a significant matter in democratic and stable societies, it's an important one in the polarized political crisis of Zimbabwe. The dilemma of aligning or not aligning with the MDC is already causing debate within the MDC. If the ZCTU asserts its autonomy, they may have more scope to question some of the MDC's policies and positions. Maintaining a critical distance from the MDC may also be important in light of the current deep rift within the MDC.

5. The dual agenda of a women's and national struggle needs to conceptualize the state as a multiplicity of sites demanding that women adopt different strategies and actions to pursue their interests. The movement has viewed the state as an arbiter of development and a bestower of rights in its emphasis on asking, challenging and appealing to the state to enshrine rights for women. This approach, which focuses on rights and legal reform, is, however, flawed because the struggle for women is not with the law per se, but with patriarchy.

The women's movement also needs to reconsider its alliances with broader civil society. Though civil society in Zimbabwe is heterogeneous and includes multiple and competing agendas, one would expect that it would be a more receptive recipient and conduit of a gender agenda than the authoritarian state. This has not, however, been the case as broader civil society in Zimbabwe has failed to spontaneously protest blatant violations of women's rights as part of its articulation of democratic and progressive principles.

6. The legal profession can enhance its effectiveness in confronting the authoritarian state by collaborating with external partners to apply international pressure on the Mugabe regime similar to that which was applied during the apartheid era in South Africa. Organizations such as the Law Society of Zimbabwe have already set in motion the process of sharing strategies with regional and other counterparts on how to confront dictatorial regimes and hold them accountable for human rights and governance commitments made in various international conventions.

The Zimbabwean judiciary needs to foster adherence even to the flawed existing constitution by clearly defining what obedience to it involves and also establishing the benchmarks by which government can measure adherence or violation of the constitution. The judiciary should also push for constitutional reforms, as the present constitution does not allow them to protect the rights of many groups from being violated by the state.

Finally, in light Mugabe-s ingenuity in using state patronage to subvert the rule of law and undermine the independence of the judiciary, there is a need for unity among the different elements of the legal profession to effectively define and respond to these and other challenges facing them.

7. In order to influence national politics in the context in the current crisis, the media needs to widen its reach to include marginalized communities, improve professional and ethical practice and engage the authoritarian state over Zimbabwe-s repressive media environment. Broadening access to information has become very important since most towns and growth points in Zimbabwe rely on state radio following the closure of the Daily News. The media therefore needs to widen its circulation beyond those areas that are already serviced by the mainstream press, radio and television.

Recent revelations about the involvement of the state's intelligence services in the ownership of the two Mirror publications and the Financial Gazette raises issues of media freedom violation and plunder of taxpayers' money by an unaccountable state. It also highlights the urgent need to ensure that media ownership in Zimbabwe is not shrouded in secrecy, but is transparent and a matter of public knowledge.

8. The contribution of the diaspora movement for democratic change in Zimbabwe can be significantly enhanced if both the internal and external struggles for democratization are synchronized. Civic groups and political parties working in Zimbabwe need to engage in a more sustained and organized campaign to mobilize the diaspora. Diaspora activists need to develop coherent programmes to mobilize mass support from Zimbabweans in the diaspora. It will also involve balancing internet-based activism with other forms of activism and continuing to fight for the right of Zimbabweans abroad to vote in elections in Zimbabwe. Diaspora groups try many actions and form many groups but many of them collapse into ethnic and petty internal bickering, thereby failing to ensure a high level of organizational integrity.

Conclusion

Raftopolous winds up his analysis of Zimbabwe-s non-political actors by suggesting that they, rather than state, opposition political parties or state institutions, can solve Zimbabwe-s crisis: "Opposition parties and civil society in Zimbabwe have both failed to develop effective and sustainable strategies to achieve democratic change in the country either through electoral means or through mass action."

A much stronger argument for assigning a major role to other areas of society in bringing democratic change in the country is that democratic values cannot be introduced and sustained by merely replacing one ruling party or elite with another. There is a need to construct a new democratic culture at all levels. It is in this process that non-state actors will play a key role.

Appendix

This appendix provides further analysis of the eight non-party political actors introduced above. It is based on a series of papers by Brian Raftopoulis entitled Reflections on Democratic Politics in Zimbabwe, published in 2006 by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation:

The Military: The armed forces' intervention in party politics on behalf of the ruling party has enabled ZANU PF to maintain its grip on power in the face of very strong and credible challenges to its political hegemony. It has also brought considerable economic and political benefits to the top echelons of the armed forces. The latter have been among the most conspicuous beneficiaries of the government's land reform programme. The armed forces have also increased their influence in the structures of both government and the ruling party. The benefits of the armed forces' alliance with ZANU PF have been restricted to the top levels. This is evidenced in frequent press reports on the rank and file armed forces' disgruntlement with poor remuneration and working conditions.

The most obvious limitation of the armed forces' decision to shore up ZANU PF is the adverse effect this has had on civil-military relations in Zimbabwe. The immediate post-independence mission, doctrine and training of the armed forces emphasized their role in protecting the people and in safeguarding the interests of the whole nation. This ethos has however been replaced by one in which the armed forces have come to view the people as their enemy and their principal role as being to protect the interests of ZANU PF. This has contributed to divisions and polarization in Zimbabwean society by creating a situation in which the ruling party and the armed forces are pitted against the majority.

The professional image of the armed forces has also suffered immensely as they are now widely perceived as an oppressive institution sustaining the rule of a government that no longer enjoys popular support. Public revelations of the armed forces overt and covert role in the administration of election processes has also undermined public confidence in any ZANU PF administered electoral system as a vehicle for democratic change. The overall effect of the armed forces' intervention in party politics in support of ZANU PF is that they have lost legitimacy, and the confidence and trust of the majority of the population.

Civil society: There are two salient shortcomings that have been shown by civil society in its engagement with state authoritarianism. The first is its failure to unite into one movement. Among the factors that have contributed to this lack of cohesion are intense rivalries that exist among the ambitious personalities who head various civil-society organizations, especially those concerned with human rights issues. These personalities have pursued their own "power" agendas and often maligned each other to potential donors as they compete for the same funds. The civil-society networks presided over by these leaders have also failed to mobilize mass support as they often comprise elite small groups of activists with no real grassroots organizational structures and support.

The second weakness shown by civil-society is its predominantly urban-centric orientation. Most civil society organizations have failed to extend their activities to the rural areas where 65% of the population lives. Even within the urban setting, the activities of civil-society groups centre too much on Harare despite the fact that 80% of Zimbabwe 's population is not resident in Harare. The regional offices of most civil society organizations are poorly equipped and barely functional. This excessive focus on Harare has led to civil society organizations failing to take account of the different experiences and requirements of the different regions. For instance, the regional position of Matabeleland has been strongly influenced by the state-sponsored atrocities that took place there in the 1980s and resulted in the deaths of an estimated 20,000 people.

The Church: The limitations of the church's responses to the authoritarianism of the post-colonial state are numerous and tend to outweigh the strengths. One notable shortcoming has been the lack of cohesion and unity displayed by the church in reacting to state autocracy. This has undermined the church's effectiveness, especially as an agent for democratic change within an authoritarian state. Another significant limitation has been the church's policy of either endorsing or failing to strongly condemn the series of blanket amnesties granted by the state to perpetrators of human rights violations. This has contributed to the entrenchment of a culture of impunity for human rights violations as the state has become accustomed to granting amnesties without any significant opposition from the church. The church's weak responses to human rights violations have also been evident in the overly cautious approach it has adopted in trying to the call the state to account for massive human rights violations. The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC), in an effort not to antagonize the government, delayed publishing evidence of the Matabeleland atrocities submitted to it by its own CCJP. It also initially resisted pressure to release this evidence to another organization that was willing to quickly publish a report on the government-sponsored atrocities.

After 1980, the church, convinced that it had played its part in the liberation struggle, decided to leave the realm of politics to politicians and focus instead on social and developmental issues. This proved to be a disastrous error of judgement, which drew the church too close to the state and weakened its capacity to "speak truth to power". The church subsequently failed to recognise and speak out against the danger of ZANU PF's steady march towards authoritarian rule in the late 1980s. It also made it easier for the state to keep the church divided by co-opting certain sections of the church into supporting its policies. The success of the state in emasculating the church in this manner is evidenced by the churches divided response to the government's violent land reform programme and its subversion of the rule of law from 1999 to the present. In addition, the church has failed to formulate an overall political and social vision based on biblical values and which goes beyond the narrow visions offered by various social and political movements and groups.

The few strong points in the church's reaction to state authoritarianism emerged when it re-established a constructive role for itself within the political process by actively participating in the 1999/2000 national debates over constitutional reform. This constructive role was also displayed when the Church assumed a prominent role in giving humanitarian assistance to the victims of the government's Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order).

Labour Movement: The ZCTU's determination to resist authoritarianism and its ability to maintain its internal cohesion in the face of the fierce onslaught on it by the state has inspired other labour movements in the Southern Africa region and beyond. Organizations such as the South African Congress of Trade Unions (COSATU), the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) have all expressed their solidarity with the ZCTU.

However, some of the tactics employed by the ZCTU in its struggle with state repression and economic decline have either not had the desired result or have created dilemmas which the labour movement has yet to resolve. Firstly, the ZCTU's prominent role in the formation and subsequent activities of the opposition MDC has created a number of problems in its internal structures and in the political and ideological dimensions of its relationship with the state. The formation of the MDC resulted in a "brain drain" from the ZCTU as its most effective and experienced leaders left the organization to provide the top leadership for the MDC. The leaders who remained lacked sufficient organizational skills and experience and this resulted in a leadership vacuum that became noticeable early in 2001 and has continued to affect the fortunes of the labour movement.

Women: Lack of cohesion and unity about the strategies needed to achieve their goals has emerged as one of the principal limitations in the approaches used by women's organizations to pursue their interests within the current crisis context. The diverse social and class backgrounds and political allegiances of women have made the women's movement a heterogeneous site whose agenda is subject to constant internal contestation. Different views, strategies and opinions on how to advance women's interests have repeatedly surfaced within the movement.

Some women's organizations have favoured the strategy of pursuing their interests within state-controlled structures. Others have advocated situating women's movements and struggles outside the state. Some of these divisions were manifest in 1999/2000 when the Women's Coalition on the Constitution split into two camps along political lines. Both camps encountered difficulties within their chosen political alliances. Those who aligned with the state-led constitutional reform movement were often frustrated by the patriarchal prejudices against women that they encountered. Those who joined the more democratic NCA had to speak out loudly against gender imbalances within the organization and campaign vigorously for increased female representation on its task forces.

One of the strategies employed by the Women's Coalition was to campaign across political divides for the election of female candidates in the June 2000 parliamentary elections. Experience has shown, however, that it is not enough to have women in parliament. Numbers do not necessarily translate into gender equality, nor do they ensure that such forums are accommodating and receptive to women's interests. The Women's Coalition also overestimated its capacity when it decided to mobilize women to stand for election to parliament. When female parliamentary candidates became vulnerable to the widespread political violence that characterized the 2000 parliamentary elections, the Women's Coalition was unable to offer them support or protection.

The use of the Women's Coalition to politically mobilize women also placed enormous pressure on its constituent parts, comprising specific women's organizations, with diverse commitments. The ability of these different organizations to engage with the rapidly changing national political landscape was also constrained by their obligations to donors who did not want the beneficiaries of their funding to participate in party politics. The women's movement, despite its tactical limitations and a politically hostile operational environment, has been able to reconfigure women's relationship with the state and with other sections of civil society.

Legal Profession: In reacting to the authoritarianism of the Mugabe regime, the legal profession, specifically the judiciary, had to choose between two different theoretical options, judicial positivism or judicial activism. Judicial positivism can be defined as a situation whereby a judicial officer relies on assumptions that non-judicial organs of the state have a superior capacity to make determinations of a quasi-judicial or judicial nature. Judicial activism has often brought the judiciary into conflict with other state organs while judicial positivism has sometimes resulted in the judiciary passively colluding with the executive in undermining the fundamental rights of citizens. Historically, the judiciary in Zimbabwe has employed both judicial positivism and activism, displaying an ambivalence that has arguably emboldened the executive to extend the limits of its traditional legislative and administrative boundaries. As a strategy with which to respond to the current state authoritarianism, judicial activism has limitations. Firstly, with the exception of criminal trials in superior courts, judicial officers largely work in isolation, with each being the principal of the court he or she presides over. This structure of the Zimbabwean courts militates against the revival and broadening of judicial activism. The independence of the judiciary, which is one of the fundamental prerequisites for judicial activism has been subjected to profound and sustained attack by the state. Judges who fail to defer to the executive remain vulnerable to state reprisals. The independence of most of the judges who sit on the bench of Zimbabwe's Supreme Court is also questionable as they are prominent beneficiaries of government patronage. Judicial activism and the general character and capacity of the judiciary also depend on the quality of the constitution. Zimbabwe's essentially imperial constitution characterized by extreme centralization of power in the presidency at the expense of the legislature and judiciary is a significant obstacle to judicial activism.

Media: There are four main limitations in the media's approach to the Zimbabwe Crisis over the past five years. Firstly, in reporting the current Zimbabwe crisis, both the state-owned and private media have failed to transcend the polarization that has characterized discourses about the crisis. The state-owned media has uncritically endorsed the policies of the state and ZANU PF while the private media has sought to delegitimize the state and the ruling party by identifying itself with the views of the opposition MDC. This polarized reporting reflects the media's failure to problematize the constraints and limitations of the post-colonial state and the role of external players in state decisions.

Secondly, the media, especially the press has remained an essentially urban phenomenon with major newspapers failing to circulate beyond the cities. Mainstream commercial publications have failed to increase their circulation over the past five years. Media density, which is vital for democratic life, has also decreased over the past five years and there are very poor prospects of this changing soon. The government has since 2003 shut down five newspapers, including the Daily News.

Thirdly, the state-owned press has demonstrated complete partisanship in its reporting of the Zimbabwe Crisis. It has failed to claim the editorial autonomy it is entitled to in terms of the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT). The state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) has also shown unfailing partisanry.

The strengths in the approaches of the media to the present crisis are evident mostly in the private media, which has shown enormous courage in reporting the Zimbabwe Crisis from what is arguably one of the harshest and most repressive media environments in the world.

Diaspora: As a strategy aimed at bringing about democratic political change in Zimbabwe, diaspora activism has exhibited numerous notable weaknesses. Organized political parties and civil-society groups in Zimbabwe have made no serious effort to politically mobilize the diaspora. The main opposition MDC, for instance, has made no meaningful attempt to draw Zimbabweans in the diaspora into its activities through the establishment of active political structures outside Zimbabwe. Though the MDC has established branches in Johannesburg, London and the United States, these are either ineffective or dormant or constantly squabbling. Tensions have emerged between civic activists operating in Zimbabwe and those based in the diaspora. The former, who perceive themselves as having an objective assessment of the Zimbabwe Crisis rooted in its daily economic and political realities, have criticized diaspora activists for being out of touch with the political reality on the ground. Diaspora activists have also been criticized for being cowards who have run away from the frontline of the struggle against authoritarianism in Zimbabwe. These tensions between the internals and exiles have, as in the case of other liberation movements, had an adverse impact on the productive interaction and exchange of ideas between the two groups.

Racial, class, ethnic, linguistic and regional divisions among diaspora activists have militated against the formulation and implementation of a common programme of action. They have contributed to the failure by diaspora activists to co-ordinate their activities and develop focused or coherent programmes of action that clearly define their goals and how they seek to achieve them. Many diaspora groups have conducted uncoordinated activities within the same diaspora communities. South Africa for instance has approximately 18 diaspora organizations, all based in Johannesburg and competing fiercely and bitterly for the same political space.

Thirdly, diaspora activism's excessive reliance on the internet to carry out its programmes has proved to be its greatest weakness. It has largely restricted political debate on Zimbabwe to those with access to computers and the internet. The majority of people in Zimbabwe do not have computers or access to the internet and have not been able to actively participate in the major programmes and debates initiated by diaspora groups. The small numbers of people who have turned up for events reflects the failure of internet-based activism to attract mass participation from Zimbabweans in the diaspora and even at home. This "desktop" or "keyboard activism" has reduced the diaspora struggle for democratic change in Zimbabwe to a talk shop as it has not been balanced by the use of other forms of activism.

The inadequacies of internet-based activism have been compounded by the logistical problems associated with mobilizing widely dispersed communities. These include apathy from most Zimbabwean immigrants who are more concerned with daily issues of survival than with political activism. A significant number of Zimbabweans, especially in South Africa and Botswana, are illegal immigrants on the run from the law and hence are reluctant to engage in organized political activities.

Further, the material benefits offered by diaspora activism have led, in some cases, to the emergence of briefcase diaspora organizations headed by individuals for whom fighting for democratic change in Zimbabwe has become a lucrative personal industry. These briefcase organizations have no proper membership records or procedures for accounting for the funds given to them by donors. This lack of organizational integrity has had a negative impact on potential donors. In addition, some diaspora groups have adopted foundational principles that have undermined the cause by attracting and accepting funding from conservative and reactionary groups.

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