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This article participates on the following special index pages:
Talks, dialogue, negotiations and GNU - Post June 2008 "elections" - Index of articles
State media potraying MDC members in bad light
Extracted from Media Update 27/2008
Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ)
September 19, 2008
The government
media made very little attempt to apprise their audiences of the
implications of the power-sharing agreement
finally reached on Thursday September 11th, by ZANU PF and the two
MDC formations following seven weeks of intense negotiations.
The parties' leaders
formally signed the accord four days later on September 15th, witnessed
by the SADC-appointed broker to the talks, South African President
Thabo Mbeki, and other regional leaders. These media did not examine
the structure, practicality and other related workings of the power-sharing
deal. For example, Spot FM (12/9, 8am) merely announced that a "deal
was in place" without providing details on how power would
be shared among the protagonist parties and whether the agreement
could withstand the strain, given their long-running background
of animosity and mistrust.
Similarly, The Herald
and Chronicle (12/9) reports: "Deal At Last" and "A
deal at long last!" respectively celebrated the reaching of
the agreement without volunteering key information on issues agreed
on.
Earlier, ZTV and Spot
FM (11/9, 8pm) failed to reconcile President Mugabe's irritation
at the progress of the talks at a chiefs meeting in Bulawayo, vowing
"not to accept a power sharing agreement which is being advocated
by Britain and her allies" with his eventual endorsement of
the pact later that night.
Spot FM cited
him saying that although ZANU PF was committed to the talks, "it
is not ready to agree to a power transfer deal that the MDC is gunning
for" while ZTV reported Mugabe presenting the MDC as an organization
"sponsored by Britain and the USA, whose agenda is regime
change in the country".
The TV station quoted Mugabe saying: "They say 'Mugabe
must go' but they do not say where he must go . . . The British
must go out of our country . . . "
Otherwise, the government
media's reports were piecemeal, concentrating on highlighting
Zimbabweans' expectations that the deal would bring to an
end Zimbabwe's prolonged economic crisis without backing this
up with any intelligent analysis of the matter. For example, The
Herald (13/9) reported "ordinary Zimbabweans, political parties,
analysts, church leaders, captains of industry, trade unions, the
UN and the EU" as having "hailed" the agreement.
It passively cited former
business leader Marah Hativagone and ordinary Zimbabweans saying
the deal would resuscitate the country's economy without clearly
showing how. It also reported "thousands" of Zimbabweans
in the Diaspora as having "immediately welcomed the deal with
enthusiasm" and were considering returning home "once
the new political dispensation starts to take effect".
In this light,
the paper suppressed reservations by some sections of the international
community on the accord, including the EU, which it cursorily reported
as having "expressed cautious optimism" because it "wants
to see how the agreement plays out".
Ironically, the government papers continued to violate the spirit
of tolerance and unity symbolised by the agreement by chiefly using
its editorial columns as propagators of inflammatory and intolerant
rhetoric against the MDC, depicting it as being treacherous and
a puppet of the West.
For example, Herald columnist
Nathaniel Manheru (13/9) urged ZANU PF to "learn to govern
in a new environment where the enemy is now within, well embedded"
in reference to the MDC's inclusion in the new coalition government.
Said Manheru: "The West will now have an eager listening post,
right up to Cabinet. There will be lots of policy pre-emption. Part
of government will be mortgaged".
The Sunday Mail columnist,
Tafataona Mahoso, (14/9) followed suit. He accused Tsvangirai of
being a "habitual liar" for allegedly "denying
that the sanctions he asked for has had devastating effects"
on the economy.
Mahoso depicted the MDC
leader as worse than the Biblical prodigal son because he "does
not return to demand a post higher than that of his elder brother . . . who
secured, tendered and defended the independence and sovereignty
of the home throughout all the years the prodigal son spent demonizing
his family in foreign capitals!"
In fact, on the eve of
the power-sharing agreement The Herald (11/9) depicted Tsvangirai
as bent on handing the country back to former colonizers by appointing
former Rhodesian senior army chief, Retired Colonel Lionel Dyck,
as head of the Zimbabwe National Army once he became prime minister
in the inclusive government.
The report cited 'anonymous
sources' alleging that Tsvangirai's intention demonstrated
that he was not only "negotiating in bad faith" but
"remains implacably wedded to the interests that seek to reduce
Mugabe to a ceremonial leader", which "is obnoxious
here". No comment was sought from the MDC leader. The stories
formed part of the 142 that the official media carried on the subject.
Incisive coverage on
the import of the power-sharing deal only appeared in the private
media, which highlighted the organization, roles and power allocation
in the expected coalition government, among other salient points.
They carried 76 reports
on the matter. For example, the private media reported that by signing
the power-sharing deal with Tsvangirai and leader of a splinter
opposition faction led by Arthur Mutambara, Mugabe had ceded some
of his executive powers for the first time in 28 years.
They noted that the new
proposal struck a delicate balance of power under which Mugabe would
control the state while Tsvangirai, as prime minister, would be
fully responsible for government but in consultation with the ZANU
PF leader.
Further, under the accord,
Mugabe would chair the Cabinet and the proposed National Security
Council - which includes the army, police and secret services
- while Tsvangirai would preside over a Council of Ministers
and act as deputy chairperson to Cabinet.
Executive authority would
be shared among the president, the prime minister and the Cabinet
as laid out in an amended constitution, while ZANU PF would get
15 Cabinet posts, the main formation of the MDC 13 and its splinter
faction three. For example, ZimOnline (13/9) reported a source 'involved
in the power-sharing talks' claiming that the idea was to
"try and take away from Mugabe some of his presently overwhelming
powers and place them in the hands of the prime minister such that
you would end up with an almost even distribution of authority between
the office of president and that of prime minister".
The private media analysed
the adequacy of the agreement in resolving the country's crisis
and recorded a cross-section of Zimbabweans, regional and international
groups expressing mixed feelings on the matter.
Although these generally
expressed cautious optimism that the agreement would pave the way
for an end to the economic meltdown, others expressed reservations
about the viability of the deal.
The Zimbabwe Independent
(12/9), for example, quoted analyst Martin Rupiya saying: "I
do not think we are out of the woods yet . . . There are a number
of pieces that still have to fall into place. One is the role of
the military [and the other is] violence. The infrastructure for
state-sponsored violence is still in place . . . "
The private media also
presented foreign observers as maintaining a wait-and-see attitude,
citing the danger of the deal falling apart. It was against this
backdrop that The Standard (14/9) reported the EU as saying it needed
to "study" the document before deciding whether to release
economic aid to the country and lift sanctions against Mugabe and
his cronies. However, it reported the body emphasizing that even
though Zimbabwe's political parties had reached an agreement
that did not "exonerate those who were guilty of committing
violence".
Figs 1 to 2
show the voice sourcing patterns in the public and private electronic
media.
Fig
1: Voice distribution in the official papers
| Govt |
ZANU PF |
MDC |
Other parties |
Bus |
Alt |
Foreign
Diplomats |
Judiciary |
Leaders |
Ord.
People |
Unnamed |
8 |
15 |
26 |
4 |
1 |
10 |
22 |
4 |
8 |
16 |
3 |
Fig
2: Voice distribution in the private electronic media
| Govt |
ZANU PF |
MDC |
Alternative |
Foreign
Diplomats |
Ordinary
People |
Unnamed |
1 |
14 |
24 |
23 |
16 |
7 |
8 |
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