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MDC
faces dilemma over boycott
Brian Raftopoulos
September 03, 2004
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/news/2004/September/Friday3/481.html
THE decision
by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to withdraw
from any future elections until a comprehensive range of electoral
reforms is introduced by the ruling party was increasingly an option
that had to be considered.
Throughout the
post-colonial period, Zanu PF has displayed open hostility and intolerance
towards opposition parties. This hostility has been characterised
by electoral procedures that negate the possibility of political
alternatives, media practices that negate open political debate,
state interventions that minimise the possibility of open political
organisation in the public sphere and the ever-present threat and
utilisation of violence as a central political strategy.
The period since
2000 has exacerbated these practices and shown the severe limitations
of a parliamentary opposition in a political structure that has
placed increasing power in an authoritarian presidency. Moreover,
the ideological climate in the country has monotonously constructed
the opposition as a foreign creation, undeserving of respect and
subject to any form of legislative stricture and political violence
designated by the state.
In 2000, after
the momentous general election of that year, there was a residual
optimism that a substantive parliamentary opposition would open
up the political debate in the country and provide the option of
future political alternatives. This optimism obtained, notwithstanding
the fact that Zanu PF had already signalled its intention to undermine
the opposition by any means necessary.
Since 2000,
the MDC has been subjected to a broad onslaught of state coercion
that has undermined any attempts to strengthen the legislature and
turn it into something more substantive than the president's plaything.
Unfortunately
any such lofty hopes have been comprehensively dispelled, along
with the once national aspiration that legislative power would be
secured within the framework of comprehensive constitutional reform.
The excitement
and sense of national involvement that drove this objective between
1998-2000 now seems like a distant memory, poisoned by the sour
grapes and authoritarian acrimony of a ruling party unaccustomed
to dissent.
That process
demonstrated the best sense of patriotic involvement that relied
for its success on tolerance, broadly based debate and the pre-eminent
requirement of consent, rather than the commandist thuggery of state
violence, and exclusive definitions of membership of the nation.
It is not only
the legislature that has been throttled by excessive executive authority.
Local government structures too have had to bear the undemocratic
interventions of a ruling party, determined to ensure that citizen
participation at this level is once again throttled by despotic
interventions.
Urbanites have
watched their representatives emasculated and their rights as citizens
reduced to that of "totemless" subjects. Local authorities are more
than ever run by an inefficient central government, through imposed
mayors, and an additional political structure known as an urban
governor, which is little more than an extra layer of political
patronage.
The recent Southern
African Development Community (Sadc) meeting in Mauritius, which
set out electoral principles and guidelines for the region, provides
a good opportunity for the Zimbabwean opposition to campaign for
more equal conditions for electoral contest.
The Sadc guidelines
provide for a broad range of conditions on electoral practices and
access to media as well to the public sphere generally. Such conditions
are for the most part not available in Zimbabwe at present, and
the electoral reforms proposed by the ruling party are not nearly
sufficient to meet the Sadc standards.
The opposition
will have to wait to see how much the proposed Zanu PF reforms will
be extended to include broader demands around the media and the
freedom to campaign without violence. The ruling party strategy
may well be to open up such spaces as late as possible, which will
then present the MDC with a dilemma.
For if such
conditions are met, even though late in the day, the process could
well receive the support of Sadc, as well as create some divisions
in the rest of the international community. In the event a late
opening of space would do little to undo the huge damage that has
already been to the electoral process.
Notwithstanding
these problems, the opposition needs to reflect critically on its
performance over the last four years. This will include its performance
in parliament, the state of its organisational structures, problems
of internal accountability, its choice of parliamentary and local
government candidates and its relations with its constituencies
and civic partners. It will also need to assess its regional and
international alliances and the often clumsy manner it has handled
its international relations.
Additionally
the MDC will need to consider its strategy after a boycott. Most
importantly it will need to offer a message of hope to its existing
and potential supporters, and provide a programme of action that
will look beyond the 2005 elections.
Most importantly
it will need to develop a broad range of political, economic, intellectual
and cultural processes that will build its popular support in both
urban and rural areas. This problem of developing alliances across
rural and urban spaces will need to be confronted more seriously,
as it is the key to building a more effective opposition. Broad
alliance politics is still the order of the day, but it must take
into account the complex struggles that are currently unfolding
over the ongoing land question.
These are huge
challenges to which all who are concerned with long-term democratic
changes must turn their attention.
*Brian Raftopoulos
is professor of development studies at Zids.
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