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Nation, History and Culture
Scholars have observed that the writing of history has often been used to - legitimate- the nation- state, both in an attempt to -naturalise- it as the central principle of political organisation, and to make it the -subject and object of historical development. (Berger, Donovan and Passmore 1999:xv)

In Zimbabwe there has been clear evidence of this process since 2000 in particular. Terence Ranger has recently tracked the emergence of this "Patriotic History", noting its narrowing focus, resentment of -disloyal- historical questions, antagonism towards academic history and its highly politically charged nature. (Ranger 2004: forthcoming.)

As part of the attempts to revive ZANU PF-s political fortunes in the 2000 general election and the 2002 Presidential election, the ruling party placed a strong emphasis on reviving the narrative of the liberation struggle in general and the heroic roles of ZANU PF and Mugabe in particular. An unbroken thread of struggle was woven incorporating the First Chimurenga of the 1890-s, the Second Chimurenga of the 1970-s and the Third Chimurenga of land occupations in the period from 2000 and beyond.

In the official history of the ruling party the transcendent feature of the three phases was the continuous nationalist struggle for sovereignty and dignity. From Ambuya Nehanda to Robert Mugabe and the national liberation movement the teleology of national consciousness unfolded with an ineluctable logic, contradicting the findings of the recent historiography on Zimbabwean nationalism. (Raftopoulos 1999.) This construction of a long and continuous past for the nation, even while confronting the challenges of modernity, is a common feature of nationalist movements. (Eley and Suny 1996.)

Additionally in rolling out this message the emergence of the MDC and the civic movement is viewed as an interruption and detour in the -legitimate- history of national liberation. Mugabe has been at the forefront of proclaiming the need to write -correct- history: "Measures will be taken to ensure that the History of Zimbabwe is rewritten and accurately told and recorded in order to reflect the events leading to the country-s nationhood and sovereignty. Furthermore Zimbabwean History will be made compulsory up to Form Four." (Mugabe 2001:65.)

This position was re-stated by the ZANU PF Secretary for External Affairs in April 2004, noting that the party had in the last few years introduced the teaching of history in the National Youth Service scheme, a euphemism for the ruling party youth militia. As Mutasa lamented: "We erroneously did not fan the fire of our nation and struggle for independence among our children. That fire almost went out as our children knew nothing of that invaluable history." (The Voice 25.04.04.)

In line with such pronouncements the ruling party has announced its intention to compile the profiles of the leaders and freedom fighters in the party for use in secondary schools, -and for general education of our people concerning the struggles of several generations of our people for their and their rights.- The Publications section of ZANU PF-s Information and Publicity Department has been tasked with producing such information through books, pamphlets and reports about the first, second and third Chimurenga. (ZANU PF 2003: 69.)

The government has also introduced a compulsory course, known as -National and Strategic Studies- at colleges and polytechnics. The content of the course, according to a recent account, is a highly selective history designed to glorify the ruling party. Recent exam questions have included:"Which political party represents the interests of imperialists and how must it be viewed by Zimbabweans?""African leaders who try to serve the interests of imperialists are called what and how do you view patriotism?" (Independent 26.03.04.)

The National Broadcaster, particularly in the year of the Presidential election in 2002, steadily churned out its version of African History, including such statements from a small group of commentators:Whites did not have a history. By the time we had civilisations whites were still in caves..The oldest excavations were found in Africa especially in South Africa and in geological times, you find that the centre of the universe was Africa. (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 7.)

These commentators have also stressed the continuities of Zimbabwean and African history, as well as making unproblematic links to black histories in the diaspora, in the service of the ruling party-s political project of a revived Pan Africanism. Mafeje has commented that the use of -Africanity- by some -modern black intellectuals- has become a -pervasive ontology that straddles space and time- and extends beyond continental Africans -to all Blacks of African descent in the diaspora.- (Mafeje 2000: 69.)

This is certainly the case in Zimbabwe where the ruling party and the intellectuals close to it have made both political and ideological links to a particular formulation of black history in the diaspora, with no attention to the historical and cultural disjunctions between the two. The showing of Alex Haley-s "Roots" in the run-up to the 2002 Presidential Election was a clear illustration of this attempted linkage. In turn this notion of a common African history is juxtaposed to a homogeneous conception of Whiteness.

In this narrative of liberation, a common African history and Pan Africanist solidarity, the land has played a determining role as the key marker of a common struggle. It has formed the centrepiece of the ruling party-s construction of belonging, exclusion and history. The official discourse on the liberation struggle has been marked by the translation of a multi-faceted anti-colonial struggle into a singular discourse designed to legitimate the authoritarian nationalism that has emerged around the land question since 2000. (Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen 2003.)

In Mugabe-s words: "We knew and still know that the land was the prime goal for King Lobengula as he fought British encroachment in 1893; we knew and still know that land was the principal grievance for our heroes of the First Chimurenga, led by Nehanda and Kaguvi. We knew and still know it to be the fundamental premise of the Second Chimurenga and thus a principal definer of the succeeding new Nation and State of Zimbabwe. Indeed we know it to be the core issue of the Third Chimurenga which you and me are fighting, and for which we continue to make such enormous sacrifices." ( Mugabe 2001: 92-3.)

During the 2002 Presidential election this liberation rhetoric was accompanied by a cultural programme that saturated the public with liberation war films, documentaries and dramas, promoting ZANU PF generally and Robert Mugabe in particular, while also carrying strong messages against whites. Music, coordinated by the Department of Information and Publicity, was produced in the form of the Third Chimurenga series of albums.

The songs regularly included an emphasis on the sharp racial delineations in the nation. For example the song Mwana Wevhu (Son of the Soil.) by Taurai Mteki intoned "the Country is ours/../Zimbabwe is for Black people." Another song by Comrade Chinx carried the same message: "They came from Britain, America. They do not know that the land is for Blacks and full of milk and honey." (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002:12.)

In these songs the -enemies of the people- were also warned, as in a song written by the then Minister of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation, Elliot Manyika: "There are some people who have become sell-outs/ because of their love of money/.inability to reason./ Take such people and teach them the ZANU PF dogma/ ZANU PF was born out of blood." (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 12.)

Amongst the most damaging aspects of the telling of this national narrative through a series of dualisms (black/white, British/Zimbabwean), and compressions of the various aspects of the anti-colonial struggle into a single field of force, has been the enormous loss of complexity of the colonial encounter. The complexity of the settler-colonial period (not least of which included the changing relations between the black elite and different settler regimes) has been flattened into a Mugabe/Blair colonial encounter. (White 2003:97.)

While the demonisation of Whites has served the needs of authoritarian nationalist politics in Zimbabwe, it has prevented a more creative, tolerant and difficult dialogue on the European influences in the making of Zimbabwean identities. For such a dialogue would not be conducive for the kind of Manichean diatribes on nation and race, that have in recent years constituted the standard fare of ZANU PF politics.

In Southern Africa, where the scars, memories and structural legacies of white supremacist politics are still very much alive, the politics of nationalism will for the foreseeable future, and of necessity, include the articulation racial redress, often referred to as "The National Question." The form that this will take however will in large part be determined by the broader terrain of democratic struggle in particular countries.

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