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Does the velvet revolution in Georgia have any lessons for Zimbabwe?
By Ivor Jenkins, Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) Kutlwanong Democracy Centre
Published in Beeld, December 04, 2003 (translated from the Afrikaans)

The events in Georgia may seem rather remote from Zimbabwe, but, like Serbia before it, there seem some obvious similarities. An authoritarian ruler loses the confidence of his nation in the midst of economic decline and massive corruption, and is deposed following allegations of electoral fraud.

What made it possible for this "Velvet Revolution" to take place peacefully? Why did Shevardnadze opt to give up power, rather than move his troops into Freedom Square and violently restore order? There are several reasons.

Firstly, the broad based support in the population for opposition leaders and the fact that the Georgian people wanted Shevardnadze to go meant that Shevadnadze had little popular support.
Despite unsuccessful efforts by the government to shut down Georgia's independent television station, which is highly critical of the government, the country's media has held onto its independence, providing a major outlet for people to understand what is happening in the country. Beyond that, Georgia's highly literate and nationalistic people follow the news closely, engaging in lively political debate about the issues.

Secondly, is the fact that the Shevardnadze's support base within the government itself had been so significantly eroded that he had few places to look for help by the time protestors took over the Georgian Parliament. When it finally came down to a decision whether to use force the President also found that the security infrastructure had abandoned him, with military forces siding with the opposition.

Thirdly, while certainly guilty of misrule, Shevardnadze cannot be accused of having committed serious atrocities against his people. These relatively clean hands made it possible for him to step down without serious fear of reprisal. Indeed, such fears would have been justifiably created, had he decided to violently put down the opposition. As it stands, however, and especially because of Shevardnadze's international stature for helping end the cold war, it was politically feasible for his opponents to offer amnesty and promise him safety within the country.

Fourthly, and very importantly, the governments of the US and Russia supported and facilitated the transition. This was demonstrated by the presence of Russian foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, at Shevardnadze's resignation and Colin Powell's constant communication with both sides. Indeed, it appears that signals from these outside powers gave additional encouragement to opposition leaders while barring the president from holding on to power.

The presence of this outside support for a transition is particularly significant, given that Shevardnadze has always been a favorite of the US and that Russia in the last few weeks been able to extend more influence than previously possible over the embattled President. The reason is that both countries, for economic and geopolitical reasons have a strong interest in stability within Georgia as key to maintaining order within the region. They recognized that propping up a failed and unpopular leader, supporting his transition into a fully fledged dictator, would do less to serve long-term stability than pushing for a peaceful democratic transition.

Immediately the similarities and differences with Zimbabwe can be seen. A discredited leader, severe economic decline, massive corruption amidst a favoured elite, electoral fraud, and the loss of international allies are all familiar in the Zimbabwe case. Missing however from Georgia is the repression and violence so prevalent in Zimbabwe: repressive legislation, violence and torture against all opposition groups, the absence of independent broadcasting, and the shutting down of the national press. Possibly even more important a difference between Zimbabwe and Georgia is a lack of international consensus about Zimbabwe, and, worse than this, large divisions between African and Southern African countries and the rest of the international community.

South Africa here has a key role, very similar to that of Russia. South Africa, like Russia with Georgia, is able to wield considerable leverage over Zimbabwe. Georgia imported virtually all of its fuel and gas from Russia, and this could have been used to persuade Shevadnadze to leave. However, blunt economic action may have been unnecessary in a situation where unanimity amongst all Georgia's allies could do the trick. With massive internal rejection and a clear lack of external support, there was really no option for Russia but to discontinue its support for Shevadnadze.

Furthermore, it does seem that the declining lack of external support created the space in which Georgians were able to resolve their domestic crisis themselves, and this is always a hopeful sign for the growth of democracy in a country. Few will doubt that Georgia has a more optimistic future than Iraq, at least in the short-term!

The options are not the same for managing Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe and ZanuPF! Firstly, unlike Shevadnadze, there are very credible allegations about Mugabe's responsibility as President for gross human rights violations, and, possibly even worse, his direct involvement in the organized violence and torture in two different decades. Secondly, there are the allegations over the involvement of the ZanuPF elite in massive corruption and asset stripping: like Georgia, Zimbabwe gets a highly unfavourable rating from Transparency International.

Thirdly, Mugabe and ZanuPF still command a modicum of respect amongst African and Southern African states: the major players are certainly not publicly showing any discontent with the Mugabe regime, and showed no discontent at all over a deeply-flawed series of elections. Whilst the South African observers detailed all the flaws, this was not the conclusion reached by the government. Indeed, the conclusions of the regional governments, Botswana excepted, were in marked contradiction to the conclusions of most reputable observer groups, including the SADC Parliamentary Forum. Does the Georgia example now show the region that there was an opportunity lost in March 2002?

Thus, if we compare the positions of Russia and South Africa with Georgia and Zimbabwe respectively, the differences are patent. Within the bounds of diplomacy, and despite having originally validated the election, Russia creates the pressure that forces Shevadnadze to abdicate, and thus ends the possibility of another civil war or prolonged confusion. This positive response does not proscribe the future, and allows Georgia the chance to resolve the crisis and move forwards. The Russian strategy does not guarantee success, but it does avoid unnecessary conflict and suffering.

So perhaps the lesson for South Africa is that diplomacy is usually quiet, but that effective diplomacy means making positive choices. And, since South Africa frequently states that the Zimbabwe crisis must be solved by Zimbabweans, perhaps South Africa can see in the Georgian case that there are ways to facilitate Zimbabwean solutions by Zimbabweans.

The best options will lie in creating conditions for Zimbabweans to manage their own destiny, and here there can be no substitute for demanding the open space that political parties and civics need for peaceful, democratic action. Velvet revolutions after all are preferable to violent ones, and negotiated transitions are better than velvet revolutions.

Ivor Jenkins is director of the Institute for Democracy in SA's Kutlowong Democracy Centre in Pretoria.

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