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What alternative to violence?
Ivor Jenkins, (Business Day 1st Edition)
November 19, 2003

Jenkins is director of the Institute for Democracy in SA's Kutlowong Democracy Centre in Pretoria.

Each day Zimbabwe lurches further towards disaster, with the world seemingly unable to prevent this from happening. The apparent stalemate in the political problem-solving process in Zimbabwe is matched by the stalemate between opposing international interests. SA probably has the greatest reason for a strong interest in solving the crisis. After all, SA will be the first port of call for many Zimbabweans when the state finally fails.

SA has assumed international leadership on the Zimbabwean crisis, but it is difficult to see the positive effect of this leadership. Public space has closed further with the shutting down of the Daily News and the arrest of Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions leaders for protesting against the deterioration in the economic climate. These events provoked strong comment from the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), and even threats of solidarity action by Cosatu. But the South African government remained apparently silent, even though these events suggest an increase rather than a decrease in political repression, and hardly indicate an opening of the space for dialogue.
President Thabo Mbeki and government assure the world that talking is going on, but these preliminary contacts are deadlocked in very fundamental ways. It is hardly promising that stringent preconditions are no nearer resolution, but this is the reality no matter what the South African government says.

Meanwhile the economic and social fabric continues to decline at an alarming pace, and the spectre of famine looms large. A failed state and all the consequences become an increasingly probable reality for Zimbabwe. And if Zimbabwe collapses, southern Africa will be harmed. Repression in this context leads to despair and anger. As opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) spokesperson Paul Temba Nyathi pointed out when commenting on the launch of the Zimbabwe Freedom Movement a new revolutionary group violence becomes an option when all other avenues are closed.

This new development the emergence of a political group committed to the use of violence cannot be a surprise to South Africans, and brings back memories of the early 1960s. Umkhonto we Sizwe and the African Resistance Movement emerged where all normal democratic discourse was closed. It provoked much the same reaction among informed commentators at the time: while repudiating the use of violence, and objecting to the violence of the South African state, most warned that this would be the way of the future if change did not occur.

This is the implication of the MDC commentary, and has been the frequent comment of many Zimbabwean civic leaders over the past three years. In SA, the failure of the apartheid state to address the legitimate demands of ordinary citizens and the thwarting of normal peaceful action led to a long and violent process, and eventually to "mutually hurting stalemate". The recourse to violence, however justified, allowed the UK and the US to maintain a "neutral" position that supported the status quo. This lengthened both the political problems and the violence, and SA was caught in a vicious cycle of repression and armed resistance for two more decades.

Here, the push for dialogue was the final answer to the stalemate. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) statement issued in 1989 set down the framework while the Institute for Democracy in SA and other South African groupings created a second track, bringing South Africans together in a confidence-building process. Through meetings, most notably in Dakar and Lusaka, confidence was built between the rivals at war, and formal talks were able to draw resources, support and inspiration from these unofficial contacts.

It is dangerous to push analogies between SA and Zimbabwe too far. External events such as the collapse of the Soviet bloc were very influential. The near-universal consensus on the need for change in SA was a crucial factor, too, in forcing dialogue. Regrettably, it is not clear that anything approaching this consensus is present in Zimbabwe's case.

What then might be the way forward? The launch of a campaign prepared to use violence to produce change must trigger a strong demand for free political activity. As was true of SA and the armed struggle, the Zimbabwe Freedom Movement is an inevitable product of the Zimbabwean government's repression.

While there should be calls for all to repudiate violence, these should be allied explicitly to demands that "open space" is created. This means that normal democratic activity and processes should be allowed by the Zimbabwean government. A free press, the right to peaceful protest, demobilisation of militia forces and an absolute end to partisan use of state resources are essential.

However, since a lasting solution is needed, the demands must go further than merely the creation of open space: unconditional dialogue must take place. An inclusive process of dialogue leading to constitutional, electoral and economic reform, must be the final way forward.

The South African government cannot shirk its responsibility. Peace-loving and democratic Zimbabweans are reaching the end of their tether, and a peaceful domestic solution is slipping away from them. If SA does not take decisive action to support these Zimbabweans, there are only two likely outcomes. A further descent into darkness, with the balaclavaclad Zimbabwe Freedom Movement reaching towards centre stage.

Or, in the memorable words of Oliver Tambo to the OAU in 1989: "There is likely to be a competition of solutions by forces that are rightly concerned and would like to see a solution. In the process, unless Africa comes in with a solution, with a plan, it might be marginalised and forced in the end to participate in plans no doubt in good faith by others, which might not necessarily suit the African interest."

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