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Conditional loan is our best chance to influence Zimbabwe
Steven Friedman
August 03, 2005
http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/article.aspx?ID=BD4A76080
NOT for the first
time, we may be about to miss an opportunity to contribute to Zimbabwe's
democratic progress.
Our government's Zimbabwe policy is particularly difficult to read now.
Comments by opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai and President Thabo Mbeki's
support for a South African Council of Churches rescue plan suggest that
strategy is moving away from appeasing the Mugabe government.
But, publicly, government
is considering lending money to Zimbabwe's authorities and the president
has continued to defend Robert Mugabe and his government.
Whether government
is saying nice things in public about Zimbabwe's rulers while putting
the squeeze on them in private, or because that is what our leaders still
feel, is unclear.
What is clear is that
the need to pressure Zimbabwe's government has never been greater. Not
only has its campaign against the urban poor taken its abuse of human
rights to a new level, but the need to repay the International Monetary
Fund makes it more vulnerable than for some time.
This raises questions
about our government's strategy - whichever interpretation is accurate.
If it is continuing to cuddle up to Zimbabwe's regime, it ensures we are
even more resented by millions of Zimbabweans than we already are. And
if we are being nice in public while setting conditions in private, it
is hard to see how this will move Zimbabwe forward.
Mugabe's record of
honouring undertakings to concede democratic space is hardly sparkling.
Why should he now honour a secret agreement attached to resources, which
makes it easier for him to ignore pressure?
If our government
is placing conditions on financial help, how will it ensure that these
are met unless they are enshrined in a public agreement? And even then,
relying on the good faith of a government which has shown none thus far
would be a risk.
Financial help to
Zimbabwe could, therefore, help only if hedged by conditions that its
government publicly accepts; and if the custodians of the deal are not
its government alone.
This suggests a way
we might help Zimbabwe so that we ensure that money is more likely to
get to those who need it and also open possibilities for a negotiated
end to its stalemate. We could insist that we will help - but only if
the money is given jointly to, and spent jointly by, Zimbabwe's government,
parliamentary opposition and civil society organisations.
This would send a
signal that we support Zimbabwe's economic revival - but that it is a
task for all its major actors, not just its government. And that we want
our help to address the cause of the problem - the fact that the future
of Zimbabwe is being determined by Zanu (PF) alone rather than the entire
society.
This may seem naïve.
The Mugabe government is surely not going to agree to decide with its
opposition and civil society organisations, which have campaigned against
it. It would, surely, insist that it is a sovereign government which has
no need to be told to treat its opponents as partners.
But it is not nearly
as naïve as believing that a government which makes war on its most
vulnerable citizens will use money we give it to fight poverty alone.
Nor as naïve as believing that it will become democratic if we bale
it out and have a quiet word with it on the need for change.
This Zimbabwean government
is likely to honour the conditions of a loan only if it is held to them
in public.
And the problems that beset Zimbabwe will not be resolved while we perpetuate
the fiction that the ruling party alone can solve them. We have, therefore,
only two options if we want to improve Zimbabwean lives. One is to refuse
to advance any money. That would free of us of the burden of being seen
to keep in power a government of dubious legitimacy, but it would not
offer aid to Zimbabweans. The other is to help - but only if we work with
all Zimbabwe's interests, not only the government.
Since this is the
only way we can intervene while not choosing sides, and offer hope of
a more lasting solution, the probability that it would not be accepted
by Mugabe should not deter us. Even if Zanu (PF) balks now, the option
of a relief package negotiated with, and administered by, all major forces
in Zimbabwe would remain on the table, a firm offer of what we are willing
to do to help our neighbour if its major forces are willing to co-operate
to address its crisis.
When political conditions
change to make a broad Zimbabwean response possible, the offer would be
available as an incentive.
We can make a difference
in Zimbabwe. But only if we signal that we know the difference between
its government and its people.
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