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This article participates on the following special index pages:

  • Talks, dialogue, negotiations and GNU - Post June 2008 "elections" - Index of articles


  • State media potraying MDC members in bad light
    Extracted from Media Update 27/2008
    Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ)
    September 19, 2008

    The government media made very little attempt to apprise their audiences of the implications of the power-sharing agreement finally reached on Thursday September 11th, by ZANU PF and the two MDC formations following seven weeks of intense negotiations.

    The parties' leaders formally signed the accord four days later on September 15th, witnessed by the SADC-appointed broker to the talks, South African President Thabo Mbeki, and other regional leaders. These media did not examine the structure, practicality and other related workings of the power-sharing deal. For example, Spot FM (12/9, 8am) merely announced that a "deal was in place" without providing details on how power would be shared among the protagonist parties and whether the agreement could withstand the strain, given their long-running background of animosity and mistrust.

    Similarly, The Herald and Chronicle (12/9) reports: "Deal At Last" and "A deal at long last!" respectively celebrated the reaching of the agreement without volunteering key information on issues agreed on.

    Earlier, ZTV and Spot FM (11/9, 8pm) failed to reconcile President Mugabe's irritation at the progress of the talks at a chiefs meeting in Bulawayo, vowing "not to accept a power sharing agreement which is being advocated by Britain and her allies" with his eventual endorsement of the pact later that night.

    Spot FM cited him saying that although ZANU PF was committed to the talks, "it is not ready to agree to a power transfer deal that the MDC is gunning for" while ZTV reported Mugabe presenting the MDC as an organization "sponsored by Britain and the USA, whose agenda is regime change in the country". The TV station quoted Mugabe saying: "They say 'Mugabe must go' but they do not say where he must go . . . The British must go out of our country . . . "

    Otherwise, the government media's reports were piecemeal, concentrating on highlighting Zimbabweans' expectations that the deal would bring to an end Zimbabwe's prolonged economic crisis without backing this up with any intelligent analysis of the matter. For example, The Herald (13/9) reported "ordinary Zimbabweans, political parties, analysts, church leaders, captains of industry, trade unions, the UN and the EU" as having "hailed" the agreement.

    It passively cited former business leader Marah Hativagone and ordinary Zimbabweans saying the deal would resuscitate the country's economy without clearly showing how. It also reported "thousands" of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora as having "immediately welcomed the deal with enthusiasm" and were considering returning home "once the new political dispensation starts to take effect".

    In this light, the paper suppressed reservations by some sections of the international community on the accord, including the EU, which it cursorily reported as having "expressed cautious optimism" because it "wants to see how the agreement plays out".

    Ironically, the government papers continued to violate the spirit of tolerance and unity symbolised by the agreement by chiefly using its editorial columns as propagators of inflammatory and intolerant rhetoric against the MDC, depicting it as being treacherous and a puppet of the West.

    For example, Herald columnist Nathaniel Manheru (13/9) urged ZANU PF to "learn to govern in a new environment where the enemy is now within, well embedded" in reference to the MDC's inclusion in the new coalition government. Said Manheru: "The West will now have an eager listening post, right up to Cabinet. There will be lots of policy pre-emption. Part of government will be mortgaged".

    The Sunday Mail columnist, Tafataona Mahoso, (14/9) followed suit. He accused Tsvangirai of being a "habitual liar" for allegedly "denying that the sanctions he asked for has had devastating effects" on the economy.

    Mahoso depicted the MDC leader as worse than the Biblical prodigal son because he "does not return to demand a post higher than that of his elder brother . . . who secured, tendered and defended the independence and sovereignty of the home throughout all the years the prodigal son spent demonizing his family in foreign capitals!"

    In fact, on the eve of the power-sharing agreement The Herald (11/9) depicted Tsvangirai as bent on handing the country back to former colonizers by appointing former Rhodesian senior army chief, Retired Colonel Lionel Dyck, as head of the Zimbabwe National Army once he became prime minister in the inclusive government.

    The report cited 'anonymous sources' alleging that Tsvangirai's intention demonstrated that he was not only "negotiating in bad faith" but "remains implacably wedded to the interests that seek to reduce Mugabe to a ceremonial leader", which "is obnoxious here". No comment was sought from the MDC leader. The stories formed part of the 142 that the official media carried on the subject.

    Incisive coverage on the import of the power-sharing deal only appeared in the private media, which highlighted the organization, roles and power allocation in the expected coalition government, among other salient points.

    They carried 76 reports on the matter. For example, the private media reported that by signing the power-sharing deal with Tsvangirai and leader of a splinter opposition faction led by Arthur Mutambara, Mugabe had ceded some of his executive powers for the first time in 28 years.

    They noted that the new proposal struck a delicate balance of power under which Mugabe would control the state while Tsvangirai, as prime minister, would be fully responsible for government but in consultation with the ZANU PF leader.

    Further, under the accord, Mugabe would chair the Cabinet and the proposed National Security Council - which includes the army, police and secret services - while Tsvangirai would preside over a Council of Ministers and act as deputy chairperson to Cabinet.

    Executive authority would be shared among the president, the prime minister and the Cabinet as laid out in an amended constitution, while ZANU PF would get 15 Cabinet posts, the main formation of the MDC 13 and its splinter faction three. For example, ZimOnline (13/9) reported a source 'involved in the power-sharing talks' claiming that the idea was to "try and take away from Mugabe some of his presently overwhelming powers and place them in the hands of the prime minister such that you would end up with an almost even distribution of authority between the office of president and that of prime minister".

    The private media analysed the adequacy of the agreement in resolving the country's crisis and recorded a cross-section of Zimbabweans, regional and international groups expressing mixed feelings on the matter.

    Although these generally expressed cautious optimism that the agreement would pave the way for an end to the economic meltdown, others expressed reservations about the viability of the deal.

    The Zimbabwe Independent (12/9), for example, quoted analyst Martin Rupiya saying: "I do not think we are out of the woods yet . . . There are a number of pieces that still have to fall into place. One is the role of the military [and the other is] violence. The infrastructure for state-sponsored violence is still in place . . . "

    The private media also presented foreign observers as maintaining a wait-and-see attitude, citing the danger of the deal falling apart. It was against this backdrop that The Standard (14/9) reported the EU as saying it needed to "study" the document before deciding whether to release economic aid to the country and lift sanctions against Mugabe and his cronies. However, it reported the body emphasizing that even though Zimbabwe's political parties had reached an agreement that did not "exonerate those who were guilty of committing violence".

    Figs 1 to 2 show the voice sourcing patterns in the public and private electronic media.

    Fig 1: Voice distribution in the official papers

    Govt ZANU PF MDC Other parties Bus Alt Foreign Diplomats Judiciary Leaders Ord. People Unnamed
    8
    15
    26
    4
    1
    10
    22
    4
    8
    16
    3

    Fig 2: Voice distribution in the private electronic media

    Govt ZANU PF MDC Alternative Foreign Diplomats Ordinary People Unnamed
    1
    14
    24
    23
    16
    7
    8

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