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A
Zim perspective on the TRC
Brian
Raftopoulos
May 05, 2006
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/viewinfo.cfm?linkid=21&id=1931&siteid=1
LISTENING to debates
on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) at the tenth anniversary
conference organised by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation last
week, and reading various recent reflections on the event, I was struck
both by the differences and similarities of the democratic transitions
in South Africa and Zimbabwe.
In both countries there was a clear similarity in the language of reconciliation
and the political compromise it was meant to encapsulate.
The emphasis on forgiveness for past injustices as a basis for future
nation-building was seen as a necessary compromise to "move forward"
in the context of international pressures that favoured such a dispensation.
The structural and political legacies of different colonial pasts combined
with contemporary pressures of global neo-liberalism provided strong pressures
for such a compromise.
In the 1980s the Zimbabwean transition was often hailed as a model of
reconciliation in post-settler societies and the changes in both Namibia
and South Africa drew in some ways from the Zimbabwean example. In sum,
the politics of reconciliation became a modality for the transfer of power
for those societies moving out of white domination.
There is no doubt that the policy of reconciliation in these southern
African countries had a good deal of merit in avoiding broader conflagrations
and opening up democratic spaces for the consideration of new options
in these societies.
However, the legacies of enormous inequality remained as potentially explosive
questions waiting to be resolved, and therefore available for both progressive
and dangerous forms of popular mobilisation.
Within this context, as many analysts have pointed out, the TRC was both
a major achievement and a distinctive evasion.
In important ways it gathered vital information about the human rights
abuses of the apartheid era and provided a forum for public testimony
and, to a more limited extent, "confession".
Its major limitation, as other scholars have pointed out, was its silences
on the institutional effects of apartheid and the limited notion of victims.
Notwithstanding such limitations, the TRC provided a valuable space for
the discussion of accountability and questioning of impunity.
In Zimbabwe the policy of reconciliation had as its basis the occlusion
of any body that would deal with questions of historical accountability,
and overall immunity became part of the basis for consolidation of the
new state.
While the new South African state embarked on its quest for selective
truths in the early years of transformation, the first years of the new
Zimbabwean state were marked by the Matabeleland massacres and the repression
of alternative political voices.
Public discussions about the past very quickly took the form of memorialisation
of the particular history of the ruling party and the assumption that
this rendition was coterminous with national history.
Through a tightly-controlled public media, a particularisation of liberation
history took place combined with a narrow state construction of "the
liberation hero" to evade more open national discussions on the past.
It took concerted pressure from civic bodies to pry open some discussion
of state accountability for the Matabeleland debacle, and a crisis within
the ruling party over the war veterans issue in the late 1990s to begin
to glimpse the cracks in the ruling party’s one-dimensional image of itself.
The decisive moment in opening up discussions of both the past and contemporary
issues in Zimbabwean politics was the emergence of a strong civic and
political opposition in the late 1990s.
The state’s response has been to impose an authoritarian nationalist closure
on Zimbabwean politics which continues to be a central feature of the
crisis in the country.
An important point to be made about the emergence of this crisis is that
the unfinished business of reconciliation politics provided the breeding
ground for a repressive, highly racialised state nationalism that has
for the moment foreclosed any further discussion of democratic alternatives.
What has struck me in recent debates on the TRC is the ways in which the
unfinished business of the 1994 transition is calling out for redress.
I refer not only to the important questions of reparations for victims
and further prosecutions of high-level perpetrators of apartheid crimes,
but the urgent need to attend to the structural legacies of the past.
It has also been apparent the recent discussions continue to be characterised
more by the moral/ethical tone that marked the TRC itself than by the
hard political questions that need to be asked about the current nature
of the South African state. For it is around such questions that the blockages
around the recommendations and the broader implications of the TRC are
likely to be located.
Notwithstanding this reservation, South Africans have every right to be
proud of the TRC with all its limitations and ambiguities. It was a landmark
event that also constituted a key ingredient in the difficult nation-making
process in that country.
It provided an important arena for public discussions about the past and
raised questions around accountability that continue to reverberate in
this society. Zimbabweans continue to fight for such a space.
As the ANC faces the challenges of transformation in South Africa it will
be important to track the changing political language of the state. An
important determinant of these changes will be white responses to the
challenges of reconciliation.
Seeing reconciliation as a means of legitimising privilege or constructing
a relativist response to past historical injustices would be a serious
political mistake, and under such circumstances the dangers of a more
aggressive nationalist response should not be underestimated, especially
when alternatives on the left remain weak.
* Brian Raftopoulos is a Zimbawean scholar working for the Institute
for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town.
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