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ROBERT Mugabe is not going to rule Zimbabwe forever. He is either going to leave voluntarily or be forced out of office.

If he does not vacate the presidency voluntarily, a popular uprising, an electoral defeat or dynamics within Zanu (PF) will free Zimbabweans from the pernicious effects of his misrule.

If recent reports are anything to go by, he intends seeking another presidential term next year. This is another indication of how impervious he has become to external opinion and is evidence of the failure of diplomatic approaches in all forms to bring about a resolution of the crisis.

Given Mugabe’s intransigence, neither the proponents of quiet diplomacy nor its detractors should take credit for what seems to be a deepening crisis for the Mugabe regime. The deepening crisis results from neither external intervention nor quiet diplomacy on the part of African leaders but from the realities of an economy on the verge of collapse and a struggle icon gone mad. Debates about what the South African government should do or should have done are academic and pointless if they are still influenced by the illusory notion that tough talk and tough action would have made an impression on the Zimbabwean despot.

I still maintain, as I argued five years ago, that no amount of external intervention can be a substitute for required levels of resistance on the part of Zimbabweans themselves. Whatever external forces do or say must be in support of the efforts of Zimbabweans to rid their country of undemocratic rule as the first step towards Zimbabwe’s social, political and economic renaissance.

To this end, Zimbabwean civil society, both factions of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and other opposition forces, have strategic and tactical choices to make about the form opposition to Mugabe must now take.

These strategic and tactical choices must in part be anchored in the understanding that the Zimbabwean state is characterised by an imbalance: on the one hand its capacity for repression and on the other its inability to satisfy citizens’ basic needs.

The capacity of the state for repression should inform the nature of mobilisation as well as the forces that should be mobilised. The failure to deliver basic services, coupled with the imminent collapse of the economy and a restless population, present opportunities for new ways of engaging the Mugabe government.

These new opportunities will pose serious challenges to both nonstate and in-state actors in the country. Civil society formations and the opposition must find ways of working together to harness the growing spirit of protest and resistance among ordinary citizens to ensure that the mobilisation of Zimbabwean masses does not become a phenomenon limited only to the urban areas.

They must also anticipate possible shifts in the balance of support for Mugabe within the security forces and how these shifts will affect the repressive capacity of the Zimbabwean state, and therefore, the nature of tactical advantages that this may present to a united opposition.

Furthermore, the inability of the Zimbabwean state to pay its public servants opens up a range of possibilities for the building of tactical alliances, including the reconfiguration of opposition forces. It also means decisions must be made about whether Zanu (PF) or elements within it should be engaged when resistance to Mugabe begins to undermine the unity and cohesion of the ruling party.

But members of the ruling party are themselves faced with difficult choices. They must choose between aligning themselves with the movement for democracy and the unsustainable option of buying more time for their leader. They must appreciate that the achievement of personal political goals will at some point be in conflict with Mugabe’s agenda. There will come a time when the advancement of Zanu (PF) leaders’ political careers will depend on them distancing themselves from Mugabe or face the alternative of sinking with him.

Ultimately, Zimbabweans who are thirsty for a return to democracy must forge a broad-based alliance of opposition forces as a basis for the adoption of a process aimed at constitutional reform and the launch of a national conversation about the shape of a post-Mugabe order.

Such a conversation will also have to be about whether opposition forces should support participation in the 2008 presidential election if Mugabe reneges on his undertaking to step down. In addition, tactical decisions must be made about the content of an opposition platform to build positively on the failures of the MDC.

All these strategic and tactical considerations must take into account the fact that Mugabe’s age has not affected his ability to inflict pain and suffering on Zimbabweans who refuse to worship him. Zimbabweans must, therefore, prepare themselves for more police brutality and the torture of opposition leaders.

The current opposition momentum will have to be maintained under conditions of severe repression and the impotence of external actors.

There must, therefore, be less emphasis this time on international publicity campaigns to focus more urgently on the task of internal mobilisation. The help of Africa and the world must be sought in support of practical expressions of unity by Zimbabweans around the idea of building a new Zimbabwe.

*Matshiqi is senior associate political analyst, Centre for Policy Studies.

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