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Avoid secret political deals
Isaya Muriwo Sithole, Financial Gazette (Zimbabwe)
March 11 & 18, 2004

Isaya Muriwo Sithole is a Harare-based legal practitioner

Where there are several organisations or even individuals engaged in a struggle against a common enemy, there is bound to be a power struggle among them.

This is a fact and a principle of human and organisational dynamics.

In my last contribution a few weeks ago I promised to interpret the alleged attempt on Lovemore Madhuku's life from a historical perspective. In the past few days I have been inundated with calls from many of my readers who could not wait for the article.

But the unfortunate thing is that I lost my young brother Garikai (may his soul rest in peace) on February 16 and so I have been spending most of my time at my rural home in Birchenough Bridge.

In this rather lengthy contribution (my contributions are always lengthy anyway) I wish to draw parallels between our contemporary political situation in Zimbabwe and the situation that obtained during the liberation struggle from round about 1974.

The intention is to highlight the dynamics that were at play and try to draw lessons therefrom so that, as we wage our contemporary struggles, we don't repeat our past mistakes as a people.
Instead, we should draw greater inspiration, courage and strength to do good from our past mistakes and achievements. Our history should be our mwalimu.

By the middle of 1974, it had become clear that nationalist guerrilla pressure against the Ian Smith regime could neither be contained nor wished away indefinitely.

Further, the sudden collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa came as a nightmare to the Smith and John Vorster regimes, for the Mozambique border with Rhodesia and Angola's border with Namibia were now open to nationalist guerrillas. The balance of power was changing at a very fast pace.

Smith and Vorster realised that, under these changed political paradigms, it would enhance their fortune if they devised a formula that would yield a ceasefire.

So it was that Vorster set in motion a policy of détente, aimed at good neighbourliness with some independent African states to the north.

The intention was to arrest the revolution, " . . . at best, to silence guerrilla guns in Zimbabwe without Smith's yielding much to African demands . . . A major objective would be to forestall the possible use of Zimbabwe as a near base for liberation movements in Azania (South Africa)" [Rukudzo Murapa, The leadership struggle in Zimbabwe; background in first world, Jan/ Feb, 1977,pg 12]

It may enhance your understanding of this article if you take President Robert Mugabe to represent Smith, President Thabo Mbeki to represent Vorster and Mbeki's quiet diplomacy to represent Vorster's version of détente.

You may go further to equate the opposition and civil society to the nationalists in the period in question (that is if you are not charged with heresy by the minister of information) and the contemporary international community to the frontline states then.

Détente is a French word which means "relaxation of strained relations". In the southern African context it meant the relaxation of strained relations between white minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa and their African neighbours which came to be known as the frontline states because they were the ones closest to the spot of conflict.

These were countries which, because of geographical proximity, and for psychological and political reasons, were involved in efforts - diplomatic and / or military - to achieve majority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

After the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)'s "final push", some of us argued that it demonstrated that there is now a condominium or dual authority/presidency in this country, one wielding the power of coercion, while the other wields the power of moral and popular support. It was clear by June last year that the MDC could neither be contained nor wished away indefinitely.

It was at this time that we began to see the Mbeki taking serious steps to ensure that there was a negotiated settlement to the Zimbabwe crisis along the lines of his promise of quiet diplomacy which I have already said resembles Vorster's détente.

Kenneth Kaunda, then president of Zambia, responded positively to Vorster's feelers on détente. On October 26 1974, in a veiled invitation to Vorster, Kaunda offered his "good offices to anyone who wished to use them to pursue peaceful change in southern Africa".

This was a very dangerous time for Zimbabwean nationalists because a lot of hypocrisy and double-dealing characterised the whole détente policy, just like the Mbeki-style quiet diplomacy.
It was a time when the Zimbabwe liberation movements were divided and there was inter-party and intra- party rivalry. Efforts at unity were also underway.

Ken Flower, the director of the Rhodesian spy organisation, in his book Serving Secretly, notes that Kaunda was not sincere to the détente policy, just as he was to his philosophy of humanism.
You may want to say Mbeki is not sincere to his policy of quiet diplomacy as he is to the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the African Renaissance.

President Mugabe, in a digression from his written speech at the burial of Vice President Simon Muzenda late last year, described the détente policy as "a dangerous and treacherous scheme. At least we read it as such because we knew that what was meant to be détente was not believed to be such by the regime here . . . which continued to be oppressive, repressive and suppressive . . . detaining people, kidnapping them, some of whom we are still looking for to this day".

What is ironic is that, in spite of all domestic and international efforts to forge a negotiated settlement, ZANU PF, like the Rhodesian Front at that time, has shown itself to be averse to any such suggestions. The preconditions the party attaches for the resumption of dialogue amounts to a refusal, and if Mbeki's version of quite diplomacy seeks to bring the two parties to the table with the political legal and constitutional framework unchanged then it is not different in focus from Vorster's version of détente and we necessarily reject it. While I personally believe that the international community should now pursue quite diplomacy. I am not referring to president Mbeki's version of it because it lacks the basic and elementary tenets of natural justice.

There are a lot of dirty things that happened in our struggle for independence especially between 1974 and 1977. The struggle had reached its height and it was clear to both the nationalists and the Rhodesian Front that majority rule was imminent. It was a time when the Rhodesian Front was becoming progressively brutal using murderous tactic against political opponents, especially those nationalist leaders who were perceived as militant, obstructive, radical and/ or 'troublesome' and therefore an obstacle to the policy of détente.

At the same time nationalist leaders were also positioning themselves for positions in the post-independence Zimbabwe and as such there were also struggles among themselves which the enemy exploited along tribal and regional lines and every ideological and personal lines. There was also a temptation to nationalists to real clandestine political deals amongst themselves and with the enemy and thus endangering the life of and sometimes eliminating those who disagreed. This was a war and killing wasn't that much of a feat. President Mugabe, in the speech quoted above added that, 'the trajectory of our guns was political. We would not just shoot in vain, we would shoot to kill in order to achieve that objective and whoever stood in the way had to go.

So as it were the dynamics that were at play made life very dangerous for many nationalists such that when one 'went' you would never know precisely whether he was a victim of the struggle - within the struggle. The détente policy crystallised the situation and made it more complex. This the time when the code 'Sinjonjo tamba wakachenjera' became popular in ZANU.

It was a period so fraught dangers and contradictions. With president Mbeki and ZANU PF insisting that there are informal talks between the latter and the opposition, and the opposition itself denying it, there are various inferences is that there could be some leaders within the opposition who are making clandestine groupies/ factions and engaging in clandestine negotiations with ZANU PF. Those who are being sidelined because of their known view and convictions and by virtue of their marginalization from these deals they are left exposed to attacks from any angle, that is, they can be a victim of the struggle or of the struggle within the struggle (internal contradictions).

This must be looked at in the context that ZANUPY is becoming more oppressive, repressive and suppressive and it is targeting all those who are likely to obstruct an easy settlement with the opposition. It is against this background that the alleged attempt at DR Lovemore Madhuku's life should be understood. In 1975 the Rhodesian front was moving swiftly against those militant nationalists in the Zimbabwe liberation movements at a time when there was supposed to be détente and that is what made the situation dangerous.

Likewise a time when everyone is focusing on promoting talks, the Zimbabwean government is moving swiftly against political opponents perceived to be militant and therefore, obstacles, like Lovemore Madhuku and also in the manner that they are judiciary harassing Morgan Tsvangirai.

Tsvangirai's position is made even ore precarious and dangerous by internal contradictions within his party. He may be convicted for high treason and some of his colleagues may call it 'good riddance'. But then is this how we hope to achieve the objectives of the struggle? What with 'Nyarota' beans' reported on the front page of this paper's edition of January 29- February 2004, if its anything to go by ? And the acquittal of Tsvangirai's co-accused?

On 18th march 1975, Herbert Wiltshire Hamandishe Chicopee, the revolutionary chairperson of Dare reChimurenga, the ZANU 'politburo' at the time, was assassinated in Lusaka, Zambia and there are various theories explaining his death. He was in a situation in which Tsvangirai finds himself at the moment, that is, when the colonial regime had targeted him as a militant in order to pave the way for détente and at the same time some of his colleagues in the High command and dare wanted his head on a platter over the controversial surroundings the Nhari rebellion.

According to Ken Flower, in is book referred to above, a few days after Chitepo's death my uncle, Dr Edison Furatidzayi Chisingaitwi Sithole, a ZANU central committee member but then working as the information and publicity secretary for the enlarged ANC, and as legal and constitutional adviser for the then ANC President, Bishop Abel Muzorewa during the Smith- Muzorewa talks, declared in Salisbury that Chitepo's assassination had shattered all hopes of a negotiated settlement.

Ken flower specifically states that the Rhodesian Front did not like and was be coming impatient with Dr Sithole's militant and obstructive tactics and his general veteran leadership, which qualities particularly manifested themselves during the NO vote campaign against the constitutional proposals on the Pearce Commission in 1972. Inside the struggle he also hold his enemies. Finally on 15 |October 1975, in a more similar to what happened to Dr Madhuku, Dr Edison Sithole was abducted and bundled up into vehicle. That was the last that was seen of him and up to now his fate is still a mystery, perhaps the biggest political mystery in Zimbabwe in the past thirty years.

What is worrisome to us a s a family is that it took his colleagues in government fourteen years after independence to declare him a national hero, and further six years to install a representative grave at the national shrine. What is even more worrisome is that there are some among his colleagues who have decided to embark on a deliberate and systematic operation to suppress his achievements and what he stood for, but for us the bones that legacy and heritage continue.

I shall not dwell on the ascendancy of Robert Mugabe to the presidency of ZANU in 1975 in succession to Nbabaningi Sithole except that it was part of the struggle within the struggle, without of course being blind to the merits and demerits of both men. What is of interest to me for present purposes is the information of the Patriotic Front by the late Vice President Joshua Nkomo's ZANU and the President Mugabe led faction of ZANU in 1976.

In his book, 'Struggles- within- the Struggle' the late brilliant professor Masipula Sithole notes that after 1974 ZAPU was clearly divided ideologically between militants' and 'centrists' or moderates as they were called. (could this be the situation in the MDC at the moment?). The militant wing consisted of those who had led ZAPU in exile like Jason Ziyapapa Moyo, Edward Ndlovu and George T. Silundika. The centrists were mainly those ZAPU leaders who had been restricted at Gonakudzingwa like Josiah Chinamano, Joseph Msika, Willie Musarurwa and Mr Joshua Nkomo himself.

The former group was largely responsible for building up ZIPRA, the military wing of ZAPU and giving it a soviet orientation under the direction and leadership of Mr Jason Moyo. This group was well known for its persistent resistance to a united front with ZANU. For that reason they had formed a very troublesome group within ZAPU called Dengezi - the clay that fights unity'.

The later group was largely responsible for maintaining PCC/ ZAPU structures within Zimbabwe and it is this wing that was involved in the aborted controversial Smith- Nkomo talks 1976 against protestations from the ZAPU external wine which felt that unlimited talks with Smith were ill-advised and would further compromise the party's precarious image within the African population, which was responding more and more to militant political symbols.

After failure of the smith- Nkomo the external wing of ZAPU gained more relevance, while the internal wing become irrelevant because its mass support had dwindled. Mr Joshua Nkomo then left the country assume ZAPU leadership in exile from Jason Moyo. In light of the October - December 1976 Geneva Conference on Rhodesia Mugabe of ZANU formed what became known as the Zimbabwe patriotic Front. About a month after adjournment of the Geneva conference, Mr Jason Moyo was assassinated when a latter bomb exploded in his Lusaka office while Nkomo was away accompanying President Kaunda on a trip to West Africa.

Jason Mayo's death was attributed to what was described by both ZAPU and Patriotic Front as, 'enemy agents'. And in 1978 Mr Alfred Nikita Mangena, the ZAPU veteran Commander believed to have been very close to Mr JZ Moyo was killed in a landmine outside Lusaka. For both Moyo and Mangena some put it on struggles within the struggle (internal contradictions). You are free to arrive at your own informed conclusions.

In like manner, in contemporary Zimbabwean politics some of us are advocating for a popular front of the opposition civil society and other progressive elements in order to exert collaborative effort to pressure the ruling party and government to come to negotiating table.

This is a process and the temptation is to coerce those who resist without understanding why they have reservations and where possible addressing their pertinent concerns.

About a month ago, in a very commendable move, Mr Tsvangirai announced that his party had now forged an alliance with the NCA and the ZCTU and that future political action would not be carried out under single organisations. What is puzzling is that within a month of Mr Tsvangirai's announcement both the NCA and the ZCTU embarked on separate political actions as separate organisations. What is going on here? This seperatic and fragmented approach has proved to be futile and it is entrenching unnecessary struggles-within-the-struggle, not to mention the wastage of resources. We must avoid a situation where we will end up fighting amongst ourselves, as if that is the struggle.

The reality is that as the formation of a popular front against the establishment becomes increasingly inevitable, opposition and civic leaders and positioning themselves strategically for a higher bargain in the united front- the who is calling the shots thing. And that this time when the regime is using heavy- handed tactics against political opponents, one can be either a victim of the struggle or of the struggles within the struggle. Alternatively one can be a victim of the struggle and have no sympathy whatsoever from fellow comrades. These are things that we must avoid as a lesson drawn from inspirational history.

We have seen it before during our struggle for independence and if we have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing from our past mistakes then we will only have ourselves to blame for our ignorance. We must learn to persuade and not to coerce and even physically eliminate those who may hold opinions that differ from our own. Everything in the national interest must be done with a consensus - seeking spirit and we must avoid sealing clandestine political deals that will unnecessarily endanger the lives of fellow activists and analysts alike. There are a lot of sinister things that happened in the struggle between 1974 and 9177, which we must avoid at all costs in our contemporary struggles. Our history should be our rabbi.

On March 18 1975, Herbert Wiltshire Hamandishe Chitepo, the revolutionary chairperson of Dare reChimurenga, the ZANU "politburo" at the time, was assassinated in Lusaka, Zambia, and there are various theories explaining his death.

He was in a situation in which Tsvangirai finds himself at the moment, that is, when the colonial regime had targeted him as a militant in order to pave the way for détente. At the same time, some of his colleagues in the high command and Dare wanted his head on a platter over the controversies surroundings the Nhari rebellion.

According to Flower, in his book referred to above, a few days after Chitepo's death, my uncle, Edison Furatidzayi Chisingaitwi Sithole, a ZANU central committee member but then working as the information and publicity secretary for the enlarged ANC, and as legal and constitutional adviser for the then ANC president, Bishop Abel Muzorewa during the Smith- Muzorewa talks, declared in Salisbury that Chitepo's assassination had shattered all hopes of a negotiated settlement.

Flower specifically states that the Rhodesian Front did not like and was becoming impatient with Sithole's militant and obstructive tactics and his general veteran leadership, which qualities particularly manifested themselves during the "NO" vote campaign against the constitutional proposals of the Pearce Commission in 1972. Inside the struggle he also had his enemies.

Finally, on October 15 1975, in a move similar to what happened to Madhuku, Sithole was abducted and bundled into a vehicle. That was the last that was seen of him and up to now his fate is still a mystery, perhaps the biggest political mystery in Zimbabwe in the past 30 years.

What is worrisome to us as a family is that it took his colleagues in government 14 years after independence to declare him a national hero, and a further six years to install a representative grave at the national shrine.

What is even more worrisome is that there are some among his colleagues who have decided to embark on a deliberate and systematic operation to suppress his achievements and what he stood for. But for us ,the "bones" of that legacy and heritage continue.

I shall not dwell on the ascendancy of Mugabe to the presidency of ZANU in 1975 in succession to Nbabaningi Sithole except that it was part of the struggle within the struggle without, of course, being blind to the merits and demerits of both men.

What is of interest to me for present purposes is the formation of the Patriotic Front by the late vice president Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU and the Mugabe-led faction of ZANU in 1976.

In his book, Struggles- within- the Struggle, the late brilliant professor Masipula Sithole notes that, after 1974, ZAPU was clearly divided ideologically between "militants" and "centrists", or moderates as they were called. (Could this be the situation in the MDC at the moment?)

The militant wing consisted of those who had led ZAPU in exile, like Jason Ziyapapa Moyo, Edward Ndlovu and George T Silundika. The centrists were mainly those ZAPU leaders who had been restricted at Gonakudzingwa, like Josiah Chinamano, Joseph Msika, Willie Musarurwa and Nkomo himself.

The former group was largely responsible for building up ZIPRA, the military wing of ZAPU, and giving it a Soviet orientation under the direction and leadership of Moyo. This group was well known for its persistent resistance to a united front with ZANU. For that reason, it had formed a very troublesome group within ZAPU called Dengezi - "the clay that fights unity".

The latter group was largely responsible for maintaining PCC/ ZAPU structures within Zimbabwe and it is this wing that was involved in the aborted controversial Smith- Nkomo talks in 1976 against protestations from the ZAPU external wing which felt that unilateral talks with Smith were ill-advised and would further compromise the party's precarious image within the African population, which was responding more and more to militant political symbols.

After the failure of the Smith-Nkomo talks, the external wing of ZAPU gained more relevance, while the internal wing became irrelevant because its mass support had dwindled. Nkomo then left the country to assume ZAPU leadership in exile from Moyo.

In light of the October- December 1976 Geneva Conference on Rhodesia, Mugabe of ZANU and Nkomo of ZAPU formed what became known as the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front. About a month after adjournment of the Geneva Conference, Moyo was assassinated when a letter bomb exploded in his Lusaka office while Nkomo was away accompanying Kaunda on a trip to west Africa.

Moyo's death was attributed to what was described by both ZAPU and the Patriotic Front as "enemy agents".

In 1978, Alfred Nikita Mangena, the ZAPU veteran commander, believed to have been very close to JZ Moyo, was killed in a landmine blast outside Lusaka. For both Moyo and Mangena, some put the blame on the struggle (enemy agents), while others put it on struggles within the struggle (internal contradictions). You are free to arrive at your own informed conclusions.

In like manner, in contemporary Zimbabwean politics, some of us are advocating a popular front of the opposition, civil society and other progressive elements to exert collaborative effort to pressure the ruling party and government to come to the negotiating table.

This is a process and the temptation is to coerce those who resist without understanding why they have reservations and where possible addressing their pertinent concerns.

About a month ago, in a very commendable move, Tsvangirai announced that his party had now forged an alliance with the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and that future political action would not be carried out under single organisations. What is puzzling is that within a month of Tsvangirai's announcement, both the NCA and the ZCTU embarked on separate political actions as separate organisations. What is going on here?

This separatist and fragmented approach has proved to be futile and it is entrenching unnecessary struggles-within-the-struggle, not to mention the wastage of resources. We must avoid a situation where we will end up fighting among ourselves, as if that is the struggle.

The reality is that as the formation of a popular front against the establishment becomes increasingly inevitable, opposition and civic leaders are positioning themselves strategically for a higher bargain in the united front - the who-is-calling-the-shots thing. And at this time when the regime is using heavy- handed tactics against political opponents, one can be either a victim of the struggle or of the struggles within the struggle. Alternatively, one can be a victim of the struggle and have no sympathy whatsoever from fellow comrades.

These are things that we must avoid as a lesson drawn from an inspirational history.

We have seen it before during our struggle for independence and if we have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing from our past mistakes then we will only have ourselves to blame. We must learn to persuade and not to coerce and even sometimes physically eliminate those who may hold opinions that differ from our own.

Everything in the national interest must be done with a consensus-seeking spirit and we must avoid sealing clandestine political deals that will unnecessarily endanger the lives of fellow activists and analysts alike.

There are a lot of sinister things that happened in the struggle between 1974 and 1977 which we must avoid at all costs in our contemporary struggles. Our history should be our rabbi.

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