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Economic
Poverty Agreements: How the poor are excluded from trade negotiations
Richard Kamidza
Extracted from Pambazuka News 243
February 23, 2006
On paper, negotiations
for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) allow for the involvement
of a range of organisations that should to some extent ensure the
voice of the poor are heard in the construction of the agreements.
Richard Kamidza outlines how in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA)
the reality is far different. The process of negotiations has deliberately
excluded the poorest in Africa though their structure, complexity
and a general lack of political will to be inclusive. "Surely
poor constituencies cannot dream for a positive EPA when the process
totally excludes them," writes Kamidza.
There are sixteen
countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) configuration
that are preparing negotiations on the economic partnership agreements
(EPAs) with the European Union (EU). The negotiations are focusing
on six clusters: agriculture, development issues, fisheries, market
access, services and trade-related issues. All EPA-related work
at regional level is being coordinated by the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), to which all ESA member-states
are signatories. Other regional secretariats attend as observers.
To facilitate preparations in the process, several structures were
established but only the National Development Trade Policy Forum
(NDTPF) and the Regional Negotiating Forum (RNF) are analyzed for
the purpose of this discussion.
Who represents
the poor constituencies?
In
line with the Cotonou agreement, the ESA-EPA road map allows non-state
actors (including the private sector, non-governmental organisations,
the media, community based organisations, religious organisations
and trade unions) to participate in the on-going EPA negotiations
both at the national and regional levels. Civic bodies, since their
work involves interacting with both policy-makers and grassroots
communities, are assumed to represent the poor constituencies. Thus,
engaging civic bodies implies involving and consulting poor-constituencies
in the EPA process, a development that enables them to appreciate
the dynamics associated with the process. Impliedly, the structures
facilitate the participation of the poor in the on-going EPA negotiations.
But, are the poor constituencies’ voices already influencing the
structures?
What is the
extent of the poor constituencies?
The
ESA configuration is the poorest in Africa with some countries having
between 60-80% of the people living below the poverty datum line
and up to 80% unemployment. Twelve member-states are classified
as least developing countries (LDCs), which also suffer from serious
supply-side bottlenecks that impose equally serious limitations
for locally produced commodities to compete favouably with the EU
market despite the provision of duty free access under the "everything
else but arms" (EBA) initiatives. Anecdotal evidence shows
that the existence of EBA initiatives has nothing positive to show
in terms of benefits accruing to countries. Even countries categorized
as non-LDCs such as Zimbabwe are not only facing similar production
constraints, but also massive de-industrialization and de-agriculturalisation
as a result of both neo-liberal policy frameworks and irrational
nationalistic policy agendas. Indeed, the rates of socio-economic
and political indicators prevailing in some ESA member-states are
at variant with the zeal to "fast-track" the EPAs process.
A significant
number of countries are also classified as highly indebted poor
countries (HIPC) meaning that the huge but growing external debt
overhang is not only retarding economic growth and development of
respective member-states, but has also become economically exhausting
and unsustainable; politically destabilizing; and ethically unacceptable.
The debt is denying member-states resources to improve the supply-side
constraints, particularly human resources development at a time
when poor socio-economic conditions and political instability in
many states is causing massive brain drain to developed economies.
Both EBA and HIPC initiatives assume the existence of a higher proportion
of poor constituencies, which are also finding it difficult to cope
with any emerging trade regime. Also, lack of political will by
institutions and individuals coordinating the process to include
poor constituencies has remained a challenge that seems to be allowed
to continue - albeit some few months before the deadline for the
conclusion of an EPA between the ESA configuration and EU.
ESA negotiating
Structures and the State of Play
National
Development Trade Policy Forum
Each
ESA member-state has established the National Development Trade
Policy Forum (NDTPF) whose main function is to develop national
positions that will be subsequently tabled at the Regional Negotiating
Forum (RNF). NDTPFs are all cluster-inclusive and/or multi-sectoral,
and cut across all stakeholders in the country. They are supposed
to ensure wider and deeper consultations or involvement of key stakeholders
and citizens, including the poor constituencies in this process.
Stakeholders at the national level are supposed to collectively
come up with strategies, synergies and options leading to just and
fair EPA outcomes for respective member-states. In this respect,
stakeholders are supposed to participate in EPA-related national
conferences, seminars and workshops organized to discuss proceedings,
processes and findings of commissioned sustainable impact assessment
(SIA) studies and cluster studies. Each NDTPF is expected to produce
written progress reports for onward presentation to RNF meetings
and submission to the COMESA secretariat for future references.
Lastly, NDTPFs are expected to come up with both offensive and defensive
cluster interests and positions which feed into regional preparation
agendas.
However, the
events to date indicate that NDTPFs lack wide and deep consultations
or involvement of all stakeholders. It has been observed that participation
in NDTPFs of some countries excludes those stakeholders who are
perceived as critical of the prevailing governance and political
systems and socio-economic conditions. This means that the limited
democratic space constrains free participation of civic bodies in
the process.
For instance
in Zimbabwe, a sour relationship between civic bodies and government
means that mostly regional civic bodies have been participating
in this process. To date, no members of nationally-based civic bodies
have been part of the government delegation attending RNF meetings.
In other countries, the civic bodies are largely inactive and very
weak, therefore unable to mount a serious engagement in NDTPFs activities.
This means that wide and deep involvement of all stakeholders, particularly
the poor constituencies, still remains one of the biggest challenges
facing NDTPFs in their engagement in EPA negotiations. This also
means the low mobilization of citizens and/or exclusion of the poor
in this process. Further, this means weak networking and synergies
of strategies among stakeholders. Ultimately, this leads to relatively
weaker negotiable positions vis-à-vis the EC, and dangerous
and unviable EPA outcomes that are incapable of assisting in transforming
economies to the benefit of poor constituencies.
Due to deliberate
exclusion of civic bodies from the process, the publicity of EPAs
has remained largely unsatisfactory. Most EPA-related events and
activities have gone without notice by the media at the level of
both the NDTPFs and RNF. Chances are therefore that the citizenry,
let alone poor constituencies, may fail to follow the process with
the view to how to deal with the pitfalls of any agreement.
In addition,
the COMESA secretariat seems to have failed to monitor and ensure
that countries comply with their own rules and procedures of engagement
in the EPA process. Indeed, failure to deposit reports make it impossible
for interested stakeholders in the ESA configuration and beyond
to review the process with the view to understand the dynamics at
each NDTPF, and subsequently RNF negotiation process. Without publicity
and close scrutiny, it becomes difficult to assess the level of
NDTPFs’ accountability, transparency and the democratic process,
let alone encompassing poor constituencies in the process.
Regional
Negotiation Forum
The
Regional Negotiating Forum (RNF) is a structure that brings together
representatives from NDTPFs, four regional secretariats and a regional
civic body; Brussels-based ambassadors, especially cluster lead
spokespersons; and selected observers and consultants to deliberate
progress and ultimately prepare EPA positions for the ESA configuration.
Participation support at the RNF is given to two government negotiators,
a representative of non-state actor in each ESA country, representative
of the regional civic body, regional secretariat officials and invited
observers, experts and consultants. All supported participants have
speaking rights and status during the meeting.
However, given
the complexity of the negotiations coupled with deficiencies in
both technical and financial capacities to undertake EPA negotiations
in most ESA member-states, the coordination becomes equally complex
and technical, requiring an equally broad-based and sound technical
depth. This unfortunately, has not been satisfactory, leading to
instances where crucial documents ended-up being distributed during
the onset of the meetings and deliberate omission of items from
the programme that had earlier on been circulated. This has a negative
impact on member-states contribution at the regional meetings. However,
this is not entirely of COMESA’s making but also a function of too
much congestion on the EPA calendar and limited technical advisory
(It is only this year that the Chief Technical Advisor has been
hired to assist in the process) coupled with other regional mandates
requiring similar attention.
Some countries
have been sending only two participants to the RNF meetings in spite
the availability of resources which end-up being returned to the
EU – the sponsor of the process. This raises the question, "whose
problem is it?" as well as pointing to the state of governance
systems that are guiding the process in respective member-states.
This development further indicates weak status of NDTPFs in terms
of consulting and involving widely and deeply all stakeholders.
Other countries have failed to establish viable NDTPFs that are
capable of generating offensive and defensive positions to be subsequently
tabled at the RNF meetings. In this respect, a few countries have
been bringing more delegates using their own resources to support
the process, a development that is encouraging in terms of providing
the necessary moral support to negotiators.
It is thus fair
and just to allow more civic bodies, especially the social movements,
to become part of governments’ delegations to RNF and other meetings.
Only when this happens, will the crying voice still at the periphery
of defining a long-term trade regime with the EU, become louder.
This is more so given that the invitation extended to regional civic
bodies in 2004 meant to bring the voice of poor constituencies into
the process has been withdrawn. The purging means no invitations
to future RNF meetings and no accessing of sustainable impact assessment
(SIA) studies of member-states that are deposed at the regional
secretariat. But, the major casualty of COMESA’s reaction remains
the "crying voice" that is watching the unbalanced and
heavily biased match from outside the pitch.
Given the above,
it seems as though COMESA lacks the political will to assist in
widening and deepening the level of involvement and consultations.
It also suggests that the organization has assumed the role of monitoring
intervention of critical voices in this process with the view to
purge all those who happen to be critical of them.
From the table,
many countries’ delegations consist mainly of government officials
and to some extent private sector representatives. Only Kenya, Malawi,
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe have widened the size of their delegation
to RNF by including officials from relevant ministries and departments.
From the table Kenya too has brought more participants to all the
RNF meetings including a member of parliament.
The Secretariat
as at the beginning of 2005 reported that it had not received any
written reports on the activities of NDTPFs. This means that all
past presentations by delegations on the progress and constraints
were/are verbal, a development that often mislead the process aiming
at achieving positive EPA outcomes. As expected, no criticism has
arisen from country presentations, and as it stands, it is difficult
to review the process in future.
Conclusion
The
above discussion clearly shows limitations to including poor constituencies
in the process of negotiating an EPA with the EU. There is generally
lack of political will to centrally involve and consult civic bodies
regarding the on-going process. There is no political will to ensure
availability of resources for mobilizing poor constituencies.
At the beginning
of 2005, only five studies out of 16 countries were deposited with
the regional secretariat. While the studies have been produced,
no rigorous engagement of the findings has taken place with the
view to translating the pitfalls to poor constituencies. This position
is further worsened by limited space for civic bodies to participate
in the process. It therefore tends to reason that the participation
of civic bodies are constrained by imperatives on the ground such
as limited democratic space, poor state-civic relationships and
outright exclusion by coordinating institutions in the capitals
and beyond. The "poor’s voice" continues to cry out, pleading
with the technocrats that "ESA is not for sale". Surely
poor constituencies cannot dream for a positive EPA when the process
totally excludes them.
* Richard
Kamidza is Senior Researcher at the African Centre for Constructive
of Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).
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