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Not a united opposition, but managing the army is the Zimbabwean challenge
Itai Zimunya
August 22, 2006

As the Zimbabwean crisis continues to deepen and widen as displayed by the acute shortages of food, local and foreign currency, fuel and jobs, calls for the resolution of the political crisis seem to be growing. The most particular call of recent days is that opposition political parties ought to unite and form a strong front that can successfully challenge Zanu PF from power. However, after assessing the current balance of power in Zimbabwe, we content that it is not a united opposition that is the missing link in Zimbabwe. Whilst it has merit, it is not the touchstone. Some celebrated political thinkers, including Masipula Sithole, Alfred Stepan and Jonathan Moyo prescribe that the opposition need to engage a section of democrats in Zanu PF and move towards a process of sustainable democratic transformation. The big question, however, is how, when and by whom shall this materialise.

To adequately answer the above questions, it is important to analyse the balance of power in Zimbabwe, from which we will derive the political formula. A close look at the outcomes of the 2000, 2002 and 2005 general and presidential elections reveal that Zanu PF does not have an active majority of people in Zimbabwe. The opposition, despite its activists being targets of political violence, has matched Zanu PF in every district. In fact, various electoral reports to the 2000 and 2002 national elections state that, had it not been the use of violence and manipulation, Zanu PF would have 'lost power'.

One eminent political scholar, Brian Raftopoulos argues that there are two political personalities that shape Zimbabwe’s polity, Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai. Like John Makumbe predicted, Morgan Tsvangirai is leading in the "numbers game" but seems to have failed to capitalise on this popularity to affect the political environment in Zimbabwe. Various factors contribute to this failure. These include the mere presence of a counter power, Mugabe and the threat of the manipulated state killing machinery.

This scale of demographic support to the MDC and Zanu PF dismisses one aspect for calling for a united opposition because the problem in Zimbabwe is not a numerical minority of the opposition supporters. Masipula Sithole and Jonathan Moyo agree that the power lies in the elite coercive apparatus, the military, and this coercive apparatus is controlled by the ruling Zanu PF elite. The challenge therefore is how to unlock this coercive power, the military without a war.

Stepan suggests that the opposition needs to focus more on increasing the process of authoritarian erosion than focusing more on the total collapse of the regime. In this thinking, he noted five groups in any authoritarian regime in transition. These include:

• core supporters of the regime,
• the coercive apparatus i.e, the military, intelligence and the police,
• the regimes active opponents i.e the opposition activists like the MDC, ZAPU etc
• the regimes passive supporters, i.e the business community and,
• the regimes passive opponents such as the educated workers and academics and sections of the church.

From the above classification, it can be argued that the power in Zimbabwe lies in a zone that is beyond electoral formations. That is why some political commentators posit that the MDC won the 2002 presidential election but Zanu PF retained power.

At present, the majority of Zimbabweans seem to be fed up with the Zanu PF regime, but for many reasons, they passively put up with the political rot. It is important to highlight that at Tsholotsho, the media reported that six Zanu PF provinces had agreed that Mugabe had to go. In essence, these provinces agreed that there is a need for democratic reform in Zimbabwe. The failure of the Tsholotsho declaration may be that those resolutions had no support of the coercive force, the military.

After the Tsholotsho declaration, Jonathan Moyo pointed out that there was a bigger opposition within Zanu PF. Therefore other opposition political parties, the Movement for Democratic Change specifically, needed to engage a section of democrats in Zanu PF to finally rest the Zimbabwean crisis. Reactions to Jonathan Moyo’s proposition were negative. The proposal was not dismissed because of its emptiness, but because of the anger of his link to the promulgation of obnoxious pieces of legislation, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) during his stint as Minister of Information in Mugabe's government.

In other words, Jonathan Moyo is revealing that there are many people in Zanu PF that have either degraded themselves or have been degraded from active supporters of that party into passive supporters. It means, if there were no fear of reproach, they would have left to join the opposition. Masipula Sithole proposes solutions to this dilemma.

Writing the Public Eye, in the Financial Gazette of 8 January 1998, Masipula Sithole says, " members of the coercive elite are the major agents of change". He further states that a combination of democrats from both inside and outside Zanu PF may well be the source of a more enduring democratisation process.

Therefore, it is the duty of the opposition to prove that an alternative establishment is a viable option. This will most likely diminish the Zanu PF fear of change and enlist them as active opponents leaving the coercive force a neutralised force.

Equally, it would be naïve for any of the two Zanu PF factions, that of Mnangagwa or Mujuru to think that they can go it alone in the post Mugabe era. Zanu PF, in whatever form needs to realise and acknowledge the presence and permanence of opposition politics in Zimbabwe. Wishes of a super Zanu PF in government must be taken as mere dreams. There could be a motivation for democrats in Zanu PF to realise this and begin to make strategic contacts with the opposition.

In this case, the two Zanu PF factions have two options, and time is fast running out on them. They either have to mend relations or compete to make collective deals with the opposition, especially the MDC. Option number one is almost impossible because of the levels of mistrust and economic attacks that have been made including the purge on the financial sector and the post Tsholotsho sanctions on pro-Mnangagwa actors.

The second option is real but very risky, especially in the presence of Mugabe. Mugabe has personally declared Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC as enemies that "must be crushed". He means it and anyone that entertains the MDC is a sell out that must receive the highest form of punishment. This is why South African President Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy failed. That is also noted as the main problem behind the stagnation in political dialogue among political actors in Zimbabwe. The main player of this option is therefore Robert Mugabe himself.

Assuming Mugabe away, expectations of the army causing confusion are, in this case, remote for several reasons. Chiefly, the army is viewed as part of the succession jigsaw and there is no consensus at present among the army generals of which Zanu PF faction to support. Secondly, tribal politics form an integral part of the Zanu PF succession debate and thus, because the army is not immune to tribalism, it is affected. The third factor is that the army is loyal and not naïve. They are loyal to Zimbabwe, and support a peaceful political transformation, which they also highly expect given the current economic downfall.

These facts confirm perceptions that Mugabe is a stumbling block to Zimbabwe's political transition, both within Zanu PF and at national level. It is this perception (if not reality) that justifies the calls, both within Zanu PF and in the opposition that Mugabe must go. He must rest and pave way for intra-Zanu PF reform, which can not be disassociated with national reform.

In realisation of this Mugabe factor, Jonathan Moyo, despite being a political gymnast, argues that the political leadership in the opposition political parties must realise the existence of a big opposition currently sitting in Zanu PF. It has to be strategically captured and this reflects a greater chance for quicker and more stable political reforms. Should these talks fail, though it is remote, there could be a super intra Zanu PF agreement for power sharing among the warring Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions.

An intra-Zanu PF power-sharing agreement is the last thing that Zimbabwe expects because it could mean suffer continues to the masses and looting-continue to the political sultans.

An all-out MDC government is possible more as a theory than in reality in the short term, though it is possible in the medium term. Whilst the opposition has the active support of the masses more than Zanu PF, it is the military aspect that is the stumbling block. It is the key that one faction of Zanu PF presents. This presentation brings with it avenues for the making of a new democratic constitution leading to free and fair elections.

This is the fourth way. It presupposes the existence of three other possible avenues of political development in Zimbabwe. These include:

• maintenance of the status quo,
• total power to the opposition without Zanu PF, and
• domination of Zanu PF with a subdued opposition in parliament, the senate and city councils.

Analyses of these possible options reveal that hopes of an all Zanu PF or an all MDC government is a mirage. Such a scenario does not cherish multi-partism and is constructed around a one-party-state manifesto base. A political system that has made Zimbabwe wilt under Mugabe, the Alpha and Omega of Zanu PF. Option three represents cosmetic democracy where a dictator displays and celebrates the holding of elections according to the constitutional calendars and celebrates minority and insignificant opposition representation in parliament, in the senate and in local government authorities as a sign of peoples will.

The fourth way is inevitable and history is with Zimbabwe. In reference to Africa and Zimbabwe in particular, socio-political transition can not be done in a mathematical formula of total elimination of the status quo. That is why in 1980, the patriotic front had to join hands with the former oppressors and enter into a new phase of politics. South Africa is another model of the fourth way, where in 1994, the emerging revolutionary power engaged a section of the oppressive machinery to facilitate reforms. This is possible in Zimbabwe, despite the existence of extreme resentment both among the cadres of the opposition and those that are benefiting from free government funds.

It has to be noted however, that such a move must not be used to crush other political opinions. Opposition politics, in the case of Zimbabwe must be encouraged to provide the balance of power. For a meaningful implementation of this proposal, issues of transitional justice must be visited, where victims of socio-economic and political violence are compensated and perpetrators brought to book.

This proposition is believed to be the reverse of what South African President had prescribed for Zimbabwe. It is believed that during the 2003 MDC-Zanu PF dialogue, it was Mbeki’s plan to sideline Morgan Tsvangirai, seen as a hard-liner, and bring a section of the MDC into a coalition government with Zanu PF. This, as it did, was doomed to fail for several reasons. The reasons include the exclusion of ordinary Zimbabweans from participating in the transitional process and the reluctance of the domineering Zanu PF from using force as a tool of governance. So the people remained suspicious, and I think will remain suspicious of any formation that is dominated by Zanu PF because to them Zanu PF represents hunger, oppression, torture and violence.

The best way forward for Zimbabwe demands a careful cost-benefit analysis of any such political moves. Political dialogue is inevitable. Just like there is a cease-fire in any struggle, it might be time for such in Zimbabwe. Time and accuracy are important, as any delay might be dangerous to both the ruling elite and the opposition. As the world allies and the political horses begin to get tired, it exposes and weakens many political movements. For the opposition, a long struggle has the danger of creating an opposition within an opposition as the foot-soldiers begin to get tired and disillusioned, then turning against their own masters and losing discipline.

The other present initiative of making a national vision document by the Church complement the calls for a new democratic constitution in addition to setting value based standards for a future Zimbabwe. Mass action is best as a threat in Zimbabwe, and mostly as spasmodic and sporadic comical displays of the dictator’s weakness than as a popular front for regime change. Sporadic action presents a counter military headache than a formalised revolution that can be crashed using conventional defence operations. The final push of June 2003 must serve as a lesson.

In conclusion, and from a nationalist perspective, it may be time Zimbabweans recognise and appreciate their political differences and begin to work towards people-inclusive dialogue. Every day is a painful day for Zimbabweans despite Gono's Operation Sunrise and his sugar promise of a better Zimbabwe buoyed by bearer cheques. Die hards like Robert Mugabe, that have master minded Zimbabwe’s downfall over the last 26 years must be assisted to go by both opposition sections within and without Zanu PF, the international community and by the church. Lastly, any mediated settlement on the Zimbabwean crisis must address the constitutional vacuum created by the amended Lancaster House constitution that Zanu PF claims to be Zimbabwean. Any failure to visit the constitutional question means the struggles continue for Zimbabweans. And it shall continue for it is our birthright.

*Itai Zimunya, a former student leader and human rights defender.

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