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Tsvangirai, Mutambara, Ncube and MDC's future
Geoffrey Nyarota
March 09, 2006

http://www.fingaz.co.zw/story.aspx?stid=825

THE surprise entry of Professor Arthur Mutambara into the fray that has pitted MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai against his former acolytes, deputy president Gibson Sibanda and secretary general Welshman Ncube, was on the basis of a woefully wrong assumption on his part on the essence of the dispute.

Referring to the two factions of the once vibrant party as the pro-senate and the anti-senate factions is both a terminological inexactitude and an exercise in self-delusion. The conflict pre-dates the October 12 fallout over participation in the November 2005 senate elections. It would be more accurate to refer to the MDC, on the one hand, and to Ncube's anti-Tsvangirai breakaway faction of the MDC, on the other.

The crusade to oust Tsvangirai from the leadership of the party has festered for three years and he has been aware all along. The perceived weakness of his leadership partly derives from his failure to deal with this palace coup. In reality, the senate issue merely thrust into the public domain an internal power struggle which has simmered since 2002.

The legitimate Mayor of Harare, Elias Mudzuri, elected on an MDC ticket and deposed by ZANU PF, now studies at Harvard University. He says Tsvangirai received ample warning of the machinations within the party's top executive to topple him.

"For some reason best known to him Tsvangirai did nothing about it," Mudzuri says. "The senate issue was only the last straw."

The first hint of a possible split within the MDC surfaced when Colonel Lionel Dyke, a former top-ranking officer in the Rhodesian army contacted me in 2002. I was then editor of The Daily News, now banned. In two meetings he revealed details of a new political initiative seeking to broker a unity pact between ZANU PF and the MDC. I was accompanied to the second meeting by a witness, just in case.

Now a wealthy entrepreneur, whose landmine clearing organisation has won lucrative contracts in the trouble spots of the world, Dyke identified the leaders of the negotiating teams as the powerful ZANU PF politician, Emmerson Mnangagwa, then Speaker of Parliament, and Ncube, acting for the MDC. The names of retired army commander, General Vital Zvinavashe, and MDC secretary for information, Paul Themba Nyathi, were mentioned as well.

Dyke said he had been assigned to solicit the backing of The Daily News, then Zimbabwe's largest daily newspaper. He said contingent to the scheme, which allegedly enjoyed the blessings of both London and Pretoria, was the sidelining of both President Mugabe and Tsvangirai. Tsvangirai lacked the qualities to enlist the support of the army, it was suggested. While both Mnangagwa and Ncube were quick to distance themselves from his assertions, Dyke has, significantly, not backed down.

The response of The Daily News was to splash details of a United Nations report which linked Mnangagwa to "blood diamonds" in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Two years later in December 2004 President Mugabe ruthlessly descended on a perceived revolt within ZANU PF, dealing a severe blow on Mnangagwa, long regarded as his successor, and mercurial former information minister, Jonathan Moyo, following the so-called Tsholotsho Declaration.

On the MDC side, as 2005 drew to a close, Ncube relentlessly manoeuvered to dislodge Tsvangirai from leadership.

Mutambara says his current task is to re-unite Ncube and Sibanda with the mainstream MDC. It is no easy task, though, to unite a viable political entity which has a countrywide support base with what, to all intents and purposes, remains a political pipedream. Ncube does not seem to command a following even in his own ethnic catchment area, where he may be reviled as a sellout who insinuated publicly that ethnic groups other than the majority Shona have no legitimate claim to leadership positions in Zimbabwe. His candidates lost in two wards in council elections in Bulawayo over the weekend. The mainstream MDC lost mayoral elections in the city of Chegutu.

Since the High Court dismissed the rebel faction's challenge of Tsvangirai's leadership of the MDC Mutambara is, in fact, stuck with what, technically, is an illegally constituted faction. Its credibility and viability are undermined by serious ideological and organisational contradictions — his own personal ideological prevarication included.

Mutambara says he opposes the senate elections, yet he accepted leadership of a faction whose very quintessence is adherence to the resurrection of the Senate? He publicly praised Tsvangirai as a hero yet he finds solace among rival politicians who mercilessly castigate him as a blundering dictator.

Another contradiction revolves around the on-and-off pursuit of an MDC-ZANU PF unity pact, spearheaded by Patrick Chinamasa of ZANU PF and Ncube, representing the MDC. This futile exercise seeks to re-entrench the one-party dictatorship that the opposition party set out to eradicate in the first place. Zimbabwe needs a viable opposition, not an opposition which is co-opted within the structures of ZANU PF. This was the folly of the unity agreement which derailed Dr Joshua Nkomo's PF-Zapu as a viable opposition in 1986. Nkomo's largely ethnic following was based in Matabeleland. Now Ncube seeks to deliver the MDC's nationwide following to ZANU PF.

There has always been a perception that Ncube is the lynchpin of Thabo Mbeki's disastrous Zimbabwe policy. Now there is a view that Mutambara's emergence as Ncube's Shona leader was endorsed by Mbeki in pursuance of an elusive government of national unity.

Mutambara embarrassed Ncube when he professed synergy with Tsvangirai, who has steadfastly opposed any accommodation with ZANU PF. At this crucial stage of his entry into the world of active politics Mutambara must be seen to practice what he preaches. Otherwise, he runs the risk of being dismissed as another ambitious opportunist. Apart from that, despite his excellent academic qualifications, his quest for top-level entry into politics in a country from which he departed as a young student could easily alienate him from those who value patience, humility and experience as excellent attributes. Miracles are known to happen but rarely do they come about by design or through clever manipulation.

Apart from his involvement in student activism at the University of Zimbabwe Mutambara is of unknown political pedigree. In any case, resort to rocket science or robotics does not seem to be the answer to Zimbabwe's current problems, notwithstanding the fawning adulation of journalists who are awestruck by high-sounding academic titles. Mutambara, no doubt, immediately realised Tsvangirai's bedrock of support, hence his sudden about-turn at the congress. In suddenly presenting himself as an admirer of Tsvangirai, Mutambara sought to mitigate the damage caused by his own strategic miscalculation in accepting the presidency of the rebel faction.

During the 2000 general election the newly formed Zapu 2000 failed dismally to attract support. The party presented itself as a champion of the aspirations of the people of Matabeleland. It drew its support almost exclusively from Bulawayo. By voting overwhelmingly for the MDC, while rejecting Zapu 2000, the people of Matabeleland demonstrated their abhorrence of ethnically divisive political agendas. Mutambara must now convince potential supporters outside Matabeleland that his breakaway faction is not an ethnic initiative.

Hard-core supporters of Ncube may never forgive Mutambara for coming to their congress as a wolf dressed in sheep's clothing. Ncube obviously approached Mutambara on realisation that Tsvangirai enjoyed greater grassroots support than him.

A nobler agenda for Mutambara as arbitrator in the gratuitous dispute between Tsvangirai and Ncube would have been to engage in the process of adjudication from a neutral position, and not while embedded with Ncube and, more damningly, while flaunting his own presidential ambition. Any peacemaker who seeks to be the major or sole beneficiary of his mediation undermines his own stature, legitimacy and credibility. Mutambara runs the serious risk of relegating himself to leadership of an irrelevant ethnic-based clique.

Meanwhile, if Tsvangirai genuinely has the welfare of the MDC and of the nation at heart he must evaluate his own position. If there is sufficient evidence to suggest that, notwithstanding his grassroots support, he has become a liability to the struggle then he must prescribe an appropriate medicine, cognizant of the fact that it takes a great man to sacrifice self for nation.

The traditional MDC attitude that the party is "the exclusive preserve of the founding fathers and mothers", which allegedly was perpetuated by Ncube and former information secretary, Paul Themba Nyathi, in order to isolate Tsvangirai from an infusion of other competent politicians has rendered the party moribund. The MDC congress on March 17 provides Tsvangirai with an opportunity to demonstrate to critics that he can rebuild the leadership of the fragmented party by bringing in new blood and expertise. But he should primarily view himself as leading a struggle against a despotic regime, as opposed to being a president in waiting.

Tsvangirai, Mutambara, or whoever becomes the future leader of Zimbabwe must have the capacity to build a national rescue team that is broad-based. That person could start, for instance, by retaining Gideon Gono as governor of the Reserve Bank, if consensus is that he is Zimbabwe's most competent economic turn-around strategist, given a free hand by an enabling administration. Callisto Madavo, formerly of the World Bank and now with Georgetown University in Washington DC, would be another prime candidate. Such leader must have the capacity to rally around him some of Zimbabwe's more progressive politicians - Simba Makoni, Tendayi Biti, Roy Bennett, Daniel Shumba, Oppah Muchinguri, Elton Mangoma, Dzikamayi Mavhaire, Francis Nhema, Thokozani Khuphe and David Coltart, to mention a few.

Bankers Mthulisi Ncube, Nigel Chanakira, Julius Makoni and entrepreneurs, Strive Masiyiwa, Chemist Siziba, Mutumwa Mawere and Nkosana Moyo would be valuable in rebuilding Zimbabwe's ailing economy.

War veterans Solomon Mujuru, Dumiso Dabengwa, Freedom Nyamubaya, Wilfred Mhanda, and Margaret Dongo would represent the interests of those who made sacrifices for the liberation of Zimbabwe.

Civil society leaders and academics, John Makumbe, Much Masunda, Lovemore Madhuku, Eliphas Mukonoweshuro, Brian Raftopolous and journalist Francis Mdlongwa, to mention a few, would be assets in spearheading the new political agenda.

The former town clerk of Bulawayo Mike Ndubiwa, lawyer Washington Sansole, and former University of Zimbabwe vice chancellors, Gordon Chavhunduka and Walter Kamba or his wife Angeline - or both - would infuse the wisdom of age.

Youthful political activists such as Brian Kagoro and Daniel Molokela would be strategic players. Building a team along these lines would entail co-opting apparently progressive Zanu-PF elements outside the structures of the ruling party.

The man or woman charged with overseeing the economic turn-around programme would earn the highest salary, higher than that of the president. The minister responsible for charting a progressive and equitable land policy in the national interest would be another key player.

If Tsvangirai fails to present a new team of such diverse talent and influence he could ultimately go down in the annals of Zimbabwe's political history simply as the man who dared to challenge Mugabe's authoritarian regime and spearhead a drawn out process of political change.

For the MDC to bring about change in Zimbabwe the party must itself go through a process of internal transformation. Tese ngatichinje maitiro - let there be national political transformation. The process of change should start with acceptance by the Zanu-PF ruling elite that Zimbabwe belongs to all its citizens. The process should incorporate realization by Matabeleland region that not all Shona people were cheerleaders as Five Brigade committed the Gukurahundi atrocities.The majority of the more than 300 MDC supporters who died at the hands of Zanu-PF between 2000 and 2005 were not from Matabeleland.

Willie Musarurwa of the Sunday Mail who became the first of many editors to be fired by government after independence was not Ndebele. Neither were most of the rest. The former Mayor of Gweru, Patrick Kombayi, is not Ndebele either. He challenged former vice-President Simon Muzenda as an election candidate in the city in 1995 and nearly lost his manhood when he was shot by a CIO agent and a Zanu-PF activist. MDC leader, Tsvangirai's driver Tichaona Chiminya, and party supporter Talent Mabika, who were brutally butchered by another CIO agent and another Zanu-PF activist in Buhera in April 2000 were not Ndebele.

Some of the Zanu-PF leaders who have caused untold hardship and strife in Zimbabwe are Ndebele, former ministers Enos Nkala and Jonathan Moyo being notable examples. Zimbabweans should not be divided by Zanu-PF's ethnic-orientated diversionary tactics. It is as irresponsible and mischievous to visit the sins of one man, Robert Mugabe, on 11 million Shonas as it is to blame today's Ndebele nation for the predatory raids by their forefathers into Mashonaland.

I lived in Bulawayo in the 1980s. There was peaceful and harmonious coexistence throughout the week between Shona and Ndebele in the city.The residents rode to work on the same buses. They shared a mug of beer in Phata Phata, Mathonisa or Congo Beerhalls. Once in a while Nkala flew down from Harare over the weekend and delivered an inflammatory speech at a rally, causing instant ethnic clashes.

Sections of the donor community active in Zimbabwe that willingly or otherwise find themselves sponsoring initiatives with a potential to engender ethnic division - evidence of this abounds - do a great disservice to the national interest of Zimbabwe. They should support only those projects that rally Zimbabweans together in unity against the tyranny of Zanu-PF.

The congress of the anti-Tsvangirai group was the climax to a strategic plot, going back, not to October 12, 2005, but to 2002 after Tsvangirai lost the presidential election. As the day of the congress drew close exhortation from the anti-Tsvangirai section of the media - the vast majority - became high-pitched. On the day of the congress they, however, fell silent.

This is the barometer by which the failure of the internal plot to topple Tsvangirai or the prospect of Mutambara embarking on an easy passage to State House shall be measured. The refusal of former MDC secretary for legal affairs, David Coltart, to serve under Mutambara was an indication of the direction of the wind.

But the last word goes to political commentator, Dr John Makumbe.

"Their worst enemy is the local media," he says. "Once ZTV, the Herald and the Chronicle dance to your tune, you are finished. It reflects badly on you."

*Geoffrey Nyarota is founder and former editor in chief of the banned "The Daily News" in Zimbabwe. He can be contacted at gnyarota@yahoo.com

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