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Time
for civil society to seize the space?
Sam
Kebele, Extracted from Pambazuka News 300
April 20, 2007
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/40855
Sam Kebele-s analysis
of recent events in Zimbabwe highlights the internal and external
complexities at work in the country. He considers the possibilities
of a broad non-partisan front emerging from the ranks of Zimbabwean
civil society with a common agenda. He suggests ways in which outsiders
and human rights activists can support Zimbabwean civil society
in effecting sustainable change in the country.
Following Mary
Ndlovu-s excellent article in Pambazuka News...
From last month, possibly
for the first time, it seemed that in the African context, Zimbabwe
was finally losing the propaganda war it had successfully pursued
amongst its traditional allies.
The beatings in March
of Morgan Tsvangirai and others flashed around the world caused
an immediate drop in the Zimbabwe dollar of a quarter of its value.
Any remaining tourism took another hit with mass cancellations at
Victoria Falls hotels.
The strategies of the
Zimbabwean state of both structural and physical violence reminiscent
of the last years of apartheid seem to be both unravelling and becoming
more vicious.
The combination of a
centrally directed, presidential-inspired incitement to violence,
securitisation of state institutions, state of emergency in all
but name, use of informer networks and hit squads to destroy the
opposition, and manipulation of the media seek to provide ideological
justification for the demonisation of the opposition, and licensed
informal violence.
Greater unity amongst
independent democratic forces and the statement of the Catholic
bishops conference unequivocally laying the blame for the first
time for the current situation at the door of a 'corrupt,
greedy and repressive elite- marks a significant step.
It is clear that regional
uneasiness and internal ZANU PF struggles have created space for
independent voices to organise for systemic democratic change. But,
as in the scenarios that Mary Ndlovu outlines, there needs to be
a realistic assessment of what can be done as well as strategic
regional and international solidarity directed towards progressive
targets.
The emergency
Southern African Development Community (SADC) leaders'
summit in Dar es Salaam on 29 March discussed the crisis. It
appeared to give some succour to Mugabe-s regime, in line
with its stance since the start of the crisis seven to ten years
ago.
SADC appointed Thabo
Mbeki, seen here in Zimbabwe as Mugabe-s chief defender, as
mediator. It called for sanctions, i.e. the asset freeze and travel
bans on Mugabe and cronies, to be lifted; and for the UK government
to honour its land reform aid package promises.
Since these changes are
unlikely to be implemented without some serious reform, this appears
to some as yet more of the same non-interference and 'Áfrican
leadership solidarity-.
The alternative more
optimistic assessment was that these two demands were a face-saving
formula to get Mugabe to accept that SADC wanted an end to the crisis,
which has begun to have a serious impact on the region.
For the first time there
has been recent and outspoken public criticism of ZImbabwe from
continental and regional leaders, notably the Zambian president
Levy Mwanawasa, on more than one occasion.
This reading of the situation
suggests there will be a more sustained engagement in Zimbabwe and
the possibility for opening a space for manoeuvre.
Widely believed sources
say that Mugabe was given the choice either to leave office at the
end of his current term in March 2008, or to introduce significant
reforms to end the economic and political crisis.
Many inside Zimbabwe
felt that SADC could and should have gone much further in applying
open political pressure. They argue that the regional organisation
has dealt Mugabe a card to play.
The government press
has certainly trumpeted the SADC statements as vindicating Mugabe-s
speech to his fellow leaders: outlining his liberation war credentials,
and berating the British as the sole cause of the crisis. One effect
has been to give Mugabe a stronger hand to deal with his internal
party critics.
At one point in the week
of 26 March just before a politbureau meeting, sources within the
Mujuru faction were reportedly informing journalists that they could
persuade Mugabe to stand down for re-election in 2008. They allied
opportunistically with the Mnangagwa faction (see below) to see
off Mugabe-s bid to 'standardise- the presidential
and parliamentary elections in 2010.
The assumption has been
widely canvassed that Mugabe would become a ceremonial president
with a Prime Minister. He would retire soon afterwards with no dangers
of being whisked away to the International Criminal Court in the
Hague. Then opposition factions could re-engage with the West.
The problem for both
factions was that Mugabe was too paranoid to trust anyone, and had
probably seen that impunity often has a limited shelf life.
The party-s central
committee, packed with Mugabe supporters such as the youth and women-s
league, duly endorsed the president as their sole candidate for
the 2008 elections.
This has left the two
different factions on the back foot. Despite claims that this time
they would force the issue of succession, they appear to have retreated.
They are perhaps biding their time to see what the SADC mission
looks like.
At face value though,
and as has happened without fail in the past, Mugabe has proved
a better street fighter when he has his back against the wall than
his would-be party presidential opponents. But the deep rifts in
ZANU PF are very unlikely to go away.
It is far from certain,
however, that Mugabe will automatically see off his critics outside
the party whether internal, regional or international.
There was huge
support for a signed petition in the press from regional civil society.
There is considerable international support for the ZCTU
stay away on 3-4 April. There has also been consolidation of concern
and critical statements from church leaders. The deposing of the
President of the Evangelical
Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), Trevor Mananga, who was suspected
of getting to close to the ruling party, and who denounced the ZCTU
stay away on state television, points to renewed energy amongst
opposition forces, and possibilities for change.
Since the late 1990s,
Zimbabwe has been trapped in major interlinked crises that have
resulted in economic and political free fall. This situation has
been described by diplomatic sources, even with the examples of
DRC and Somalia in mind, as 'just about unsustainable-.
A series of disastrous
land reform policies; the adoption by ZANU-PF of draconian measures
curbing civil and political liberties; a devastating HIV/ AIDS epidemic;
widespread hunger and food; 80 per cent unemployment in the formal
sector has driven tens of thousands of professionals to leave the
country to find work abroad in the region and Europe.
This was compounded
by the attack on urban dwellers known as Operation
Murambatsvina ('clear out the filth-). Inflation
is now running at 1,720 per cent and rising, expected by the IMF
to hit 5000 per cent by the end of the year.
The Fund says Zimbabwe
is losing control of its economy. Anecdotal evidence is of the government
having to visit the parallel market to gain US dollars to pay off
debts on a day-by-day basis. Fiscal deficit is 40 per cent of GDP,
which has fallen by 35 per cent.
Official UN statistics
show that life expectancy for women is now just 34 years. The HIV
infection rate has been 25 per cent, one of the highest in the world.
Zimbabwe has fallen 23
places over the last decade in the ranking of the world-s
poorest countries and now stands as the 145th poorest out of 177
ranked countries (UNDP Human Development Report 2005).
So what is the likelihood
of serious change? For those who remember some of their Leninist
theory, the ideal conditions for radical change include fractures
in the state and its apparatuses, unity of the opposition with a
vision, leadership and a strategy, serious multiple crises and significant
outside support.
It is hard to say that
any of these major elements are in place, although there are some
recognisable characteristics and opportunities for the development
of more. According to a young civil society activist the current
choice is between 'Á New Zimbabwe- or Somalia-.
There are other options
beyond this binary interpretation, including the danger of a tainted
and compromised transition brokered by the region with the support
of the West. This could leave in place the systemic features of
the repressive and kleptocratic regime, impunity and little real
democratic change.
There is a danger that
there will not be adequate forces to prevent this as many in Zimbabwe
may accept this arrangement, especially if accompanied, as it was
apparently proposed at the SADC meeting, by a substantial rescue
package put together by the US and UK governments. It would probably
save lives.
In terms of possible
fractures in the state, divisions, often underpinned by ethnic rivalries
within and without the majority Shona-speaking group, have been
endemic in ZANU-PF for many years, although they have sharpened
considerably over the last year.
Mugabe has been able
to use and contain divisions with lesser or greater degrees of coercion,
given his awareness of 'where the bodies are buried-.
The current major divisions
are between the equally corrupt Vice-President Joyce Mujuru (and
husband Solomon) and Emmerson Mnangagwa factions, all of whom represent
the ageing liberation generation.
Mugabe appears to retain
most support. Although now arguably a faction leader himself, he
remains dominant and is unlikely to be unseated before 2008.
As a result of the fallouts,
Mnangagwa-s faction may be on top at the moment. Since Mugabe
has explicity attacked the Mujuru faction for plotting against him,
it might be now or never for Mnangagwa since he is widely believed
to be dependent on anti-retro virals.
Much of the faction-fighting
- beyond the usual desire for power and control of resources
- is over who controls the army, Mugabe-s power base. The
army controls most of the major institutions of the state and is
likely to be a power broker in any new situation, through, it is
generally thought, Solomon Mujuru, given his former position as
liberation war vet and post independence army commander.
At his recent 83rd birthday
party, Mugabe attacked Joyce Mujuru in a long rambling tirade that
even ZBC felt obliged to censor - in itself an amazing step. Joyce
it is understood subsequently to have resigned, but was reportedly
persuaded by her husband to withdraw it.
Mujuru remains one of
the richest men in ZImbabwe. Whilst he is largely believed to have
significant army support, there is talk that this is not as strong
as previously thought. There may be elements in the army who prefer
Emmerson Mnangagwa to come out on top in the feuding over who would
succeed Mugabe.
Whether there would be
actual armed violence between the two factions is a matter of debate
with younger activists seeming to expect it and older ones less
sure. However, there have been no reports of conflicts so far. If
they do occur, the point of conflict may be the recently discovered
diamond field (se below) in which the Mujurus have a stake. There
are also reports of plenty of buried weapons just over the border,
from Mozambican war days.
There have been reports
of great disaffection within the lower ranks of the army and police,
even within the presidential guard, with reports of shootings at
State House (and allegedly 22 executions, although in Zimababwe
wild rumours are not uncommon).
It is believed that the
presidential guard now consists of Congolese troops which suggests
a deep mistrust of Zimbabwe-s own military. The lower ranks
have also seen an increased rate of desertions which the regime
has been unable to stem even by using the war veterans and the Green
Bombers.
Reports of the imminent
deployment of Angolan police units have been denied, with Luanda
claiming they are providing 'training- to help replace
the deserters. If, as is claimed, 3,000 Angolans will be deployed,
this is clearly more that just a training mission.
There are also no facilities
to support their deployment. According to the (London) Times correspondent,
the police being sent are supposed be the dreaded Ninjas, famed
for their brutality in Angola and in action against illegal garimpeiro
miners from the DRC - which may not be coincidental.
If the Angolans are sending
police, this strategy could backfire by generating further resentment
from the ranks of the ZRP indigenous police as well as the population.
Even the Angolans stressed the need for peace and security in overcoming
internal problems.
It would not seem necessary
that the Zimbabwean police need training in handing out beatings.
There have been suggestions that the beatings meted out on and since
11 March are the responsibility of several special units, possibly
including army in police uniforms. The violence also suggests the
involvement of special units in 'black operations-,
such as the attacks on police stations and a passenger train -
which the regime subsequently used as part of its propaganda in
the region to portray their actions as necessary in the face of
'terrorism', which the state claims is being orchestrated by the
MDC. The confessions in the Mail and Guardian at the beginning of
April of 'John Gweru-, a special operative in the Charlie
Four hit squad, provide disquieting reminders of the tactics of
the last years of apartheid.
For the people, the major
problem remains the expected massive food deficit of 1.2 million
tonnes (Zimbabwe needs 1.8m tonnes), and the likelihood of politicisation
of any aid, especially in an election.
The region as a whole
needs to monitor this situation far more carefully than for instance
at the time of the 2005 election. Assuring independent verifiable
information must be made a central component of the mediation.
The government continues
to deny there is a problem, yet in one incident a permanent secretary
is believed to have followed the visiting World Food Programme head
out of a meeting saying that he had made denials of food shortages
because CIO intelligence people were present in the meeting and
that Zimbabwe really did need emergency and food aid.
Only belatedly has the
country asked the EU to provide food aid. Nor is the region likely
to help out with maize, given shortfalls and drought in countries
such as Zambia and South Africa: the latter will have to import
in a situation of high world maize prices. Malawi may have a surplus,
but wishes to build up a strategic reserve. Discussions about a
regional food security stockpile are only in an early stage. The
UN has already launched a US$215 million appeal, of which $62m is
for food aid. The Zimbabwe government has so far imported 400,000
tonnes to cover deficit. Zambia says it will honour existing contracts.
On energy, South Africa
will also need all it produces and Zimbabwe is in debt to ESKOM
(the South African energy parastatal), Mozambique and to SNEL, the
Congolese power authority, which was in Harare in early April chasing
the money it has already been promised several times.
Tobacco farmers who provide
much of the foreign exchange are in dispute with the government
over price and are not bringing their reduced crop to the selling
floors.
So are the Zimbabweans
losing their automatic regional and continental outside support?
The Zambian president Mwanawasa, who will be the next chair of SADC,
has compared Zimbabwe with a sinking Titanic - a statement that
drew an immediate visit to Lusaka from Zimbabwean officials.
This followed a visit
from Jakaya Kikwete, president of Tanzania and head of the SADC
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. The SADC troika of Tanzania,
Lesotho, Namibia allegedly want Zimbabwe to be top of the agenda
at the next organ meeting (or did do before the recent summit).
As well as being tasked with re-engagement with Zimbabwe and with
the SA ambassador having had talks with Tsvangirai, the South Africans
had already made it clear that they wanted commitment to at least
formal democratic practices.
Furthermore, given their
own history and that of the region, a declaration of a formal state
of emergency would be received very negatively. It is arguable of
course that Zimbabwe already has an informal one given the defiance
by the state of its own repressive legislation e.g. refusing to
obey court orders on allowing the opposition to stage rallies.
The ACP countries are
also planning a special mission, according to diplomatic sources.
Harare is said not to be resisting - presumably on the grounds
they can continue to play the line: 'imperialists are using
terror against us-. Leaders of the African Union and African
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights have offered to help Zimbabwe.
This marks a further stage on from initial non-interference, then
concerns expressed over Operation Murambatsvina, and now offers
to help. Credibility will no doubt depend on what any mission does
and who it talks to, and not falling for the benign guided tour
Harare is likely to provide.
It seems unlikely that
Harare-s historic allies, the Angolans and Namibians, will
abandon their fellow invader of the DRC - despite reports
that the Brazilians warned Angola not to overtly support Mugabe.
But interestingly, the Namibian president remained silent during
the Mwanawasa statement.
There is of course China
and the 'Look East- policy. This policy follows a long
line of failed rescue initiatives from the Libyans to the Malaysians.
But each of those in the end want something in return for support,
and the Zimbabweans had little to offer. According to diplomats,
the Chinese are 'risk averse' and were tired of the Zimbabweans
claiming after meetings that the Chinese would be providing support
e.g. building a steel mill - a story the Chinese immediately
denied. Zimbabwe was notably absent from the itinerary for the recent
Chinese Premier-s visit.
The five person Southern
African team charged with negotiations and coming up with solutions
looks like being coordinated from the President-s Office by
Rev Frank Chikane, a one time key anti-apartheid activist. According
to reliable sources, the Tanzanian president, Kikwete, will be brought
in to talk to Mugabe, Mbeki will liaise with the MDC, AND South
African local government minister Sydney Mufamadi with ZANU-PF.
There are two deputy ministers and two other DGs as part of the
team.
This will occur against
the background of the US and EU looking at how they might sharpen
up existing 'sanctions-. Such sanctions possibilities
might be extended to include relatives of those banned from travelling
to the EU, business leaders of ZPF companies or to widen areas.
SADC-s call for
the lifting of sanctions is a sign of moral disapproval rather than
a serious overture to ease Zimbabwe-s economic woes, despite
claims by Harare that sanctions are responsible for the economy-s
collapse.
It is highly unlikely
that there would be major investment anyway given the economic downturn
and extremely unfriendly investment climate with threats to nationalise
major parts of the economy. One possible advantage to the Zimbabwean
government is, as stated, the recent discovery of a major diamond
field near Marange whose ownership is disputed and could exacerbate
tensions within ZANU PF. However the possible deal with Equatorial
Guinea trading oil debts for diamonds could run into legaL problems
with the Kimberley Process, which regulates the diamond industry.
How united are the democratic
forces and the opposition?
It is clear that the
Mugabe regime retains some measure of support both within SADC and
the AU leaderships. Domestically, Mugabe can call on much of the
party, in particular the women-s league. Mugabe/ZANU PF also
retains some support amongst sections of the church and other civic
leaders, although outright support does appear to be waning.
But this situation is
far from static. A shrinking economy has inevitably eroded the regime-s
ability to service its client or find new sources of patronage.
This situation has undermined the government-s means to retain
all-inclusive loyalty from the police and army, to some extent elements
of the war vets, and from other state employees.
This is a serious problem
for the authorities, and will only get worse as the economy continues
to shrink. Indeed, the state can no longer insulate most civil servants
from the desperation that ordinary Zimbabweans have been living
with for some time as they try to make ends meet.
Already, teachers, nurses
and other civil servants have signalled their displeasure with the
government - the reports of mass desertions from the police
and military are a signal of these groupings voting with their feet.
The extent to which, if at all, the democratic opposition can capitalise
on these fissures remains to be seen.
But larger questions
must be asked. It remains to be seen whether SADC-s intervention
will take heed of Zimbabwean civil society-s concerns and
priorities. For it to do so, Zimbabwe-s civil society will
need to organise itself sufficiently to ensure the mediation team
is aware of those concerns and priorities and not leave it at state
and party level. The prospective mediation may provide an unprecedented
opportunity, but this will certainly require significant coalition
building and greater cohesion amongst opposition forces, as well
as an awareness that reliance on US funding is not going to help
their regional image.
As mentioned, Lenin stressed
that democratic opposition must have have unity, vision and leadership.
The democratic/social movement in Zimbabwe, however, has been largely
characterised by turf wars, parallel forms of opposition, a multiplicity
of largely uncoordinated activities, and personalist forms of leadership.
Since January
2006 and the launch of the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA) and
the Save
Zimbabwe Campaign, there appears to be signs of a greater unity
and sense of purpose - not only rhetorically, but also in
practice. It was noticeable, for example, that when police raided
ZCTU offices and stole the posters advertising the stayaway of 3-4
April, other parts of civil society were able to help out.
So what are the possibilities
of a broad front emerging from the ranks of Zimbabwean civil society,
a non-partisan platform, with a common agenda in relation to a new
constitution, and a commitment to no engagement with electoral process
without major changes and a level playing field?
Despite the split in
the main opposition MDC and a sustained attack on their structures,
the two factions, Tsvangirai and Mutambar, are generally working
together; although there are clearly differences and many of the
issues that precipitated their falling out have not been addressed.
Nevertheless, their cooperation
intensified after the events of 1 March and was much in evidence
at the memorial service for activist Gift Tandare - shot by
police and secretly buried. It seems as if police tactics of allowing
Mutambare rallies to go ahead with the objective of promoting suspicion
that he was a government stooge have failed to work. Unity is thought
to be better in rural areas - activists belong to most of
the relevant groups and work together, although there has been a
major crackdown on opposition supporters in rural areas.
The ZCA report great
enthusiasm for their approach from the grassroots and their driving
of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign. Civil society at one time appeared
purely reactive, but some now feel that they have the government
on the back foot instead of proactive. Certainly, continuous pressure
appears to be forcing the regime to commit unnecessary public relations
blunders like the beating up of opposition MP Nelson Chamisa at
the airport on his way to an EU-ACP meeting.
Whether or not civil
society groupings have the capacity and commitment to take advantage
of these developments is a moot point. As ever, the problem is how
to keep the democratic momentum going, and what route it should
take. Their inability to capitalise on opportunities in the past
does not generate much optimism in the current circumstances.
In terms of
strategy, the National
Constitutional Assembly (NCA) is continuing its brave street
protests with the state seemingly only too willing to accept the
invitation to commit unacceptable brutality. But these are often
not well supported. A possible second phase to street protests is
not yet there.
Amongst the talk of a
new constitution there is also some disagreement around issues of
process and what are the necessary preconditions. The opposition
needs greater coordination behind the scenes as well, so that medics
and lawyers who are prepared to put themselves in the front line,
facing threats, do not end up doing all the mundane work.
What underground structures
might be necessary, and who is willing to be out of the limelight?
This 'twilight zone-, between acting above board and
covertly, has contributed to inertia and confusion - as the
MDC and most of civil society continue to operate within the parameters
of laws that they do not accept. Whilst some see the inevitability
and utility of operating covertly, most are unwilling and indeed
seemingly unprepared to do so.
There is also need to
establish what strategies should be employed towards talks with
the government. At the same time as calling for stayaways such as
the partially successful one on 3-4 April 2007, the ZCTU is engaging
with the government through the Tripartite National Forum on Reserve
Bank Governor Gideon Gono-s 'social contract-
- not that the latter which calls for price and wage stabilisation
is likely to have any success given that even if prices stabilise
-when they are rising astronomically - most goods only come through
the parallel/black market.
The big question is whether
civil society concerns are even on the mediators- agenda.
The intervention is essentially political - to talk to the
Zimbabwe government (and Mugabe), ZANU PF and the MDC.
Civil society will not
be on the radar screen unless they put themselves there. The small
space will soon be gone. Unless civil society uses this brief opportunity
to sent clear articulated message on what must be addressed they
will be sidelined. They must do this in concert with their solidarity
partners in the region, so they can also exert pressure on their
respective governments.
In this regard, their
link to the South African groupings is critical - but to date,
solidarity has been piecemeal. This requires a clear communication
strategy, not only between Zimbabwean groupings and the region,
but within Zimbabwe civic society itself. At present, civil society
is seen as a group of disparate groups and individuals, with a limited
constituency base. Why should the mediators take them seriously?
Despite the parallels with South Africa, there has not been the
emergence of a UDF-type leadership that could provide strategic
direction and utilise the practical energies of its constituent
parts. Much work has been generated over the last few years, but
there has not been a strategic division of labour that will pull
activities and outputs towards a common vision.
Up to recently, church
leaders in this very religious country have been seen as either
ineffective, in collusion with the government, or silent, or self-serving,
with notable exceptions such as the Archbishop of Bulawayo Pius
Ncube. Even those who were not ZANU PF and/or alleged intelligence
(CIO) agents (and there are plenty of allegations) had appeared
more concerned about their hierarchical status and their conversations
with the President and Gono, not dissimilar from other parts of
civil society that seem to prefer constructive engagement, at cost
to their perceived integrity. This had disappointed many Zimbabweans,
given what impact they could have had.
There now appears
to be a turning point: the pastoral
statement from the Catholic
Bishops- Conference stressed the unacceptable face of
the state in repression, violence, economic decline and lack of
moral values. Unlike previous ecumenical statements from the Catholic,
Protestant and Evangelical churches, which have been watered down
to the lowest common denominator, and attempted to equate blame
for violence to 'both sides-.
The recent Catholic declaration
followed a rather more hard-hitting Zimbabwe Council of Churches
statement and was followed by the ousting of Bishop Mananga as President
of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe, who was seen as getting
closer to the ruling regime. We wait to see if the recent Catholic
pastoral letter has similar impact to their Malawian counterparts
in 1993, or is dismissed as has happened to previous statements.
However it does not appear
that the churches want to lead a civil society movement as yet,
preferring for the time being to attempt to represent 'all
of their flock-, including no doubt their fellow Catholic
Mugabe; and to continue 'negotiations- with the government;
and talk to the South African churches about their government-s
role in negotiations.
In talks with
a church leader, there is as yet no follow-up on the letters although
the called for days of prayer and fasting could provide such opportunities.
There is also the National
Vision Document process to integrate into this, whereby church
leaders produced a document 'The Zimbabwe We Want-;
for some in the church this process had many contradictions and
was seen as very hierarchical and topdown.
The consultations with
government led to a second draft which had been substantially watered
down at presumed government insistence. There is also, as with the
trade unions, the contradictions of debating with the government
as the space for debate is brutally closed down in all other areas.
As one civil society activist put it 'why engage with the
government when they are beating you up?-
The
ways forward
Are there yet key demands,
commitments to an understood and widely-accepted process and some
awareness of interactions with outside forces? It is difficult to
ascertain, although the new situation presented by SADC-s
intervention presents an opportunity that needs to be quickly seized.
There needs
to be a solid front especially on not contesting elections under
the present unfair and unfree conditions and for civil society and
other democratic forces to organise to make that apparent to the
South (ern) African team. To some extent as with the Crisis
Coalition of Zimbabwe (grouping NGOs) there could be a dual
approach of calling for a boycott but preparing in case minimum
conditions can be achieved.
The two MDC factions
have stated both their wish to cooperate (possibly re-merge) and
their determination not to stand in 'pre-determined elections-
-said by Tsvangirai at the memorial service for killed activist
Gift Tandare. In the past there have been calls for electoral boycotts
but the MDC has then taken part, often under outside pressure. How
can MPs, often desperate to keep their posts, be persuaded not to
take part in elections; or even if the boycott is maintained not
to enter stooge parties set up by the regime to provide democratic
veneer?
One approach from a leading
human rights activist says:
'The government is illegitimate
and therefore it must go. We need a transition authority just to
narrowly get the economy back on feet and perhaps prepare the ground
for elections. Once in place we can have free and fair elections
internationally observed.'
Other thinking revolves
around calling for a national convention (parallel parliament) on
the West African model, involving different sectors in policy making
and transition. There may be need to call on outside regional civil
society assistance. In other places the churches have played a major
role in these types of initiatives, although that would not yet
seem the case in Zimbabwe. Any such actions must incorporate an
effective communications strategy within and outside the country,
especially key players in the mediation process (including the MDC).
Areas that also need
consideration are: who can help recapitalise and reprofessionalise
the country? What mobilisation strategies are possible against rural
chiefs in the regime-s pocket? What would be the earliest
time it is possible to hold free and fair elections?
Possible
outcomes
1) Stasis quo -
maintenance of the present system whilst Mugabe purges his opponents
inside ZANU-PF, enlarges the number of parliamentary, especially
rural seats to ensure his tenure in power, and maintains what the
South Africans called the kragdadigheid system of brutality.
This of course would
be contrary to what SADC is planning, and would further economic
and political freefall, anger and mass migration, and is not sustainable
for much longer.
How would the Mbeki team
counter it, and is the South African president wanting to make solving
Zimbabwe part of his legacy - the recent interview with the
Financial Times made reference to the Blair fix of Northern Ireland?
Some, including within
diplomatic circles in Zimbabwe, would suggest that South Africa
is too crippled by its own contradictions of the African Renaissance,
bridge between North and South, not acting at the behest of the
West, incomplete transition from liberation movement to governing
party, historic and present day neo-liberal policies of the ANC
to be able to make a significant difference. Zimbabweans are going
to remain very suspicious of the true intentions of Pretoria/ Tshwane
- despite the welcome from the MDC.
2) Outside-brokered incomplete
transition. This still seems the most likely. Weary Zimbabweans
might prefer it to what they have now, or to complete breakdown.
The parallels with the incomplete transition of 1979 when ZANU took
power are many.
If the solution is a
government of national unity/ reformed ZANU-PF without Mugabe acting
more or less under international tutelage, what happens to issues
of accountability, impunity, genuine grass roots reconciliation,
and whether the thieves keep their loot?
As well as keeping sections
of the elite in power, the problems are of who can staff the transition
given the systemic corruption and repression of precisely those
organisations/institutions that need to lead change.
The alternative of parachuting
in outside experts would quickly lead to alienation and possibly
similar events as seen in Timor Leste. There is the diaspora to
call on, but there is little sign of planning for the future bar
some small organisations, mostly outside the country. There are
however other transitions to provide comparative work - reunification
of Germany, South Africa, Liberia perhaps.
Secondly who is it precisely
that Mbeki is negotiating with and with what mandate? He seemed
to pull out of involvement in Zimbabwe when things got tricky and
much the same could be said of his peacebuilding attempts in DRC
and Cote d-Ívoire He has courted disillusionment in
Zimbabwe, feeding in wildly optimistic assessments of the government
and opposition parties willingness to undertake genuine discussions
and consider transformation. Few in Zimbabwe trust him given South
Africa-s track record in defending Zimbabwe at the Human Rights
Commission (as was) and in other forums. Obviously the democratic
forces need enormous support from allies in South Africa such as
COSATU, the church leaderships, the human rights activists and indeed
ordinary people.
3) Spontaneous explosion
possibly leading to option 4? There is the danger that anger could
suddenly erupt out of nowhere as an inchoate explosion leading to
possible reprisals and the dangers of formal army action.
4) Military option -
either by a more overt military coup than the creeping securitisation
that has so far characterised the state, or disaffected different
parts of the army allied perhaps to different factions contesting
power.
5) Civil society driven
transition with some kind of national convention/ constitutent assembly
process? At present there is no sign of this achieving critical
mass and there needs to be an assessment what needs to be done internally
and what pressure outside forces can provide - regionally
and internationally.
There needs to be a multipronged
approach, involving information gathering and dissemination on human
rights abuses in international and regional forums, showing that
the government is acting extra-legally as a matter of state policy.
The record of human rights
abuse is a sustained and entirely credible one, but pressure for
international reaction and action needs to be maintained. There
is talk of a Human Rights Council office in Zimbabwe to monitor
abuse. This needs to be backed up with interventions to the mediation
team and maintenance of international support.
Outside
supporters role
Assistance to Zimbabwean
civil society in working out its strategies including toward the
SADC/South African 'negotiating- team. There needs to
be pressure from outsiders such as the EU to provide greater and
practical support for human rights defenders; maintaining the Common
Position ('sanctions-) in particular on no invitation
to Zimbabwe to the EU-Africa Summit in November/December 2007; what
use can be made of the money from the European Development Funding
(EDF) line from 2002 and can it be used to help Zimbabwean civil
society?; to ask trades unions, churches, youth groups to create/sustain
links with Zimbabwean counterpart groups and to engage with South
African counterparts to the same purpose; to ensure that the Commonwealth
remains focused on the Zimbabwean issue (despite Zimbabwe expelling
itself from the body); help Zimbabwean civil society and take up
the issue for further discussion at CHOGM in November in Uganda.
5-8 April, Harare/Johannesburg
* Sam Kebele
is a writer on Zimbabwe currently having to use a pseudonym. Please
send comments to editor@pambazuka.org
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