|
Back to Index
Regional
cooperation: What future for SADC?
Henning
Melber
October
28, 2004
http://www.pambazuka.org/
Recent trends seem
to suggest a shift away from strengthening of regional cooperation in
Southern Africa. But such regionalism has been hitherto a declared priority
on development agendas. Hampering factors presently include political
differences such as the controversy over Zimbabwe. This escalated into
a sharp division of views among the member countries of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC). It is hardly an exaggeration to state that
the inability to agree on a common approach has an almost paralysing effect.
The following analysis is however concentrated on socio-economic factors
of concern, which divide the region further instead of bringing it closer
together.
Strategic shift
towards NEPAD
The New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) seems to emerge increasingly
as a type of mega-NGO to channel aid-funds into developmental projects,
which at best claim but in reality fail to be driven by a desire towards
enhanced regional collaboration. The programmes and policies funded under
NEPAD are implemented mainly by countries and not by regional bodies.
Hence NEPAD in effect more undermines than strengthens an agency such
as SADC (or any other regional institution).
This is a trend notwithstanding
the fact that NEPAD attributes substantial relevance to regional bodies
when identifying ways and means to achieve the defined socio-economic
goals. NEPAD claims that its agenda is "based on national and regional
priorities and development plans", which ought to be prepared "through
participatory processes involving the people". So far, however, no
visible signs in the SADC would indicate that the collective (multilateral)
efforts aim at a united approach of the region in its relations with the
outside world.
Nor does NEPAD so
far translate its noble aims into practical steps for implementation.
The blue print emphasises sub-regional and regional approaches even under
a separate sub heading. It stresses "the need for African countries
to pool their resources and enhance regional development and economic
integration … to improve international competitiveness". But the
crux of the matter lies there: the emphasis on international competitiveness
comes at the expenses of strengthening the local economy and the local
people. Instead, integration in Africa should as a priority meet the socio-economic
and environmental needs of its citizenries and not seek to turn even more
into an export platform.
NEPAD claims further
to enhance the provision of essential regional goods as well as the promotion
of intra-African trade and investments, with another focus on "rationalising
the institutional framework for economic integration". But again,
such an approach neglects the local/internal in favour of the global/external
orientation. The implementation of NEPAD will hence most likely have the
adverse effect and assist in an increased outward orientation of a regional
bloc at the expenses of internal consolidation. It is interesting to note
in this context, that notwithstanding the decisive role of South Africa
within NEPAD, SADC has so far hardly acknowledged and certainly not embraced
the initiative.
Divisive Free Trade
Agreements
The Free
Trade Agreement between the European Union and South Africa (EU-SA
FTA) negotiated since the mid-1990s, had a similarly divisive effect on
the Southern African region by entering into a preferential trade relation
with one country and thereby enhancing differences within the region resulting
from existing conflicts of interest among the national economies.
South Africa herself,
the monetary zone, the South African Customs Union (SACU) and SADC are
already not in harmony at any time and less so given the effects of the
FTA on regional economic matters. Hence the EU intervention adds more
friction. The new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiated between
the countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Islands (ACP states)
on the one hand and the EU on the other hand not only seek to replace
the previous Cotonou Agreement by means of sub-regional separate negotiations
but also aim towards compatibility between EU-ACP trade relations and
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). They are hence dependent upon the
settlement of the Doha Development Agenda's controversial and yet unresolved
issues.
Interesting enough,
the draft European Constitution makes no reference to cooperation with
ACP states. It is only fair to assume that the EU enlargement shifts interest
even further away from the neighbouring continent towards more collaboration
closer to Brussels. In addition, the negotiations by the EU aim at separate
accords with each region, and no country may negotiate in more than one
bloc. As such, SADC is reduced to seven member countries (half of the
14 SADC states) under the EPA negotiations.
It is not far fetched
to see that there is an inbuilt conflict between regionalism as it exists
and the negotiations of new multilateral processes. Countries might differ
over the advantages between benefits from the continued protection of
regional arrangements or the creation of individual preferential access
within other trade agreements. But if regionalism is considered as a problem
or obstacle towards further global harmonisation under the WTO, it stands
little chances of being a viable point of departure for strengthening
in particular the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the South within
the global trade arrangements.
Instead, the predictable
outcome of the current negotiations under the WTO related agreements will
be a shrinking of "development space". To avoid such in-egalitarian
pseudo-partnerships, a shift in balance from the drive to homogenize trading
commitments to other states towards granting states reasonable scope to
choose appropriate levels of national protection is required. A development
strategy would therefore have to operate in a zone where both internal
as well as external integration reinforce rather than undermine each other.
Instead, issues of internal integration (including issues of regional
integration) have largely dropped out of the development agenda as the
gospel of the free trade paradigm dominates the discourse.
EU and US as partners?
The same
limiting effects can be expected from the Free Trade Agreement between
SACU and the USA. The SACU-US FTA seems to promise nothing different from
the US-American African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which tends
to separate and divide instead of bringing African economies and interests
closer. The benefits from AGOA differ among African countries according
to their resources.
Ironically, within
those countries having been allocated a LDC status under AGOA (receiving
additional preferential treatment), external capital (from mainly East
Asian countries) has managed to exploit the opportunities created for
supplying the US market under preferential tax regimes with cheap textiles
from these countries. The by and large unqualified and underpaid workforce
in the local sweatshops is hardly reaping any benefits from the super
exploitation. Nor does the fiscus in these states, as initial investments
and running costs for operations are substantially subsidised with public
revenue instead of providing any tax income from the profits generated.
Such recent trends
indicate towards less rather than more regional cooperation and integration.
The political and security interests might provide with increased support
by the G8 (the group of 8 most industrialised countries of the Northern
hemisphere) and the strengthening of initiatives towards closer regional
collaboration in reducing armed conflicts and securing more stability.
Such stability continues however to be perceived as regime security, in
contrast to a concept of human security. The latter would give primacy
to human rights in favour of the citizens and not preference to the governments
in power.
Even if there would
be achievements in this direction, the multidimensionality and heterogeneity
of a region like Southern Africa is likely to persist and may eventually
increase. This does not prevent external support towards further positive
regional interdependence. But this requires more than merely the opening
up to the global economy. More so, it would have to re-visit matters of
regional economic collaboration and seek involvement of the majority of
the African population in these countries. The current initiatives by
the EU and the US under the WTO offer little to no promise to contribute
to such a desirable tendency, neither in SADC nor elsewhere.
* Henning Melber
is Research Director at The Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala/Sweden
and has been Director of the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU)
in Windhoek between 1992 and 2000.
Please credit www.kubatana.net if you make use of material from this website.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License unless stated otherwise.
TOP
|
