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Mugabe faces dilemma
Brian Raftopoulos
February 23, 2007

http://www.theindependent.co.zw/viewinfo.cfm?linkid=21&id=10068&siteid=1

THE Zimbabwean crisis has reached the point where a number of factors are combining to introduce a new political dynamic into the current situation. These include the confluence of drastic economic decline, growing internal dissent within the ruling party, a renewed wave of labour and civic activism and the continued isolation of the regime by Western countries.

In the face of these growing challenges, the response of President Robert Mugabe has been to seek an extension of his presidential mandate until 2010 in order to seek more time to deal with the destructive succession debate in the ruling Zanu PF party, ensure his own immunity from possible prosecution and create more frustration for the divided opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

The economic challenges facing the Mugabe regime are immense.

In a statement responding to the monetary policy statement by the Reserve Bank governor, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) painted a gloomy picture of the indicators of economic decline. These included hyperinflation of 1 600% as at December 2006, a cumulative economic decline of about 50% over the past seven years, an unsustainable budget deficit of 43% of GDP, chronic shortage of foreign currency, sporadic availability of fuel, skills shortages, and mass unemployment and the collapse of real earnings of workers.

In this regard there is anecdotal evidence of numbers of workers preferring not to continue working in the formal sector because of the high cost of staying in employment, preferring instead to engage in various informal sector activities.

The ZCTU and both factions of the MDC agree in characterising the contemporary Zimbabwean economy as based on "rent-seeking" and speculative behaviour. Distortions created by developments such as price controls and foreign exchange controls create rents.

As Zimbabwean economist Rob Davies writes, this "creates an incentive for people to devote resources capturing rents, rather then using them for productive purposes".

Tendai Biti, the economic spokesperson of the Tsvangirai MDC, observes that at the core of the crisis is the crippled supply side of the economy. "The scenario of non-existent supply," notes Biti, "creates fertile ground for middlemen and the rule of rent-seeking activities."

Evidence of this rent-seeking behaviour abounds in the Zimbabwean economy. The Grain Marketing Board (GMB) was, until last week, buying maize at $52 000 per tonne and selling it to select millers at $600 per tonne.

Politically connected individuals were able to buy the subsidised maize from the GMB, get it milled at commercial millers and then sell it at exorbitant prices.

Similar speculative activities take place in the fuel and fertiliser sectors where the new farmers who have benefited from the land occupations are receiving subsidised inputs from the state and selling them rather than using them for productive activities.

As Arthur Mutambara, leader of the other MDC faction, states: "The distortions in our economy create opportunities for arbitrage."

In such an economy the emphasis of many of the emerging business individuals is on fast-track accumulation through such speculative activities, exploiting the breakdown of the rule of law and the corruption of the state to accumulate vast profits through unproductive activities. This is a key constituency that has been created by the authoritarian politics of the Mugabe regime, and the indigenisation of economic activities has largely been carried out through this means.

Moreover, an important part of the battle for succession within Zanu PF has been fought over access to various such rent-seeking activities, and the fortunes that then become available for further political consolidation within the party.

In the midst of these activities there are no doubt businesspersons who continue to think about the longer-term need to maintain and build up productive activities both in the industrial and agricultural sectors.

The problem however is that this parasitic accumulation model is taking place within a broader context of endemic poverty and a steady decrease in the percentage share of wages in the gross domestic income.

The standard of living of workers has reached desperately low levels, fuelled by a general ruling party antipathy to urban workers, and epitomised by the massive human rights violations of the "urban clean up" Operation Murambatsvina in mid-2005.

The result has been a renewed wave of labour, student and civic protests since the beginning of the year.

In the field of labour protests, public sector workers have led the response to the state. Junior doctors earning $56 000 per month, nurses $35 000 and teachers $84 000 have come out on strike or go-slows.

Even unions that have had less confrontational relations with the state, such as the Zimbabwe Teachers’ Association and the Public Services Association, have threatened to take industrial action in the next week if their salary demands are not met.

Other protests from the constitutional movement, women’s organisations and students have created additional pressure on the state.

These protests resemble the labour unrest in the second half of the 1990s, also triggered by the 1996 public sector strike that was the first indicator of the force of labour that would play a major part in challenging the state during this period.

There are however some differences with this current period of unrest. In the late 1990s the structures of the labour movement were much stronger, developed through strong organisational and educational capacity in the ZCTU.

The effective use of consultative labour forums ensured greater ownership of collective actions by the union membership. Additionally during this period the labour movement was able to "speak for the nation" in their messaging and demands and build effective alliances with other civic groups.

In the current period the structures of the labour movement have been weakened by a combination of structural changes in the labour force, state repression, decreased organisational and educational capacity and a leadership that has placed more emphasis on the ZCTU taking actions on its own with less emphasis on building broader civic alliances.

Part of the explanation for this more narrow focus of the ZCTU can be found in the difficult relations that have arisen between the labour movement and both the MDC and the civics. The labour leadership perhaps feels that it has been used and marginalised within the broader political processes in the opposition.

However, this recoil from coalition building is likely to encounter limits very quickly given the need to develop a broad front against Zimbabwe’s authoritarian state. It is thus unclear whether the militancy of the present leadership will translate unto a broader participation by the union membership and the general public in mass actions.

There is little doubt also that the division in the MDC that took place after October 12 2005 has weakened both sides of the party and created confusion and demoralisation among its supporters and in the civic movement.

Over the last year there have been attempts to heal the breach in the opposition and this has led to the signing of a code of conduct between the two formations, designed to lessen their public hostility and violence. This has certainly been a step forward for both sides, but urgent efforts need to be taken to strengthen the strategic and electoral cooperation between the two groups, whether there is a presidential election in 2008 or 2010.

Both formations at present belong to the Save Zimbabwe Campaign led by church leaders, and also bringing together all the major civic groups in the country. The major demand of this campaign is that there should be a presidential election in 2008 under a new constitution, thus opposing Mugabe’s move to delay this election to 2010.

One of the consequences of both MDC formations working under this umbrella is that one or both factions may feel less need to pursue the possibility of re-unification, but instead use the momentum of the campaign to push their separate agendas. This is likely to be a mistake in the longer term as closer cooperation between the two MDCs is essential to confront Zanu PF.

It is against this background that the recent monetary statement by Reserve Bank governor Gideon Gono needs to be understood. In many ways the statement is an admission of a policy dead-end and recognition that the primary problem in the country is the political blockage being created by Mugabe’s actions.

In the statement, Gono desperately called for the establishment of a social contract between the government, business and labour, seeking to use this vehicle to attempt to achieve what the political leadership is unwilling to attempt.

Clearly in the present political conditions the call for a social contract is unrealistic, given the unwillingness of the state to confront the political challenges around democratisation, which would be essential to a workable agreement between the three legs of a tripartite arrangement.

Gono’s call for a social contract in Zimbabwe is not new, as the ZCTU proposed it, under different circumstances, in its 1996 document "Beyond Esap". Instead the government set up the National Economic Consultative Forum in 1997 and the Tripartite Negotiating Forum in 1998 which, in the words of the Labour and Economic Development Institute of Zimbabwe, "have either become talk-shops or their decisions have been largely ignored".

Both Mugabe’s attempt to extend his presidency to 2010 and Gono’s attempt to draw other social forces into a social contract should be seen as Mugabe’s attempt to control change in Zimbabwe under his tutelage and that of his party.

The recent cabinet reshuffle confirmed Mugabe’s need to maintain the support of his loyalists as he attempts to get his proposal for a 2010 extension of the presidential election confirmed by the Zanu PF politburo.

Under this proposal it is likely that Mugabe would appoint a prime minister who would still be responsible to him, as his position as a purportedly "ceremonial president" provides him with continued immunity from possible prosecution for crimes against humanity.

Such a move could then possibly be a precursor to small reforms in the political and economic arenas, as a prelude to an election in which Mugabe would hope to defeat the opposition under a new candidate, and prepare the way for a "normalisation" of his regime.

However, Alexis de Tocqueville’s warning that the "most dangerous time for a bad government is when it starts to reform itself" should be a reminder to Mugabe that once small reforms are introduced it is often difficult to control the change.

Under the present political conditions Mugabe’s government, as with all authoritarian regimes, must continue to choose between compromise and repression, or more specifically the particular blend of both.

It is likely that in the short term Mugabe will continue to emphasise state coercion in dealing with dissent in the country.

However, the continued availability of this option will depend among other factors on the capacity of the opposition and civic forces to mount more effective popular resistance to the regime, the continued loyalty of the police and army in the face of deteriorating economic conditions for the armed forces, Mugabe’s capacity to contain and resolve the succession debate in his party and the ongoing pressure and isolation from the West.

Mugabe is likely to be acutely aware of the transition dangers that befell the authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe after 1989 and the lessons of his Chinese friends at Tiananmen Square.

All the indications are that 2007 will be a crucial year marking the Zimbabwean crisis.

If Mugabe continues to deploy authoritarian strategies in response to the political opposition, both the economic and the political conditions will deteriorate further, and the international isolation of the regime is likely to continue.

On the other hand if Mugabe attempts a controlled reform process, the new political spaces opened are likely to provide additional momentum for the political and civic opposition, and the internal threat to Zanu PF will intensify.

Caught between an unproductive confrontational strategy that he would prefer and a reform strategy whose consequences he is unlikely to be able to control, Mugabe is faced with a very difficult political dilemma.

On the other hand Zanu PF’s capacity to re-invent itself in part should not be dismissed, especially if the opposition forces facilitate this option by further strategic blunders.

It would not be the first time that authoritarian regimes have carried out a semblance of reform while retaining the core of the former government. There are several such examples in both Africa and Eastern Europe.

Such an outcome would not be unfavourable for a South African government that has always been more concerned with the "stability" of its neighbour than with a more profound democratic transition.

* Brian Raftopoulos is head of the Africa programme at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town, South Africa.

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