|
Back to Index
Lifeline or licence for Mugabe?
Stan
du Plessis
August 11, 2005
http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/article.aspx?ID=BD4A78628
IF CURRENT negotiations are successful, South African taxpayers
could soon be funding the cost of a loan to the Zimbabwean government.
The immediate purpose of the loan is apparently to roll over existing
debt owed by Zimbabwe to the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
on which Zimbabwe has defaulted. If the loan exceeds this immediate
requirement it will amount to a more general lifeline for a government
in fiscal disarray.
It is disconcerting
that these negotiations have proceeded to such an advanced stage
while the South African public has yet to hear convincing reasons
for supporting such an irregular project.
There is a basic
incoherence at the very core of the negotiations: on the one hand
we are told that Zimbabwe is too close to fail financially, as the
ensuing economic chaos might engulf SA, or at least impose massive
regional costs.
On the other hand we are told that the South African government
is attaching what are called tough conditions to the prospective
loan, including conditions of a political character, in addition
to the economic conditions which such loans often entail.
But these two
positions are fundamentally at odds: the first is a position of
unconditional support for the Zimbabwean government, depending as
it does on the unconditional facts of geographic proximity, while
the second is a conditional position qualifying our support by the
compliance of the Zimbabwean government with a set of conditions.
The rationality of this loan depends on which of these positions
will take precedence.
Starting with
the unconditional argument: this argument makes nonsense of the
present wrangling over conditions. If it is taken at all seriously
- as it seems to be by President Thabo Mbeki - then conditions simply
do not matter. Bearing in mind that the very IMF loans on which
Zimbabwe has defaulted also carried conditions, we can reasonably
expect that the Zimbabwean government will soon fall foul of any
conditions the South African government might impose.
But that would
hardly lessen the force of the unconditional argument for supporting
Zimbabwe. On the contrary, as Zimbabwe sinks further into debt the
crisis will become increasingly acute and, since Zimbabwe will still
be too close to fail, SA's financial support risks becoming open-ended.
The incoherence
to which I am pointing does not change if another unconditional
argument is swapped for the "too close to fail" argument,
for example, the cabinet's argument that it would support Zimbabwe
financially, provided that the support would be to the benefit of
the "Zimbabwean people as a whole".
Practical politicians
know all to well that there are no loans or spending programmes
that benefit Zimbabweans (or for that matter South Africans) "as
a whole". The art of government is about making difficult trade-offs
with limited resources, and it is disingenuous to suggest that we
can do in Zimbabwe what we cannot achieve at home.
Which brings
me to a further concern; this loan will not be without costs, even
in the unlikely circumstance that it is repaid. In financing Zimbabwe,
the South African government is trading off domestic needs against
doubtful international goals, and the public has a right to know
how this trade-off is made. To put it bluntly: how did the self-inflicted
economic crisis in a neighbouring country come to trump domestic
needs in SA?
If, however,
the conditions really did matter then we have to assess the likelihood
that Zimbabwe will honour the conditions, including repaying the
loan.
The primary
purpose of conditions for an international loan is to raise the
likelihood that the loan will be repaid. Unfortunately, the track
record of the Zimbabwean government could scarcely be worse in this
regard, as was comprehensively shown by its inability to meet the
conditions attached to the same IMF loan which the South African
government is now hoping to roll over on Zimbabwe's behalf.
IMF financing
is highly concessional and certainly more so than the terms that
the South African government could get on the capital markets. It
defies belief to think that the Zimbabwean government could meet
the cost of a more expensive loan from SA, carrying political conditions
in addition to economic ones, when it has just failed with respect
to the IMF loan.
In this regard
it is important to remember that Zimbabwe's failure to meet the
IMF's conditions is not due to some act of God, but almost entirely
to the foreseeable consequence of ruinous policies, implemented
in the face of repeated international warning and, ultimately, condemnation.
Perhaps it is
not surprising that the same South African government that evidently
failed to anticipate the economic catastrophe in Zimbabwe, though
it was plain for all to see, is now ready to offer conditional finance
as if the Zimbabwean government had not yet convincingly demonstrated
its lack of credibility in such transactions.
At the time
of writing, the Zimbabwean government was holding out for a sweeter
deal, hoping to exclude the political conditions which have so far
been insisted on. Such brinkmanship is an ideal opportunity for
the South African government to reassess the whole transaction.
It is an opportunity to untangle the conceptual muddle of the prevailing
approach by dropping the arguments for unconditional support and
realising that conditional finance for a Zanu (PF) government is
throwing good money after bad. SA should offer no financial assistance
as long as Zanu (PF) prevails.
*Du Plessis
is associate professor in the economics department at the University
of Stellenbosch.
Please credit www.kubatana.net if you make use of material from this website.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License unless stated otherwise.
TOP
|