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Back
to the future
Stephen
Chan
April 12, 2007
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=304478&area=/supzim0407_home/supzim0407_content/
With or without
Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Zimbabwe is not at a point where it can sink
no further. Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko, Uganda in the aftermath
of Idi Amin, genocide in Rwanda, and the civil wars of Liberia and
Sierra Leone all stand as examples of what could still come.
Powerful actors
on all sides in Zimbabwe are realising that the worst must not be
allowed to happen. If their interests are to survive, the future
has to be rescued from the hands of the current president. The last
sacrifice in the struggle for national liberation will be Mugabe
himself, the father of the nationalist movement.
Within Mugabe's
own party, Zanu-PF, frantic realignments are taking place. Among
the likely successors, several share a common history. Solomon Mujuru,
the retired army commander, and his wife Joice Mujuru, currently
Vice-President, command significant military credentials. The top
soldiers are behind them.
Their hands
would be stronger still if Didymus Mutasa, Minister of Security
and architect of much of the current internal repression, chooses
to throw his hat into their ring. An alliance with Mutasa would
bring the Central Intelligence Organisation on to the side of the
Mujurus.
The chief rival
to the Mujuru camp is Emmerson Mnangagwa. As a former defence minister,
he can draw on his own military alliances. If Mnangagwa opts to
cooperate with the Mujurus, their combined resources would command
decisive coercive force in the military and security agencies.
Together, these
factions would present a formidable inducement to Mugabe not to
persevere beyond 2008. But their triumph would become the triumph
of coercive powers. Securocrats will run Zimbabwe and that is not
a good omen for democracy.
Mugabe has good
reason to seek to divide and rule these two factions. His efforts
to date have not been decisive, making it likely that he will endeavour
to fashion his own presidential force from Zanu-PF's youth militia
-- the "Green Bombers". This tactic would mimic the last
act of prime minister Abel Muzorewa, who assembled a personal militia
in the final days of Ian Smith's minority white regime.
Relying on this
method of brutal political policing to build Mugabe's political
leverage would be a sign of desperation. The Bombers are neither
disciplined nor heavily armed. If Mugabe refuses to go without a
fight, it won't be civil war - the Bombers cannot withstand an organised
military push. But they could cause much bloodshed in a showdown.
Will it come
to this? Certainly, Mugabe is in a belligerent mood. His fighting
talk has become more militant and the lashing out -- both verbal
and in attacks on the opposition -- is a departure from his usual
style. Mugabe has always sought to give the impression of being
in control. He acts calmly, preferring to taunt his opponents with
disdainful sarcasm. There is no sarcasm now.
The opposition
-- the two MDCs -- are edging towards unity. How they can sustain
this momentum from the protests of early March is not clear, although
they have a powerful incentive to cooperate if they are to secure
an effective role in the political brokering that lies ahead.
Morgan Tsvangirai
has, as ever, shown immense courage -- and even Arthur Mutambara
has now been blooded. They are closer together than before. But
the two MDCs have been ineffectual for so long that a single explosive
moment is no reason to predict a last push sufficient to topple
the old president.
The larger ambition
of the opposition movements was not just to bring down Mugabe but
to democratise Zimbabwean politics. Here, it will be the South Africans
who will call some decisive shots. But, whatever the outcome, the
horse-trading that must follow Mugabe's departure will not be very
democratic.
South Africa
has long sought a unity government. They would be happy with a coalition
involving the Mujurus, Mnangagwa and Tsvangirai. While they do not
have a strong view on Mutambara, they will assume that it is better
to have all the "name" actors inside the government, rather
than outside.
This emphasis
on inclusivity will make it easier, in the post-Mugabe period, for
South Africa to guide Zimbabwe into a new era of political transition.
There is not much Zimbabweans will be able to do to resist. The
great nationalist project will have led to foreign influence of
a new -- and greater -- sort than ever before.
For the international
community, this is likely to be enough. Whether one of the Mujurus,
Mnangagwa, Tsvangirai or Mutambara is president is a smaller issue.
The departure of Mugabe will be a symbolic moment for the West.
Aid and investment will, slowly, resume. But this begs a terrible
question: is the West prepared to sacrifice so many Zimbabwean lives
merely because of its argument with Mugabe? The answer is probably
"yes". The synchronicity of Mugabe and Tony Blair both
leaving office within 12 months would be truly symbolic.
The timing,
however, remains far from certain. Dissidents within Zanu-PF are
not yet ready to force out Mugabe. The two MDCs are not sufficiently
organised. The president, meanwhile, is fiercely resisting.
An alternative
strategy for Mugabe's opponents is to prevent him from running again
for president in 2008. That would mean another 12 months of Zimbabwe
in meltdown. It might seem abstract, but there really is a big difference
between inflation at its current rate of about 1 800% and say 5
000% in a year from now. At that rate, many in today's Zimbabwean
elite will not feel like much of an elite by next March.
Perhaps some
combination of the dissidents and the MDCs will invite a visiting
delegation of high-level African Union presidents to "persuade"
Mugabe to accept honourable retirement. There may be a promise of
immunities and protection, even exile. But this would imply an escape
from accountability for those who have caused great hardship, just
as Smith was allowed to at independence.
The image of
a bitter old black man as an exact parallel of that bitter old white
man is a miserable record for posterity. But this is the image history
is likely to retain. Mugabe, the ruthless liberation leader who,
after the war was won, combined ruthlessness with, for a time, highly
successful government, but in the end sacrificed reality for his
dream of a completed nationalism.
The president,
with his defiant moustache and beautifully cut suits, has soft hands.
I have noticed these hands. They are not hands that hold a hoe or
spade. They do not remember how. They are hands that are used to
eat daintily with good manners.
Perhaps, when
he embarked upon the seizures of land in 2000, Mugabe felt the angel
of death at his shoulder. He wanted to complete his life's work.
Instead, his actions have overturned the economic foundations of
an independent country. Whoever next holds power in Zimbabwe might
still think like a Jesuit, but should plan like a farmer - and grow
food for his neighbour.
*Stephen Chan
is a professor of international relations in the University of London
and Dean of law and social sciences at the School of Oriental and
African Studies. He is the author of Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power
and Violence and was a member of the Commonwealth Observer Group
to Zimbabwe in 1980.
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