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Africa
verdict will be pivotal
Comment from
Business Day (SA)
By Diana Games & Greg Mills
March 02, 2005
http://www.zwnews.com/print.cfm?ArticleID=11350
The more things
change, the more they stay the same. Nowhere is this more true than
with Zimbabwe’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for March 31.
With just under a month to go, it seems the ruling Zanu PF has snookered
the region again, with the electoral landscape looking worse than
in 2000 and certainly not conducive to a free and fair election.
This is clear to everyone except, it seems, regional leaders, who
are doing their best to convince themselves and everyone else that
President Robert Mugabe is acting in good faith. Over the years,
no one has come to expect much from the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) - but its protocol, Principles and Guidelines Governing
Democratic Elections, was impressive. Region watchers believed that
it might be a new start, particularly with Mauritius, a no-nonsense
country, in charge. But alas, this has not proved to be the case.
Zimbabwe has already violated a wide range of provisions in the
protocol and nothing has been said.
Mugabe’s few
gestures towards electoral reform, made to avoid censure at the
Mauritius summit where the protocol was signed, seem to have been
offered up to obscure what would happen next - further skewing of
the electoral process in favour of the government and a greater
clampdown on freedoms. A "new" electoral commission has been established,
but it is chaired by a pro-government judge appointed by Mugabe.
For the first time, soldiers and policemen will act as election
officials. Election observers must be accredited by a committee
dominated by nominees of cabinet ministers and the president, and
only people invited by a minister or the Electoral Supervisory Commission
- dominated by government appointees - will be eligible for accreditation.
The opposition has to apply for permission to hold campaign meetings
in order not to fall foul of the Public Order and Security Act,
one of the country’s most repressive pieces of legislation. Opposition
parties are forbidden to have foreign funding and are not deemed
eligible for government funding. Only government-licensed journalists
and publications may report events. Nearly 2-million "ghost" voters
have been found on the voters’ roll and the military has been involved
in the demarcation of electoral areas, which has seen the elimination
of three opposition seats and three new ones created in Zanu PF
strongholds.
Less than a
month before the poll, Harare has not issued invitations to election
observers. The SADC protocol requires invitations to be made 90
days before the poll to allow for adequate preparation of a regional
team. The much applauded protocol, in its first real test, has been
violated. Regional leaders have been disempowered by their own protocol
which, like the African peer review mechanism, relies on the integrity
of government signatories to abide by it and contains no punitive
or enforcement measures. The short-term future of Zimbabwe depends
on whether the March 31 poll is declared free and fair - not necessarily
by the international community, which does not seem to have the
power to change events in Zimbabwe much, but by African countries,
many of which have provided a bulwark against change there. No matter
what the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and international
teams might think, the African "green light" is crucial in providing
Mugabe and Zanu PF with the legitimacy they crave to perpetuate
their rule by whatever means necessary. As with the presidential
election three years ago, it is difficult to envisage a circumstance
in which the African teams will not close ranks around the ruling
party. South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, in
the face of well-published evidence to the contrary, has already
intimated that conditions look acceptable for elections to occur.
This assessment
ignores the overall worsening of the political and economic environment
inside Zimbabwe. Any concessions Mugabe has made have been overshadowed
by the tightening of laws governing elections, the role of civil
society and the media. Some economic recovery may be possible under
the "close ranks" election scenario, but it will in the main be
dislocated from non-African assistance, except for burgeoning Chinese
economic interests. But this outcome will depend, too, on what response
the MDC adopts. Zimbabwe’s opposition faced a dilemma: if they had
chosen not to participate in the elections, they would have been
labelled spoilers and lost relevance; if they did, they risked legitimising
an apparently inevitably fraudulent process. But this is not a zero-sum
game. Now it has confirmed its participation, the ball is firmly
in the court of MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai and his colleagues.
heir key asset and political leverage is the legitimacy that they
will accord to the process or not. This, in turn, depends on how
the party handles itself and its campaign in the weeks before, and
especially following, the election.
The MDC has
to learn to play to its strengths and highlight the comparative
weaknesses of Zanu PF. These
strengths include sound, youthful and pragmatic leadership; a culture
of nonviolence; broad-based support; and sensible policies. The
MDC has to offer a reasonable alternative to the internecine, eccentric,
egocentric and increasingly costly behaviour of the ruling party.
This demands a clear and continuous articulation of its core principles
of inclusiveness, not elitism; economic recovery, not continued
collapse; and popular support, not party centrism. Presuming the
election follows the predictable path of a hollow Zanu PF victory,
most interesting is the MDC’s role afterwards. It has a number of
possible strategies. First, the "obstructionist parliamentarian"
model, fighting for its cause from inside parliament. Even though
this may find favour with MDC members concerned about their livelihood
in the parliamentary gravy train, this role is likely to serve simply
to grant a stamp of approval to Mugabe, the election process and
Zanu PF misrule. A second option is not to enter parliament and
publicly contest the election result, using party structures and
its union base to mobilise mass protests - the "Ukrainian option".
But the MDC has hitherto shown little capacity or stomach for this
type of action, and it is uncertain whether Tsvangirai can make
the leap to mass insurrection. Of course, the Zimbabwean people
have the power of change in their hands. But there is also a heavy
responsibility on the shoulders of SADC countries to show proper
commitment to their own principles of African democracy in order
not to render them valueless.
*Games is
director of Africa@Work; Dr Mills is the national director of the
South African Institute of International Affairs
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