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Zimbabwe's
new 99-year lease
John
Robertson
December 01, 2006
Government's
intentions to replace former freehold title to agricultural land
with 99-year leases appears to offer political advantages that make
the concept attractive to political authorities, but no advantages
to the lessees can be determined from the lease agreement, other
than that the agreement commits the lessee to separate yearly rentals
for the land and improvements, rather than a single purchase price.
For any improvements
on the land, the rental calculated by the authorities, or lessor,
is payable by the lessee for the following 25 years, unless the
lessee chooses to reach agreement with the Ministry of Agriculture
for the outright purchase of these improvements. And, on signing
the lease, the lessee is required to pay within three months a one-off
deposit equal to the sum of the annual rent on the land and the
annual rent on improvements.
These outlays
secure for the lessee the rights to occupy and farm the area specified
in the lease. These rights bring with them a series of obligations
and requirements that must be met at the lessee's expense. They
include:
· Taking up
permanent residence on the property, or appointing a manager who
will move onto the property within three months · Fencing and farming
the property in a sustainable manner acceptable to the lessor ·
Gaining approval for a five-year development plan that will have
been submitted ahead of the signing of the lease · Initiating minimum
developments as required by the lessor within three months of signing
the lease. Minimum developments within the first three months include:
- Development
of a permanent homestead and water supplies for personnel and
animals
- Provision
of approved access roads
- Erection
of adequate accommodation for employees, and
- Initiating
minimum production in terms of the approved plan
- Clearance
of not less than 30% of the area intended for cropping
A new five-year
plan must be submitted for approval on the expiry of an existing
plan or if the lessee is directed to do so by the authorities.
Other requirements
include ensuring that no illegal tree-felling takes place, no noxious
weed growth is left unchecked, no poaching of wildlife takes place,
fire-breaks are maintained and measures are taken to prevent soil
erosion as well as to prevent the development of plant and animal
diseases.
Where lessees
inherit plantations, they are required to rehabilitate and maintain
them to the satisfaction of the authorities. All lessees are required
to assume full responsibility for maintenance, repairs and replacements
required to ensure the upkeep all other improvements already on
the property.
If the lessee
fails to meet these responsibilities, the authorities will be entitled
to carry out the work and recover the costs involved from the lessee.
While the duration
of the lease is 99 years, the lessor reserves the right to terminate
the lease if the lessee becomes insolvent, or fails to properly
manage the leasehold, fails to meet the terms and conditions of
the lease, fails to meet the rental or other financial commitments
to the lessor or fails to pay the required rates, levies and other
charges to local authorities.
If the authorities
do not receive settlement or acceptable representations after giving
the lessee 30 days notice of its intention to terminate the lease,
the lessor is entitled to cancel the lease and repossess the leasehold
after another 90 days.
Comment on
the Lease Agreement
From the point of view of the farmers, the leasehold terms and
conditions suggest that the farmers will have to have confidence
in their abilities as well as courage to commit themselves to five
year plans, and will have to meet very high standards to retain
their rights to continue farming. Two issues arise from this: firstly,
as a percentage of the population, the number of farmers who have
skills of this order is very small; secondly, even those who have
the necessary skills are likely to find that profitability will
still elude them on their small-scale leasehold operations.
Government's
intention is to have tens of thousands of farmers work to their
A2 land resettlement format with the support of 99-year leases.
If, for political reasons, the intention is that very nearly all
of these farmers are to be defined as successful, generously low
performance levels will have to be accepted when interpreting the
terms of the lease agreement.
Concessions
that permit farmers to be "successful" without being profitable
will make subsidies an absolute necessity. In effect, farmers will
be invited to become reliant on subsidised input costs together
with support prices for crops. Under such arrangements, the farmers'
need of loan facilities to finance their operations will be greatly
reduced.
For farmers,
this will be just as well, as their prospects of using their 99-year
lease agreements as collateral in support of bank loans are extremely
poor. This is true even though in Section 24 of the lease agreement,
government claims that, because the lease can be registered in a
deeds registry and endorsed to the effect that certain sums are
owed to certain lenders, the lease can serve as collateral for the
loan.
While some banks
might extend loans to certain farmers in token gestures to show
compliance with government policies; given the government's determination
to see their land reform policy succeed, the lease agreements will
be found to have no legal standing as collateral for several fundamental
reasons:
- At the most
basic level, the lease agreement does not qualify as collateral
because the property referred to in the agreement cannot be bought
or sold on an open market and it therefore has no market value -
The lessor's rights to terminate the lease after serving the lessee
90 days' notice renders what is left of the 99-year duration of
the lease irrelevant. While the lender's debt recovery RIGHTS might
remain intact, their PROSPECTS of recovering the debt will have
been effectively demolished. - The claim that borrowed money used
to carry out improvements on the property increases the value of
the property does not translate into a realisable sum of money that
can be recovered by the lender in the case of the the borrower defaulting
on the repayment terms. - Borrowers might default on repayment obligations
at any time, but would certainly do so if evicted from the property
by the lessor. In apparent recognition of these shortcomings, Section
24.3 of the lease agreement provides for amounts outstanding to
be recovered from the person to whom the lease is ceded or transferred,
and states that the final transfer of the property will not be permitted
until the intending new lessee has settled the previous leaseholder's
debt or the new lessee has come to an acceptable arrangement with
the lender.
This highly
impractical provision is certain to cause every new applicant to
seek an unencumbered property. Every property that is burdened by
outstanding debt will remain vacant and every affected lender will
be forced to forfeit the amounts owed.
But as the lease
documents will not be readily accepted as collateral in the first
place, government will have to remain committed to support and subsidies,
the costs of which will be borne by taxpayers and will impact on
the whole country through inflation.
Direct government
assistance to individual farmers so far has been typically confined
to farm inputs, but the authorities have tried to encourage farmers
to also become owners of their own farm equipment, rather than source
the needed capital items from the state. Loan finance is usually
essential for the purchase of such assets.
Lessees trying
to buy farm implements might be able to borrow from banks on the
strength of the security of a Notarial General Covering Bond that
would put the bank's claims ahead of concurrent creditors if the
farmer went insolvent or was evicted from the leasehold for some
other reason.
However, as
these items of equipment would be moveable assets, the bank would
face the additional risk that the assets could be moved beyond their
reach ahead of the disclosure of financial difficulties.
For the government,
the advantages centre on features of the arrangements that will
permit the State: - To acquire and exercise ultimate control over
the land -To make agricultural land an asset within the gift of
the State -To eliminate pressure groups of farmers empowered by
property rights -To re-allocate land that officials consider is
not being efficiently used -To protect peasant communities from
the harshness of market forces -To receive rental incomes from all
lessees -To receive separate rental incomes from the improvements
installed by previous property owners -To administer, regulate and
control the initial selection of lessees -To directly influence
the selection of successors when existing lessees choose to vacate
their leaseholds or have their leases cancelled
In its launch
of the new 99-year lease agreements, government made no reference
to these underlying objectives, but confirmation of their being
intrinsic to government's thinking is its basic distrust of market
forces and its unwillingness to permit citizens to exercise freedom
of choice.
As the initial
beneficiaries of land redistribution are being given the land free
of charge through the exercise of government patronage, the intention
is that their successors will also take over the land free of charge
through the transfer of patronage to them. However, they will be
expected to pay a rental to the state for the use of existing improvements
or pay the former lessee for improvements carried out during their
tenancy.
In previous
presentations in support of its 99-year leasehold propositions,
Government has cited the fact that considerable areas of land in
certain developed countries are successfully leased to farmers.
Unfortunately, the conditions the Government of Zimbabwe has entrenched
in the leases make them distinctly different from conditions that
apply in first world countries.
In the countries
concerned, the leased land in question is not owned by the State;
a property-owning individual, family or company owns it, each lease
is on an identifiable piece of land, each lease has a market value
and each lease is therefore marketable. Because of the marketability
of the lease, it can be offered as collateral in support of a loan.
This protects
the lessor, as a bank that is owed money that the lessee cannot
repay has the legal right to place the lease on the market. When
a new lessee pays for the remaining years covered by the lease,
the bank will recover the funds owing. Laws governing tenant rights
also protect lessees, but in exchange they are required to meet
these fully acceptable obligations or forfeit their rights.
In the event
of a lessee deciding to relinquish a lease, the market value of
the remaining years will be established in the market, a buyer will
be sought through the market and the transaction will be formalised
and registered in the market by real-estate agents and conveyancers.
Other than collecting transfer duties and registering the new lessee,
the State plays no part in the procedures.
These features
make all such lease agreements bankable in other countries, but
the leases being issued by the Zimbabwe government are not bankable,
simply because no mechanism exists that could be used to establish
a market price and no market exists that will permit a normal transfer
of ownership of the pledged security.
Government's
right to approve or reject any applicant wishing to take over an
existing lease further distances the arrangements from the open
market requirements of genuine, bankable collateral.
Notes on the
evolution of leasehold to freehold title Leasehold arrangements
first evolved from the earlier feudal systems in Europe, as landlords
and tenants tried to find means of unlocking the capital value of
land. As the shortcomings of leasing became apparent and as the
power of the landed aristocracy waned and as the need for capital
and security of tenure increased, freehold ownership rights offered
the required assurances.
When new areas
of settlement and investment were being established in the Americas,
the feudal systems of Spain and Portugal were transplanted into
South and Central America. However, in North America, the evolving
freehold land tenure systems were adopted. Today, hundreds of years
later, South and Central America remains a collection of developing
countries, but North America has become the most prosperous area
in the world.
The essential
difference between these two vast areas - and the essential difference
between the former communal and commercial areas of Zimbabwe - is
that, where they had individual title, the owners of the land used
its capital value as leverage to raise the funds required to develop
the land's potential as well as their own. With access to the capital
they needed and the confidence that came from security of tenure
over their property, they achieved remarkable successes.
Property owners'
title deeds provided them with a bridge that led directly into the
banking sector. Their ability to make long-term plans and their
eagerness to repay their loans to preserve their ownership rights
drew from them exceptional levels of resourcefulness, ingenuity
and determination to succeed.
By contrast,
where the occupants of the land were tenants, their ability to raise
money to carry out development work or to augment their own skills
was severely limited. Their uncertain hold on the land they occupied,
but could not own, left them with neither the means nor the incentives
to plan ahead, and they never felt inclined to shoulder the burdens
of expense, risk and effort to invest in productive capacity that
would enhance the value of someone else's property.
Today, many
South American countries are moving towards individual freehold
property rights in an effort to accelerate development. China has
accepted the need for individual property rights, and ownership
rights are being restored to East European families that were dispossessed
of properties after the USSR extended its territories after World
War II.
Zimbabwe's proposals
are taking the country in the opposite direction. The government's
declaration at the end of the lease agreement that " . the lessee
may use this Lease as collateral in securing agricultural financial
assistance from any financial or agricultural institution" is not
enough to make the lease acceptable to lending institutions.
As the conditions
created by land reform have effectively eliminated the collateral
value of farmland, they have made development funding entirely the
responsibility of the State and they have made each individual's
performance dependent on State subsidies and support. Personal progress
within such a system has therefore become dependent upon political
patronage, rather than upon resourcefulness, good management and
hard work.
Although fixed
assets of some value could be built with money loaned by a bank,
the separation of land from the improvements on that land makes
the recovery of the debt almost impossible if the borrower defaults.
This is because the farmer's right to remain on the land is conferred,
not by business procedures supported by market forces, but by a
political act that the bank cannot challenge.
Investment is
the first requirement for economic growth. By according a capital
value to land, considerable capital sums are unlocked and made available
to the investment process. Individual property rights, market prices
for land, transfers of ownership through the market and the official
registration of ownership rights make up the essential components
of the market mechanism that releases this capital onto the market.
The responsibility,
accountability and legal obligations that go with individual freehold
property rights quickly help communities to accept the challenges
of modern economic development and they place the means of achieving
profound economic empowerment within reach of the majority. But
because Zimbabwe's authorities consider these levels of success
to be a threat to the ruling party's power-base, these advantages
are being denied to Zimbabwe's population.
Zimbabwe's current
policies very clearly have nothing to do with empowering the people.
Government's decision to revert to feudal State-ownership of land
is already proving to be a massively retrograde step.
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