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The context for Canadian policy on Zimbabwe
Dr Linda Freeman
February 09, 2005

This presentation was made to the Canadian Parliamentary Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development on Canadian Policy in Zimbabwe

As veteran journalist Michael Holman recently commented, an "immediate chorus of derision" greeted US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's inclusion of Zimbabwe on a US list of "outposts of tyranny" followed by the inescapable sound of the closing of African ranks.

For Canadian policy on Zimbabwe, the challenge, the dilemma and the difficulty is to position this country and our policy in a way that it can contribute effectively without producing the same reaction. Therefore, I would like to begin this presentation by framing my remarks on Canadian policy in Zimbabwe in the context of Africa and the global South. The inescapable reality is that, within the region of southern Africa (with the exception of Botswana), there is strong public support for the government of President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and especially his programme of land reform. While there are more dissenters in the rest of Africa, again the majority opinion there and in the global South as a whole is pro Mugabe.

Although leaders of African states contend that they exert pressure on Zimbabwean leaders behind closed doors in meetings of SADC and the AU on issues of governance, the evidence of their effectiveness is pretty slim. There are genuine concerns about the broader effects of Zimbabwe's crisis and especially its economic decline, but so far they have not translated into concrete pressure. The most that one can see is the adoption this week of a three-year-old report on Zimbabwe's poor human rights record by the executive council of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights which now becomes part of the official record of the African Union. By and large, the record shows that, to date, President Robert Mugabe has been extremely effective in winning the propaganda battle, and in having the crisis take on a particular meaning.

>From this point of view, the key issue (indeed, the only issue) in understanding Zimbabwe's troubles is the refusal of forces within and without Zimbabwe to accept the radical reform which has resulted in the transformation of commercial farmland from white to African farmers. Therefore, the Zimbabwean government contends that concern about abuse of human, civil and political rights is simply a smokescreen to cover efforts to remove the current government in Zimbabwe and to restore old enemies in power.

The Mugabe regime, its supporters argue, needs to be celebrated for completing an important task which had been integral to the liberation struggle. The current crisis is linked to anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles which connect the present crisis back to the battle against white minority rule which ended with independence in 1980 and to the larger struggle of the South against domination from the advanced industrial world. In this view, the Western world is attempting to organize a regime change in Zimbabwe through the main opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

In his role as tribune of the South, Mugabe has gained great currency in a series of speeches at international conferences - from Johannesburg where from the Sustainable Development conference in August 2002 he was applauded when he told British Prime Minister Tony Blair "you keep your England" but "let me keep my Zimbabwe". to New York at the UN last September when Mugabe delivered a scathing speech tearing into the Iraq war allies. "We are now being coerced to accept and believe that a new political-cum-religious doctrine has arisen," he said, "namely that 'There is but one political god, George Bush, and Tony Blair is his prophet,'"

These comments are but prologue to highlight the difficulty which this context creates for the framers of Canadian policy on Zimbabwe. If one comes out in the fashion of American Secretaries of State Powell and Rice, the effect is counter-productive. Indeed, heavy-handed pressure from Western countries on southern African heads of state before SADC meetings in the early years of this crisis produced a backlash and stiffened support for the Mugabe government.

Policy recommendations:
So what should and should not be done? Looking back at this committee's report and recommendations from two years ago, much has remained the same but there are differences. There are at least two major areas to consider:

1. Be ready to provide emergency food aid quickly:
There is no question that Canada should again be primed and ready to provide assistance in the form of emergency food supplies.

The US-funded Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET), a food security monitoring group, said last week that 5.8 million of the country's 12.5 million people will need food aid to avert starvation before the next harvest in April. Despite government efforts to censor the data (and fire the mayor for reporting these facts), Bulawayo city council reported the deaths of fourteen children in January to add to the 162 who died from January to October last year. So the need is clear.

However, the Zimbabwean government and its Minister of Agriculture Joseph Made refuse to accept these facts, rejecting external food aid and contending that the new agricultural dispensation produced by the land reform has resulted in bumper crops. Mugabe himself suggested last year that food aid should be given elsewhere, that Zimbabwe didn't want to be "choked" with food aid. The official claim is that Zimbabwe had produced enough grain to feed itself - 2.4 million tonnes - a figure that has been rejected by most independent authorities and even by a parliamentary committee in Harare. Reports this morning from Zimbabwe suggest that the government is desperately trying to purchase 600,000 tonnes of maize but is having difficulty getting lines of credit or access to foreign exchange.

Although the government denies political use of food and food aid, independent reports continue to show that ordinary Zimbabweans need to be in good standing with the ruling political party ZANU (PF) to be eligible to buy food from the Grain Marketing Board, especially in the rural areas. Any indication of support for the main opposition political party automatically removes eligibility to purchase food. The choice for ordinary Zimbabweans is clear: support ZANU (PF) or starve. Linked to this approach has been the government's periodic insistence that it monopolize the distribution of food.

Moreover, the Zimbabwean government has put in place a new policy on NGOs which has not yet been approved by President Mugabe. It may severely limit the ability of NGOs to participate in the provision of food aid.

It is unclear, therefore, when and whether Canadian food assistance will be able to meet the needs of starving Zimbabweans. However, it is not out of the question that very sudden emergency aid will be needed. Canada should prepare for this eventuality and co-ordinate with other donors to address the issue of the Zimbabwean government's determination to control food aid.

2. Diplomatic efforts:

Here there are six main points:

• Given the discussion above about broad-based support in Africa and the South for the Mugabe regime, it is clear that certain efforts will be counter-productive. Any belief that additional bilateral pressure will bring influence is illusory. There is no sign that the Mugabe government has responded to pressure from close allies like South Africa, let alone Canada, a country they regard as being part of a Western conspiracy to bring down its government. Opportunities for effective interaction at this level are likely to be slim in the current conjuncture.
  
  While the Mugabe government should be left in no doubt about Canada's opposition to many features of the current situation in Zimbabwe and no retreat should be entertained, it is unclear what more can be attained. Canada has already co-sponsored a resolution at the UN Commission on Human Rights condemning human rights violations in Zimbabwe and issued a formal demarche regarding the violent intimidation of the opposition. Our representatives in Harare should continue to maintain a strong presence on the ground but it is unclear that additional actions on this line will have any effect.
  
  The most important aspect of Canadian policy towards the Zimbabwean crisis is that it be sustained. In this connection, support for groups within civil society should be continued where possible. Pressure from below from churches, trade unions and other civil society associations continue to be a sound investment in a democratic culture for the future.
  
  
• The suggestion two years ago that Canada should support "a special international tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the most serious human rights abuses" is clearly premature and counter-productive. It simply strengthens the resolve of Mugabe and the elite around him never to give up power.
  
  
• There is no indication, either, that the government of South Africa would be amenable to Canadian pressure for it to do more on the Zimbabwean issue. Since 2000, the government of Thabo Mbeki has supported the Mugabe regime under the guise of a policy of quiet diplomacy. There are few signs yet of a significant willingness to change.
  
  
• There remains a handful of countries like Ghana and Nigeria which, in a bilateral context, might be useful in diplomatic efforts vis a vis Zimbabwe. Canada should support their efforts. Attempts by governments in Malawi and Zambia to come to grips with endemic corruption should be encouraged as creating a different environment for the region as a whole.
  
  
• Although in 2004 the Zimbabwean government has signed on to a protocol of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regarding principles and guidelines governing elections, there is little indication to date that it intends to undertake more than a token compliance. Nor is there any sign that SADC intends to require Zimbabwe to do more. Any pressure from a Western country like Canada would need to be very skilful indeed not to provoke a backlash.
  
  
• Above all, the current government of Zimbabwe should not be able to claim a free and fair election in the upcoming parliamentary elections at the end of March when conditions for such an election have already rigged the outcome. Only friendly observers are going to be allowed to go to Zimbabwe to watch the election process as it unfolds.
  

Therefore, a very practical measure for Canada to undertake is to be prepared to counter the inevitable propaganda that the election process is acceptable.

*Dr. Linda Freeman is a Political Science professor at Carleton University in Ottawa

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