Back to Index

10 Options To Save Zimbabwe From Mugabe
*Dumisani Nkomo, Zimdaily
March 28, 2006

http://zimdaily.com/news2/article.php/20060327140634299

The Zimbabwe crisis does not need to be described, as it has become obvious to all. So, to attempt to redefine it would be a grave insult to the collective intelligence of the nation. I will, therefore, attempt to depict 10 possible scenarios, which may obtain from the current situation, which will enable Zimbabwe to pull herself from this quagmire.

I will attempt to present a number of scenarios and critically evaluate their practicality, worth and effectiveness. The first option, of course, is Organised Mass Action. This is the most talked about and least practiced option. It looks to me the one in March 2003 called for by the MDC was the only real success. Organised stay aways by the ZCTU and the National Constitutional Assembly have been massive flops largely due to poor organisation, ill-conceived timing, lack of consultation with relevant stakeholders, a culture of apathy and fear amongst the general masses of the population and the existence of oppressive laws such as the Public Order and Security Act and repressive State apparatus such as the quasi-military units in the form of Zanu PF militia as well as a ruthless police, intelligence and military system.The conditions are ripe for such an action, but the nation does not seem sufficiently motivated to resort to this option.

The second option is Spontaneous Mass Action - an option highly favoured by the MDC and many other Zimbabweans. It does not place responsibility for action squarely on the shoulders of an individual, party or institute, but relies on somebody, somewhere in some fuel or bread queue saying enough is enough. Spontaneous mass action has emerged as a favourite option for the following reasons: It cannot be easily contained by the brutal State security apparatus because it may start anywhere and spread anywhere. It is difficult to pinpoint leaders of such an action and to isolate or incarcerate them. It is a demonstration of people, which may appeal even to individuals in the State security apparatus as evidenced in Romania and the former Yugoslavia. The economic climate is ripe for such an action as evidenced by fuel queues and food shortages. Food shortages have always been a trigger for revolution.

The third option can be labelled the Palace Coup. This theory supports the implosion scenario whereby the President, who has emerged as the personification of the Zimbabwe crisis, is ousted by his own colleagues in the ruling party. This option seemed to be an unfolding reality when he was on holiday in Malaysia. This option can only work if the conspirators have the support of the military and, therefore, are limited to those who have a measure of influence in the military. This option appears to be quite appealing for the following reasons: Historically, even the most powerful of empire builders such as Julius Caesar and Tshaka the Great were eliminated by those closest to them and not by distant enemies. There is great pressure on sections of Zanu PF for the displacement of the old order.

The fourth option is a Military Takeover. But this is an unlikely and undesirable option as African history has proved that military takeovers have resulted in military dictatorships. The perceived "saviours of the people" may soon become ensconced in an eternal transition to civilian power, as was the case with Ibrahim Babangida in Nigeria and Ghana's Jerry Rawlings who later transformed himself into a civilian president albeit by democratic consent. Zimbabwe has suffered under a one-man one-party dictatorship and a military takeover may be suicidal and genocidal to the emergence of democracy in Zimbabwe. This option should not be encouraged, supported or celebrated by peace-loving Zimbabweans.

The fifth option is a rerun of the presidential election through the courts. As long as conditions for an election rerun remain the same, the ruling party will continue to use the uneven playing field to continuously win elections by dubious means. But that option should not be abandoned, as it will give the MDC the moral high ground to challenge the legitimacy of the Zanu PF government.

The sixth option is to allow things to disintegrate. There are many who argue that the current situation is not sustainable and the government will inevitably collapse. Whilst this is quite possible, probable and desirable, it may not be practical because it appears like the ruling party is willing to hang on to power even if it means ruling over skeletons. It may also be difficult to rebuild once the economic framework of the country collapses. The verdict is, whilst the current situation is not sustainable, the rulers of the land do not give a hoot and will hang on to power by hook, crook or book.

The seventh option is to wait for the next elections. The presidential election is only two years away. If the MDC chooses to quietly rebuild its effectiveness, credibility and image, it may succeed in winning the presidential election. Indicators, however, are that: Zanu PF will not sit idly and watch the MDC grow. More MDC leaders will be arrested, detained and tortured on trumped-up charges. Some could even be killed. The MDC and other alternative voices will be systematically silenced by current and prospective draconian laws which will further erode the democratic process.

But the most reasonable and practical route which is also the eighth option seems to be that of a negotiated settlement. In this regard previously stated strategies, such as mass action, could well be an effective means to gaining leverage to negotiate a workable settlement for Zimbabwe. A transitional authority would involve the setting up-of a transitional government of national unity composed of both Zanu PF and the MDC.

A constitutional conference of all stakeholders would then be convened to formulate a new democratic constitution, which would be the framework of democratic elections in which the parliamentary election would be held concurrently with the presidential election. Dissolution of all quasi-military units and institutions such as the militia, the national youth service and war vets and depoliticisation of food aid would also be imperative.

Ninth - A government of national unity is unlikely. Such a government would involve President Mugabe inviting the MDC to be a part of a government of national unity which Mugabe has vowed he would never do. The last option is to do nothing and still expect something to happen. This is the option, which most Zimbabweans are practicing at the moment and nothing will happen as long as nothing is done.

* Nkomo is a political commentator

Please credit www.kubatana.net if you make use of material from this website. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License unless stated otherwise.

TOP